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ABSTRACT
This research project comprises an interwoven, overlapping body of artistic interventions and 
multiple forms of writing. Drawing on Virno and others, it addresses and theorises the 
‘technosphere’: a would-be totalising, statically reproducing structure of perpetuating 
inequality, through which contemporary existence occurs.  Pivotal within the technosphere are 1
textualised processes of proprietorial individuation and de-humanising abstraction.  
In response to this, I propose an original concept of ‘radical care’. Augmenting the established 
discourse of ‘critical care’ introduced by Puig de la Bellacasa and others, radical care is 
developed as an ethical-methodological framework by which resistance within the immediate, 
visceral conditions of ‘being’ is connected with the speculative, forward-flung possibility of 
holding thinkable foreclosed futures.  This is the principal original contribution to knowledge 2
made by this research project. Combining a careful considered-ness and self-reflexivity with the 
intermittent need to act unknowingly and ‘carelessly’, radical care holds these facets together as 
mutually essential to one another, rather than opposing them.     
Radical care is both manifested and articulated through practice. In a further original 
contribution, as a method by which it might do so through artistic practice, I propose ‘embodied 
flattened allegorical montage’ (a development of Buchloh’s concept of ‘allegorical montage’).  In 3
seeking and then seeking to practice radical care, ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ 
emphasises a holding together of site, context, affect, situated economies of circulation, process, 
dissemination and potential encounter with audience as a fragmentary, de-centred, fluid, 
porous artistic intervention. It does this following Barthes’ argument to shift our thinking of the 
‘artwork’ from work to text, and in so doing reopen playfulness and process.  These texts are 4
subversively and disruptively intersected into the technosphere’s own. Radical care has been 
refined, conceptualised and made disseminable through the process of these artistic 
interventions in which it is practiced.
In reflection of the inescapability of the technosphere, my ‘being’ (in its specific positionality, 
vulnerability and agency) is entangled through the entirety of this project. ‘Being’, in reflexive 
parallel with practice and theorising, is acknowledged as a vital co-equal strand of research. The 
articulation and practicing of ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and being’ forms the third 
thread of this project’s enmeshed core contributions. Asserting a value in ‘being’ contests its 
technospheric exploitation. Ultimately, through the embodiment of a practice of radical care, 
this project opens a path whereby more equal ways of being become, momentarily at least, 
possible.  
 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For An Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. by 1
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2004).
 Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds 2
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).
 Benjamin Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary 3
Art’, Artforum, 21:1 (1982), 43-56.
 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ [1971], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 4
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Notes for the reader
There is a significant degree of reflexive circularity to this research project. In addition 
to the ‘content’ of the arguments presented, this includes a reflexive engagement 
within itself with the project’s form of presentation, the encounter with a reader which 
is initiated, and with its own, and its author’s, positionality. 
One result of this reflexivity is that there are extensive meta-commentaries upon the 
text itself. The text is tended, re-visited, cared for. Some of these attendings and 
attentions have manifested as footnotes, though should not be viewed as ‘lesser’ or 
‘secondary’ owing to this positioning. Such positioning is, rather, a means of holding 
legible the central thread of argument, while not falsely erasing these notes of care. The 
text and its arguments continue to shift through these marks of event-encounter. It is 
not static. 
The word count of this PhD (77,475 words across Lexis and Praxis) has not been 
discretely segmented out into ‘thesis’, ‘appendices and footnotes’ and ‘practice’.  This 5
conscious choice reflects the co-equal positioning and vital interrelating of differing 
forms of text, be they arttexts of varyingly literal textual form, or theorising and 
reflection conveyed through more conventional academic writing. To segment these 
apart would reassert the divisions and hierarchies I will go on to refute, and would 
echo the technosphere’s own premise of a singular abstract textual totality, to which 
any other forms are rendered subject. More generally, text can be an artistic medium, 
while writing a theoretical text involves artistry. As will become apparent in this 
 However, in line with regulations, the Bibliography and front matter are excluded from this 5
figure.
8
research project, there is a blurred distinction. To oppose the two, in authorship or 
readership, limits the potential of their productive, co-equal interweaving.
——
I have not included a List of figures here within Lexis, as there is only one diagram.  The 6
accompanying Praxis, in contrast, contains extensive visual documentation of the eight 
artworks which sit within this research project, and therefore a full List of figures can be 
found in its opening pages.  The relationship between Lexis and Praxis, and a 7
suggestion of how and when to co-read them, will be presented in the Introduction.    
 Figure 1: Adam Walker, Diagram showing original contributions within this research project, 2020 6
(p. 14).
 A formal specification of accompanying material, listing the eight artworks which comprise 7
part of this PhD research project, is also included in Praxis. 
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INTRODUCTION
Our world is becoming increasingly unequal through increasingly unseeable processes. 
In my mind’s eye my mouth gurns into a silent scream; a momentary release of pent-
up ________. 
Vocabulary fails, only the scream.  8
(No release.)
What can we do? Countless insecurities in our own contexts continuously deflect our 
attention inward towards our individuated selves. A stream of images of greater 
precarity elsewhere stokes our self-interest, our fear. 
That the world (including ourselves within it) is such demands that productivist art 
challenge, critique and proffer speculative alternatives to it.  The growing abstract 9
opacity of processes comprising our world (and within which we are bound) makes 
contestation increasingly difficult, and yet not to do so is ________.
A perpetual scream. 
 This scream, or its silent absence, recalls Holloway’s. 8
John Holloway, ‘In the Beginning Was the Scream’, Common Sense, 11 (1991), 69-77.
 I use the term ‘productivist’ in alignment with Benjamin, who argues that the first concern of 9
the artwork should be a reflexive consideration of its own position within the contemporary 
relations of production.
Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’ [1934], in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 2, 
Part 2 1931-34, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone and others (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 768-782 (p. 770).
10
Meanwhile, the escalating, unequal precarity of ‘being’ serves to materially exhaust 
and endanger, perhaps necessitating moments of acceptance of acceptance. 
To care: to accept. 
To care: to not accept. 
That art is by definition within the world requires that it must also critique itself, 
something it frequently does not sufficiently do. A reflexive self-care is needed.
This research project seeks to address these nested problems: to provide a framework 
by which art might self-reflexively operate critically to some progressive affect, 
inseparably tethered but nevertheless dynamic within the material conditions of 
collective human being. 
11
Title
The first of the paired titles of this research project, Ways of being beyond the perpetuating 
inequalities of the technosphere: textual artistic intervention as a vital strategy in enabling 
resistant agency, purposefully acknowledges the myriad layered, reflexive and 
enmeshed aspects of the research it encompasses. A brief examination will begin to 
establish the terrain, and intent, of this.
‘Beyond’ highlights a desire for a future-facing shift out of our current situation; 
‘perpetuating’ is suggestive of the ongoing extended present-ness and self-reproduction 
of that situation; and ‘inequalities’ are foregrounded as the material, ethical and political 
problem addressed. It is important to emphasise that inequalities are plural, often 
compounded and mutually reinforcing. I will postpone an explication of my use of the 
term ‘technosphere’ for Part 1: it suffices to say here that it denotes the un-fully-
conceivable global context of the perpetuation of these inequalities, and foreclosing of 
alternative futures.10
’Artistic intervention’ places focus on the practice-methodology of research, and 
emphasises a productivist position, seeking affect within the world. ‘Textual’ denotes 
both the necessary terrain of intervention as the technosphere renders ever more of our 
lived experience into forms of text, and also the ensuing approaches of artistic 
intervention taken, via multiple variable aspects of ‘textual’. ‘Vital’ proclaims the 
urgency of our present situation, but also holds an important biological, bodily 
 The term is borrowed from Haus de Kulturen der Welt’s Technosphere Magazine project. 10
Technosphere Magazine [website/research project initiated by Haus der Kulturen der Welt] 
(2015-19) <https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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connotation. This somatic sense, in direct relation to the preceding ‘textual’, is a key 
pivot upon which inequality directly manifests in certain bodies.
‘Strategy’ situates the research at a disseminable meta-level.  While several of the 11
specific artistic interventions undertaken operate, in part, with a localised specificity to 
their contingent context, the research project as a whole makes a strategic, transferrable 
contribution to consideration of ways of resistant being and critical practice. ‘Enabling 
resistant agency’ further emphasises this, as well as pointing towards a de-privileging of 
individuated authorship and affect. ‘Resistant’, in contrast to ‘resilient’, refuses an 
acceptance of the way things are. This includes refusal of the systemic reduction of 
human ‘agency’ within the technosphere.  
Returning to the start of the title, ‘Ways of being’ invokes a celebration of plurality 
within our increasingly confining and prescriptive context, but also emphasises the 
necessary multiplicity of fluid resistant approaches. That these ways of being need 
seeking, rather than being something which can be presumed, indicates the urgency of 
intervention. However, in being asserted in the title as a statement rather than 
question, a hopefulness is upheld. 
The second of the paired titles, Embodying a practice of radical care, points towards where 
this research project locates that hope.  
 As will be discussed, to operate solely at an abstract level could result in an echo of the 11
violence of abstraction of the technosphere. A key aspect of the strategies proposed will be a co-
equal acknowledgement and integration of immediate material and bodily concerns.
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Outline of original contributions
Figure 1: Adam Walker, Diagram showing original contributions within this research 
project, 2020. A simplified schematic representation of the interrelationships 
between original contributions and key sub-points (which include both identified 
problems and possible routes beyond these) is shown. By necessity, this is an 
artificially frozen approximation: the enmeshed interweaving of contributions 
and sub-points has shifted and fluxed through the research process, and 
continues to do so in relation to the dynamic world of which all are part  
14
This project makes three contributions to knowledge which interweave and overlap 
but hold differing emphases. Two of these, ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and 
being’ and ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’, are principally methodological 
contributions and are discussed in the Research questions and methods section which 
follows. The third, ‘radical care’, is the primary contribution of this project. It is 
proposed as a framing of ‘ways of being’ which reclaims agency and is resistant, 
resilient, subversive and disruptive towards the violence of abstraction within the 
technosphere. An original conception of radical care is gradually developed through 
Lexis’s three parts, built up via a number of key sub-points (as noted in the diagram 
above) through which its need and potential efficacy are argued.  These sub-points, 12
and radical care itself, are fully introduced in the sequence they will be developed 
within the Section overview below.     
 While there are extensive lineages of thought which inform my conception of radical care, and 12
which will be discussed, the specific term itself was not in academic use until very recently. 
Notably, in 2020, a special issue of the journal Social Text entitled ‘Radical Care’ was published.
Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, eds., ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’ [special issue], Social Text, 38:1 (2020).
Hobart and Kneese present radical care as ‘a set of vital but underappreciated strategies for 
enduring precarious worlds’. 
Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’, Social Text, 38:1 (2020), 1-16 (p. 2). 
My development of the concept will go somewhat beyond this in attempting to further 
emphasise the radical aspect of the term in potentially instigating systemic change.
Aside from this, somewhat surprisingly, (apart from the two words chancing to come together 
occasionally in e.g. medical journals) the only other instance of ‘radical care’ being used as a 
term comes in Dowler and others’ essay calling for a ‘Manifesto of Radical Care’ in Geography. 
Lorraine Dowler and others, ‘Care’, in Keywords in Radical Geography: Antipode at 50, ed. by 
Antipode Editorial Collective (Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2019), pp. 35-29.   
Though written within a different discipline and context (and specifically addressing the 
workings of the academic institution), Dowler and others’ use of the term does loosely align 
with my own in its linkage between attention to the immediate position of the ‘other’, and the 
need for systemic change.
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Research questions and methods
This project is structured around the following research questions. While demarcating 
a specific (though porous) nexus of focus, they have not been static. Due to the 
reflexive approach by which the project has proceeded, far from a fixed starting point 
initiating a linear progression, these questions have shifted and changed through their 
partial answering and the sometimes unanticipated realisations they have prompted. 
The methods presented below have formed and reformed these questions as much as 
they have sought to answer them. This ongoing reformulation is itself a research 
method.13
Research questions:
1: How does the technosphere use de-humanising abstraction to subsume labour, 
the body, the artist and the future?
2: How does technospheric abstraction manifest in differentiated inequalities at the 
pivotal sites of the collective political body and individuated human body? 
 
3: How might artistic use of (dis)embodiment enable critical affect at these sites?
4: How can we imagine critical agency within a would-be totalising hegemony?
5: What could constitute a way of being through which sustainable resistant 
equality might form? 
While each of the three parts within Lexis specifically addresses one or two of these 
research questions (as will be introduced in the Section overview below), they inevitably 
 (It is an element of ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and being’.)13
16
bleed into one another, reflecting the overlaid interwoven complexities of the research 
process and terrain, and the subjective position of researcher within these. 
——
‘Ways of being’ are sought as the project’s outcome, but equally, ways of being in 
myriad forms (on and off the page, within delineations of ‘art’ and not, actual and 
imagined), contribute to the porous, interwoven and reflexive means of thinking by 
which this research is undertaken. The two methods below begin as approaches to 
research: incorporating artistic practice and through artistic practice respectively. They 
eventually proceed, through an enfolding of radical care back into themselves, to be 
proposed as means whereby an expanded understanding of practice (the practice of 
being) might be more radically caringly undertaken. That these methods develop into 
means by which radical care might eventually be lived, performed and disseminated 
underpins their importance as contributions, in addition to functioning as research 
methods within the project.  
Iterative refracted practice, theorising and being
 The more overarching of the two methods, ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and 
being’ could be argued as being intuitive within ‘artistic research’.  Nevertheless, its 14
articulation and examination constitutes a contribution. Practice, theorising and being 
 As will be discussed, the reflexive methodological approaches within this project align with 14
‘artistic research’ within Teikmanis’s schema. 
Andris Teikmanis, ‘Typologies of Research’, in SHARE Handbook for Artistic Research Education, 
ed. by Mick Wilson and Schelte van Ruiten (Amsterdam: ELIA, 2013), pp. 162-169 (p. 164).
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feed back and forth into one another, variously responding to, embodying and 
articulating the research activities of each other, iteratively edging further.15
In the application of this triangulation to this research project, practice operates 
through ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’, which will be specifically addressed 
below. Practice enables momentary escape beyond the confines of the logic of language 
which can fall into alignment with the structures of the technosphere when not used 
self-critically. Without care, text can replicate the textual domination of the 
technosphere within which other forms of knowledge or meaning are rendered subject: 
having to translate themselves into its terms. Though passages of ‘conventional’ 
academic writing will follow, I do not want these to assume the role of an interpretive 
or defining frame through which ‘other’ elements are considered. The premise of a 
PhD ‘by project’, incorporating various practices (including writing), is that different 
forms of knowledge production have a vital role to play, beyond the mediated logics 
and rationalities of academic text alone. 
I have not entirely avoided following academic convention, and nor would I wish to. In 
part, this stems from a desire for this project to have potential affect beyond the 
discipline of art. In form as well as content (where an argument mirroring this will 
 By ‘theorising’ I mean the textual argumentation comprising the critical and analytical 15
sections of writing which are furthest from artistic practice. This form of writing sits at one end 
of a spectrum with textual forms of practice at the other. There are also frequent occurrences of 
writing sitting somewhere between, blurring this distinction. For this reason, I speak of 
theorising rather than text or writing in designating this methodology: to denote a specific form 
and function of text. 
Writing is as much a ‘practice’ as any other form. I use the term practice here to indicate artistic 
production, including frequent use of multiple forms of text where it itself as object is more 
central than a critical, analytical function.   
A single piece of text might operate simultaneously as both practice and theorising.
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develop), a balancing act of complicity is required, operating within a structure while 
also pushing, critiquing, disrupting and challenging it. Here then, a meta-care for the 
project itself (as attention, thoughtfulness and commitment) is needed in holding it 
sufficiently together while varying intents and requirements diverge from one another.  
Theorising (continuous consideration and reflection upon existent discourses of our 
world in both its actualities and potentialities, and attempts to develop and connect 
these further) holds open a bridge whereby those other potentially more radical forms 
of knowledge production might enter back into codes of language and text, the 
hegemonic context in which they might have most (and most urgent) affect. In so 
doing, practice and being have informed the development of my research questions. If 
‘other’ research cannot avoid such translation (or otherwise accept being rendered 
‘incompatible’ or ‘irrelevant’), it is key to hold onto an authorship in this translating; 
else the ‘other’ knowledge or process risks being neutered, aestheticised or confined 
inside a box of affectless permissibility. I seek for this research project to contribute to 
discourses beyond art, within broader political, material and ethical realms, through its 
dissemination and the encounters which may ensue. Unfortunately, asserting art’s ( or 
more broadly, ‘other’ forms of knowledge’s) validity and ability to speak into these 
discourses is a prerequisite within the technosphere.    
This is not to position written, ‘academic’ theorising as ‘negative’ or ‘unfortunately’ 
necessary. It is frequently generative of practice: the direction of translation is not one 
way. And crucially, it also needs emphasising that theorising can occur through 
practice. Within the concept of radical care which will be developed, a committed 
undertaking to think through the context of another, while acknowledging 
19
understanding will only ever be partial (in other words, to theorise), is often a key first 
step. 
‘Being’ is held alongside practice and theorising, following Michel Foucault’s assertion 
that ‘There is no experience that is not a way of thinking’.  With the terrain of research, 16
the technosphere, becoming increasingly inescapably lived within, the direct 
experience of being (in daily subjectification, surveillance and individuation, as well as 
in attempted means to resist or simply continue within these relations) becomes 
especially relevant.  This lived experience continuously informs and periodically 17
intersects other research elements. For example, signing up to work for Deliveroo is an 
element of being which intersects with, informs and enriches writing around platform 
capitalism (while the writing and theoretical research correspondingly provide 
conceptual frameworks for reflecting upon it).  More than a temporary embodiment as 18
 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two’, in Ethics: Subjectivity and 16
Truth, ed. by Paul Rabinow, trans. by Robert Hurley and others (New York NY: The New Press, 
1994), p. 201.
Foucault wrote this in his originally unused and only subsequently published preface to The 
History of Sexuality, Volume Two. This research project, both that which follows on these pages 
and those equally vital components of research practice which cannot be bound, follows this 
approach.
 Thinking around ‘being’ is developed through Lexis, generally aligning with Heidegger’s 17
concept of ‘Dasein’. The (human) being is within, and constituent of, the world but retains 
distinction; there is a tension between subject-ness and object-ness. 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1953], trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1996).
This ‘being’ within the contemporary technosphere, and its reflexive consideration, works in 
enmeshed parallel with academic literature-based research to address research question 1: How 
does the technosphere use de-humanising abstraction to subsume labour, the body, the artist and the 
future?
 My personal experience of signing up to work for Deliveroo is described and reflected upon 18
in the Dark kitchens and desert cities section of Part 2. It bore particular relevance, in focussing 
attention to my own body and its vulnerability, to addressing research question 2: How does 
technospheric abstraction manifest in differentiated inequalities at the pivotal sites of the collective 
political body and individuated human body?
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artistic method, this example of being as research emerges from, and as, the necessity 
of subsistence within the technosphere. Being does incorporate bodily-ness, but in its 
contextual situating within the world. Similarly, undertaking artist residencies has 
provided a context-event for the consideration of geographical (and other) differentials 
operating across the technosphere, entwined with my own subjective position as an 
artist co-constituting my own site; ideas engaged with in both writing and artistic 
practice.  Yet these residencies, along with the exhibiting opportunities that ensue, are 19
also a reflection of my need (or desire) to gain the exposure and cultural capital 
required of the artist within neoliberalism. A critical (self-)awareness is essential to this 
‘being’ strand of research: only in continual, critical self-reflection can it be brought into 
artistic practice and writing where it might be made public. My artwork Sequestered, 
documented and reflected upon in Praxis, offers a clear example of a manifestation of 
critical reflection upon being.  The work constitutes a montage of elements of variable 20
agency, embodiment and privilege brought together in a specific contingent event-
encounter of my being, and my being there.
There is also a politics to this assertion of being as constituting research. In doing so, a 
significance is asserted for the bodily materiality of the human: a key (though often 
obfuscated) site of technospheric subsumption, violence and exploitation. Furthermore, 
 These residency experiences, and reflection upon them, have been particularly important in 19
addressing research questions 2: How does technospheric abstraction manifest in differentiated 
inequalities at the pivotal sites of the collective political body and individuated human body? and  
3: How might artistic use of (dis)embodiment enable critical affect at these sites? 
Repeat visits to Kyiv, Ukraine, for example, have produced a context in which to consider 
differing positionalities within global economic, political and technological networks, and 
related differentials of bodily violence. I have developed, and subsequently reflected upon, a 
number of artworks produced during or in later response to these visits. (These are documented 
in Praxis.)
 Adam Walker, Sequestered (2018), documentation available at <http://20
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/sequestered.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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being (as a state of ongoing existence) remains in tethered connection to the 
technospherically subjectified and individuated ‘self’. A focus on being with a critical 
awareness of this tether (as opposed to a perhaps more transient ‘embodiment’) is key 
to my emphasising of positionality (a core aspect of ‘embodied flattened allegorical 
montage’ as a methodology of artistic practice, as discussed below). 
As will be introduced, Part 1 identifies a shift towards effectively unavoidable 
exploitation of our passive being as a paradigmatic mechanism of subjectification 
within the technosphere. An asserting of being as an element of a methodology which 
enables a human agency and criticality is especially important in focusing attention to, 
and generating resistance at, this fundamental site of our bare existence as it is 
becoming appropriated.     
Incorporating being (including, to the extent it is possible, a consideration of others’ as 
well as one’s own experience), implicitly builds care into the research methodology. 
This recognition and valuing of the fundamental importance of care for, and care in, 
being (for others and oneself) as part of the research then frees and supports the 
practice and theorising elements in doing the forward flung work of potential 
radicality.  An equal focus on being alongside the other two strands within ‘iterative 21
refracted practice, theorising and being’ contests the abstraction of the technosphere, 
while also acknowledging the (unequally distributed) bodily, material effects of it. 
Practising and theorising through, and from, this position asserts an ethics of human 
equality, not through a transcendental reification of ‘the human’, but through a 
 This connected, but flexible, bond between a resilient care in the present and a more 21
speculative care for the future will emerge as a central tenet of radical care.
22
continual critical reflection upon being human (not individual) in the face of the 
apparently incontestable textualised abstractions of the technosphere.      22
A methodology of ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and being’ is reflected in the 
disseminable presentation of this research project. In becoming public, it takes the form 
of two texts: Lexis (which you are currently reading) and Praxis. These names, 
borrowed from Jurgen Habermas (and having a much longer history of use), have been 
chosen to reflect the mutual inter-reliance of a site for the exchange, contestation and 
development of thoughts and ideas (‘lexis’), and a site for affective action and agency 
wherein those thoughts and ideas might be materialised, but also where the 
development of those thoughts and ideas might be held possible in the first place 
(‘praxis’).  In offering Praxis and Lexis as a pair of texts, the hope is that rather than 23
implicitly framing artistic practice as a methodology from which theoretical findings 
are derived (the textual translation described above), or conversely as an illustrative 
afterthought or appendix, practice and theorising can be encountered in parallel. The 
two texts are intended to be read in tandem. As a gesture towards the impossibility of a 
truly simultaneous reading, it is suggested to keep Praxis (perhaps turned to a page in 
Artistic interventions) open alongside Lexis. This might at least suggest the possibility of 
a live back and forth interplay between theorising and practice for the reader, echoing 
 Parts 1 and 3 will respectively draw upon Campbell (reflecting on Heidegger) and Arendt to 22
emphasise the need for an imminent, rather than transcendental, conception of ‘the human’. 
Timothy C. Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics From Heidegger to Agamben 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), pp. 26-27.
Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine [1929], ed. by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith 
Chelius Stark (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 23
Bourgeois Society [1962], trans. by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 
1992), p. 3.
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my own process of research. The reader is invited to fully read Praxis at a point of their 
choosing after Part 1 but prior to the Ana-conclusion.  
Being is woven through Lexis and Praxis in interplay with theorising and practice. It is 
also continuously re-presented in ourselves as author and reader. 
Embodied flattened allegorical montage
‘Embodied flattened allegorical montage’, a modified form of Benjamin Buchloh’s 
‘allegorical montage’, is the approach taken to artistic interventions (e.g. the 
methodology of artistic practice) within this project.  In reflection of the iterative meta-24
method of research just outlined, as an approach it has also been refined, 
conceptualised and made disseminable through the process of the artistic interventions 
in which it is practiced, and reflection upon them.    
In summary, ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ is a practice-methodology 
emphasising a holding together of site, context, affect, situated economies of 
circulation, process, dissemination and potential encounter with audience as a 
fragmentary, de-centred, fluid, porous artistic intervention. As an artistic approach, it 
moves beyond representation to fully recognise the significance of labour processes 
and economic, linguistic and power circulations within and adjacent to the artwork, 
but also holds open the potential for allegorical affect upon the image-surface of the 
work. A full elucidation, including how it diverges from Buchloh’s formulation and its 
 Benjamin Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary 24
Art’, Artforum, 21:1 (1982), 43-56.
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relation to plural forms of ‘text’, is offered in Praxis, alongside documentation of and 
reflection upon the artworks which work through it.  25
The term ‘embodied’ in this methodology reflects a focus on a self-reflexive recognition 
of the positionality of the artist. The embodied aspect of ‘embodied flattened allegorical 
montage’ relates to the artist rather than artwork: a disembodiment of the latter is more 
usually advocated.  It needs emphasising that this embodiment, while relating to 26
‘being’ as discussed above, is not the same as being. On the one hand, the embodiment 
of an element of being within the artwork reflects the aforementioned political 
importance of acknowledging and reflecting upon being. On the other though, the 
premise of translating one’s being out of direct alignment with one’s situated, material 
body reflects both a certain capacity of art and privilege of artist-hood.  Thus, the 27
potential of embodiment loops back around to one’s positionality of being (which 
must, in turn, be considered in embodiment within the artwork, and so forth as a 
continual process).   
However, bringing care into this inwardly focussed spiral opens it out again. Care 
brings to embodiment an always partial and speculative, but nevertheless vital, 
attempt to consider the position of a never fully-known ‘other’ in relation to the artistic 
 Ibid.25
The textual emphasis of artistic practice within this project has followed from a gradual 
recognising (through addressing research question 1: How does the technosphere use de-humanising 
abstraction to subsume labour, the body, the artist and the future?) that textualisation forms an 
effectively inescapable process of abstraction within the technosphere, and thus text must be 
contested and engaged with if resistance within this is to be possible. This is more fully 
discussed in Praxis.
 (This is discussed in Part 2.)26
 A positionally of being ‘artist’ can be overridden within a given context by other 27
technospheric subjectifications (property ownership, class, nationality, etc.).
25
intervention.  Thus, as radical care is developed as a concept, ‘embodied flattened 28
allegorical montage’ opens out to become an advocated method by which radical care 
might be practiced through the artistic intervention, within its context.  
 
‘Embodied flattened allegorical montage’ thus operates as a double contribution: it is 
both a means by which practice-research might proceed to attempt to develop 
reflexive, non-hierarchical, context-specific affect within a given site; and it becomes a 
specific approach by which radical care might be manifested through and beyond an 
artistic practice.
——
Radical care is not a research method. However, from being something loosely 
speculative it has proceeded, through the above research questions and methods, to 
become an articulated ethical-methodological milieu to be within. As specific, 
contingent research realisations are re-reflected upon and held alongside one another 
(in an attempt to present this milieu beyond the solely personal), so the methodological 
relations within the project shift. My focus moves from an emphasis on understanding 
specificities of existence within the technosphere to theorising a way to be through 
 This argument is developed further in the Ways of being: friendship section of Part 3, drawing 28
on writings by Webb and Foucault. 
David Webb, ‘On Friendship: Derrida, Foucault and the Practice of Becoming’ Research in 
Phenomenology, 33 (2003), 119-140.
Foucault.
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their continuum of connection.  Thus, radical care’s more developed relation to my 29
methodology of artistic practice is not a direct one of creating artwork which in some 
way ’seeks to articulate’ or ‘performs’ radical care. Instead, there emerges a more 
blurred, continuous ethical and political emphasis upon being radically caring, with 
practice’s specific relationship to this in the site-moment not delineated.  30
In accordance with this, ‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and being’ shifts in 
function within the project. Moving away from being a means of realisation and 
articulation, the interrelationship between the three elements proceeds to become the 
potential affect within an expanded, more human way of being according to an ethics 
of radical care. With ‘being radically caring’ then framed as a practice in itself, within a 
broader conception of artistic practice which refutes a disconnection of art and life, the 
project becomes practice-advocating. In seeking pro-equal affect and contesting 
individuation, it becomes a practice of radical care to disseminate an advocation of 
radical care. 
The fluid but inseparable relations between methods, questions, practices, theorisations 
and contexts which this segment has sought to present situates the methodology of this 
research project as a whole firmly within the reflexively enmeshed ‘artistic research’ 
category, as described by Andris Teikmanis.  Furthermore, owing to the would-be 31
 It is with this shift, and the seeking of and then gradual emergence and incorporation of a 29
concept of radical care, that my methodological approach addresses research questions 4: How 
can we imagine critical agency within a would-be totalising hegemony? and 5: What could constitute a 
way of being through which sustainable resistant equality might form?
 This is an act of extending radically caring trust to oneself.30
 Teikmanis, p. 164. 31
Teikmanis distinguishes ‘artistic research’ from the more linear forms of ‘practice-led research’, 
‘research-led practice’ and ‘art-based research’. In these alternative models there is a single 
directionality between ‘practice’ and ‘research’, one way or the other.
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totalising nature of the object of research (the technosphere), this reflexive artistic 
research is inseparable from the whole breadth of being.  
28
Section overview (a sequence of arguments leading to a concept of radical care)
In outlining the sequence of Lexis which follows, the structure of my arguments for 
radical care, including the key sub-points which support it, is set out. In place of a 
discrete literature review, relevant discourses are inter-woven throughout the text in 
dialogue with developing arguments.
Part 1: Work
How does the technosphere use de-humanising abstraction to subsume labour, the body, the 
artist and the future?32
In addressing the above question, Part 1 begins by considering this fluid superstructure 
I am terming ‘technosphere’. The centrality of text (inclusive of data, code and 
algorithm) and global interconnectedness is emphasised alongside the ongoing, though 
changing, relevance of physical materialities and sites. 
I argue that Nick Srnicek’s concept of ‘platform capitalism’, in which private 
companies operate as platforms of exchange vital to increasing aspects of everyday 
contemporary life and through which data (or profit) can be extracted, is the emergent 
dominant economic model of the technosphere.  This is an important starting point, as 33
 Though beginning with this question, Part 1 also starts to unfold the concerns of all of the 32
other research questions, and the project as a whole.
 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).33
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labour continues to hold a preeminent position within the technosphere as a key basis 
of our construction as subjects. 
Platform capitalism is considered through post-Fordist discourses, especially the 
virtuosic, performative nature of work that ensues. I particularly explore Paolo Virno’s 
argument that in centring upon linguistic-relational capabilities, capitalism is 
specifically seeking profit in those aspects of us which are most ‘human’.  This 34
contestation of the same sites of being by both hegemonic subjectification and, by 
necessity, resistance towards this is a theme which will develop.
Considering the paradigm’s emergence, Pascal Gielen’s argument that artists can be 
considered a vanguard of post-Fordist workers is covered, but critiqued for its 
decontextualising of the person of the artist (in other words, for overlooking their 
being).  The importance Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello place on artistic rather than 35
social critique in dismantling Fordism is also examined.  This evaluation of post-36
Fordism also considers Silvia Federici’s critique of the under-recognition of inequality 
being perpetuated in gendered and racialised affective and reproductive labour in 
post-Fordist (and by extension platform capitalist) and post-work discourses.  37
 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For An Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. by 34
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 
98.
 Pascal Gielen, The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude: Global Art, Politics and Post-Fordism 35
(Amsterdam: Valiz, 2009).
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’, International Journal of 36
Politics, Culture and Society, 18 (2005), 161-188.
 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist Struggle (Oakland 37
CA: PM Press, 2012).
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I argue that a notable acceleration in data collection and use constitutes a signifiant 
shift, distinguishing platform capitalism from broader post-Fordism through an 
unprecedented surveillance capability and the ensuing emphasis on prediction, control 
and conformity, alongside productivity. Proceeding from Virno’s positioning of 
linguistic-relational capability as the principal producer of value, I argue that platform 
capitalism can be considered a new paradigm.  Within it, our surveilled linguistic-38
relational basic existence is being rendered unknowing labour; a permanently available 
resource to be exploited through the data-secretions of our existence as contemporary 
beings, rather than a capacity we actively perform.  This argument, whereby the 39
means by which we are exploited is tilted towards our bare existence (via big data, 
automation, artificial intelligence and proprietorial monopolistic appropriation of 
increasing aspects of life) constitutes a key sub-point. It renders ineffective a regressive 
return to some previous modes of contestation. The possibility of resisting through 
denying one’s exploitability via means such as striking is foreclosed: simply in being, 
in a form which is not exhaustingly contrarian, we are rendered a resource.  This 40
necessitates a search for possible new forms of resistance, from which radical care will 
coalesce. 
 Virno.38
 While it might be hypothetically possible to exist as a non-data-producing being, this would 39
entail a tremendous effort to actively disconnect from the contemporary world: eschewing all 
forms of digital connectivity for information, communication, sociability, leisure, monetary 
exchange, and more. An even more extreme effort would be needed to avoid contributing more 
basic exploitable data such as official state and medical records.
 Strikes and other long-used tactics of resistance might still be effective within specific 40
contexts. The argument is not against this, but rather that at a structural level these means alone 
will be ineffective.
This attempted technospheric appropriation of ‘being’ makes all the more crucial the holding 
onto of being as a site of agency, creativity, reflection, criticality and resistance within ‘iterative 
refracted practice, theorising and being’.
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Underpinning the hegemonic contemporary way of being is a continuing reliance on 
overlooked and devalued previous regimes of labour: neo-colonial asymmetries of 
hardware and infrastructure manufacture and maintenance, call-centre operation, and 
gig economy delivery work, for example, are all essential to it. And supporting all of 
this is a heavily gendered, under-valued and unremunerated expanse of ongoing 
reproductive and affective labour.   41
Part 1 proceeds to examine the means by which the technosphere pulls back the 
possibilities of the future into a collapsed present denying agency or potential change. 
For example, I explore high frequency trading within derivates markets as a concrete 
means by which potential future variation is financially captured into the present. 
Mirroring this, I set out how at a systemic level the past is similarly destroyed and only 
reconstructed as desired, but is inescapably archived onto the individual via our 
inescapable data-self. 
Having outlined this set of inequality escalating technologies of contemporary 
dehumanising abstraction, Part 1 proceeds to consider possible resistant responses. In a 
further key sub-point, I introduce ‘pro-human post-individualism’ as a stance of 
resistance contesting the hyper-individuated, indebted isolation we are pushed 
towards. In proposing this position, I critique calls for a post-humanism which 
advocate an under-critically open embrace of the technological. While I equally reject a 
backward looking blanket rejection of new technologies, implicit ideologies of 
inequality are coded into their orthodox deployment, as Part 1 sets out. Pro-human 
 Federici.41
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post-individualism engages with new technologies but centres on the human.  It is 42
open to the positive potential of technology, but with a constantly reflexive criticality in 
looking to centre all humans as co-equal. The neoliberal individual conversely, re-
presented at an ever increasing speed through the technosphere, is premised precisely 
upon perpetuating inequality. This nascent idea of pro-human post-individualism is 
the starting point out of which radical care is developed. 
Ensuing positions for would-be productivist artistic interventions are then considered, 
centring on the disobedient, anarchic and playful as those potentially disruptive 
human qualities hardest to surveille and exploit. I emphasise that the infrastructures 
and networks themselves are not inherently unequal (though their deployment 
certainly is), and working in such disruptive ways through them holds the potential to 
put them to work as positive vectors in contesting inequalities. 
Connecting this strategy to the advocating of a post-individual pro-human positioning, 
Part 1 ends by arguing for a radical, perpetual destruction of the individuated artist self 
into fluid multitudes of undefinable creative self-hoods, a position formed through and 
looping back into practice as ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’. However, I 
acknowledge the unequally distributed vulnerability of de-individuating oneself in 
such a way, and emphasise the need for its pro-human corollary, centred on trust and 
 Though I fully recognise the contemporary urgency of thinking in terms of ecologies beyond 42
the human, an explicit focus on this is outside the scope of this project. The escalation of human 
inequalities makes clear there is still much urgent work to be done at an inter-human level.
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care. This begins to draw the connection between a critically caring basis and the 
radically caring act that might project forward from it.  43
Scene A
The two scenes, of which this is the first, are arttexts taking the form of screenplays 
which creatively, critically and reflexively seek to engage with the themes and 
questions opened up in the parts which precede and follow them. 
The inclusion of the two scenes within Lexis, along with written theorising upon text 
and ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ within Praxis, reflects the back and forth 
interplay of practice and theorising enfolded within one another. Such a blurring 
refutes the false suggestion of a discrete division. 
Scene A imagines a conversation with the narrating voice in the English-language 
version of Harun Farocki’s 1995 work Arbeiter Verlassen di Fabrik [Workers Leaving the 
 A discourse of ‘critical care’, as developed by Puig de la Bellacasa and the responding special 43
issue of Social Studies of Science, is key to the concept of radical care I develop. (This will be fully 
introduced along with Part 3.)
Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, ‘Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling neglected things’, 
Social Studies of Science, 41:1 (2011), 85-106. 
Ana Viseu and others, eds., ‘The Politics of Care in Technoscience’ [special issue], Social Studies 
of Science, 45:5 (2015).
Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).
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Factory].  The text operates as a close-reading of Farocki’s script to provide an 44
alternate route into some of the consideration of labour addressed in Part 1. 
Additionally, in reflecting upon the cinema screen (the co-focus, alongside the factory, 
of Farocki’s work) and the television screen (through which the work was broadcast in 
1995, around the time of television’s limited-channel apex within the mass-cultural 
landscape), the text opens up questions of the public sphere as a site of individuation 
or collectivisation and normatisation or contestation. These questions foreshadow the 
focus of Part 2, which will proceed further into the ramifications of contemporary 
technologies upon the public sphere.   
Both scenes actively engage in text as an affective matter, paralleling but not replicating 
the affective function it holds within the technosphere. Their suggestion of a dramatic 
form, that these words could be voiced, serves as an implicit reminder of the human 
and attempts to reconnect this back into the text. Simultaneously, it reminds us of 
human absence. The texts presented become almost-human characters in an inversion 
of the way the technosphere forces us to render ourselves text. 
 Harun Farocki, Arbeiter Verlassen di Fabrik [Workers Leaving the Factory] (1995) <https://44
vimeo.com/59338090> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
This is a single-screen moving-image work, broadcast on terrestrial German television in its 
original language. A similarly titled multi-screen gallery variant of the work was subsequently 
produced which includes much of the same material, but incorporates some changes (e.g. the 
inclusion of factories outside of Europe or North America, which are notably absent in the 
original). However, this multi-screen version breaks up the singular narrational flow upon 
which Scene A is built.
35
Part 2: Bodies
How does technospheric abstraction manifest in differentiated inequalities at the pivotal sites of 
the collective political body and individuated human body?
  
How might artistic use of (dis)embodiment enable critical affect at these sites?
Part 2 examines the material repercussions of technospheric abstraction within the 
somatic and political, acknowledging that rights, opportunities, equalities and such 
forth hold a much diminished meaning (if any) ‘without the ability to concretize them 
in absolute space and time’.  I argue that these are key sites at which power within the 45
technosphere fixes and seeks to self-legitimise, in order to continue its perpetuation of 
inequalities.  
Drawing on Miwon Kwon, ’site’ itself is first turned to, with the technosphere’s 
presented image of immaterial ephemerality being scrutinised, and its underpinning 
overlooked structures of situated materiality (infrastructure, labour and violence) 
addressed.  Establishing a ‘territory’ to be defended, in varying degrees of materiality, 46
is considered as a situated strategy to contest the technosphere. In an art context, I 
consider how the artwork and artist are constituent of, and constituted by, their own 
contingent siting, building an argument for continuous self-reflexivity in relation to 
site.
 David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development 45
(London: Verso, 2006), p. 129.
 Miwon Kwon, One Place After Another: Site Specific Art and Locational Identity (Cambridge MA: 46
MIT Press, 2004).
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The part then moves on to focus on the ‘political body’.  This, I argue, is a pivotal site 47
for the continuation of, and ‘legitimisation’ of, inequality. Drawing on Habermas, 
Hannah Arendt and Ed Finn, I examine the historical emergence of the public sphere, 
focussing especially on the key idea of ‘bracketing out’ various elements of life 
(including numerous inequalities of ‘being’) beyond discussion.  The fallibility of 48
dialectically focussing on a single public sphere (or single counter public) to ‘correct’ 
inequality is countered by emphasising the need for dynamic continual contestation 
through emergent counter publics, counter-counter publics and beyond.  49
I expand on Finn’s argument that we presently have an inversion of the public sphere 
which forecloses ‘legitimate’ contestation of itself.  Within the inverted public sphere, 50
the formerly bracketed out realms of firstly the social and subsequently the economic 
 I use this term in recognition of the body being both, in biopolitics, the base unit of the 47
foreclosed political, as well as holding in assembly, as Butler argues, the capacity to reopen a 
space of politics. (This is expanded on in Part 2.) 
Judith Butler, ‘Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street’, transversal texts (2011) <https://
transversal.at/transversal/1011/butler/en> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Theory of Performative Assembly (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).  
Relating the literal body back to this meta-body also reduces the risk of an overly empirical 
consideration of the body as a theoretical device, which Vishmidt warns against.
Marina Vishmidt, ‘Bodies in space: On the ends of vulnerability’, Radical Philosophy, 2:8 (2020), 
33-46 <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/bodies-in-space> [Accessed 2 January 
2021].
 Habermas.48
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958], 2nd edn (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1998).
Ed Finn, What Algorithms Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
2017).
 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 49
Existing Democracy’, Social Text, 25/26 (1990), 56-80.
 Finn, pp. 172-179.50
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enter into and come to dominate the space of politics. Such an inverted form denies 
contestation within its structures and logics, which are presented as all-encompassing. 
This foreshadows a requirement for the radicality within radical care, which might 
momentarily brace open a potentiality of change within this structure. 
Part 2 then revisits Karl Marx’s notion of a ‘general intellect’ (briefly discussed in Part 
1) as suggestive of the positive potential of new technologies.  I argue that while these 51
technologies might potentially be made use of, they are ideologically inscribed in their 
initiating. Any egalitarian general intellect will only be possible with a functioning (e.g. 
continually contesting and self-contesting) public sphere proactively preceding rather 
than following technology. That being a seemingly impossible reversal of present 
realities though, I advocate a viral, disruptive misuse of technological structures.
The part proceeds to more closely examine two specific technologies of the 
technosphere: Keller Easterling’s ‘zone’, a spatialisation of the notion of bracketing out; 
and precarious ‘freelance’ labour for lean platforms, which I propose is an equivalent 
technology to the zone only brought to bear upon individuated bodies at the 
metropolitan core.  I argue that the spatial zone of exception has been encoded onto 52
the ‘dividual’ workers within a society of control operating in an equivalent way, 
through micro-targeting of specified bodies, as is elsewhere enforced through 
geographical boundaries.   This framing of ‘dividuated exception zones’ constitutes a 53
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [1857-61], trans. by 51
Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 690-712.
 Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London: Verso, 2016).52
 ‘Dividual’ is Deleuze’s term.53
Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59 (1992), 3-7.
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key sub-point: an articulation of the lineage of this attempt to foreclose the possibility 
of human care at the site of the individuated body.    
This section (Dark kitchens and desert cities) includes first-hand recollection of engaging 
with lean platforms as a Deliveroo worker, an example of ‘being’ functioning as 
research. The section ends with a cautious, qualified note of optimism, observing the 
irresolvable tension coming with the reemergence of the relevance and potential affect 
of physical site behind the technosphere’s presented ephemerality, when for example 
economic logics bring gig economy workers together in congregation.     
Part 2 concludes by turning attention back explicitly to the artwork and artist. ‘Social 
engagement’ and ‘participation’ models for artistic relationship with site are critiqued, 
and an approach of considering the artistic intervention as a shifting assemblage is 
proposed. The need for open co-vulnerable human-to-human encounter is returned to 
and developed, with the centrality of agency being emphasised. In so doing, the 
entwined nature of radical care as an emerging concept and ‘embodied flattened 
allegorical montage’ as a methodological contribution is further examined and 
articulated. In ending, Part 1’s call for radical, perpetual destruction of the 
individuated artist self into fluid multitudes of undefinable creative self-hoods is 
revisited. A strategy of embodiment in the personhood of the artist alongside 
disembodiment in the artwork is developed. This positioning constitutes a key 
methodological sub-point. It is a means of attempting to hold the artistic intervention 
away from individuation, while recognising the strategic need to possibly put oneself 
at stake, especially when one’s body and being are not those most typically subject to 
the greatest vulnerability within the technosphere.  
39
Scene B
Scene B presents four ‘characters’, all of which are fragments of texts I had previously 
written in varying contexts for different purposes. The four text-characters do, 
however, share a connection to a series of residencies and research visits I undertook to 
Ukraine, and the artworks which ensued. These text-characters are pulled out of their 
initial context to intersect one another and form potential new retrospective meta-
authorial understandings. They are brought into a new site, where their differing initial 
purposes reveal a web of complicit entanglement within interwoven networks of 
history, politics, and economics, and the material inequities which follow. The tether 
these text-characters retain to their initial context (and authorship) refracts the 
positionality of my being into these interwoven networks.  
As with the previous, this scene offers an alternate route into some of the concepts 
theorised in the part which precedes it: in this case the political body and the corporeal 
body. It also again foreshadows the part which follows through its documenting of an 
emergent condition of embodied critical care (in commitment, concern, affection and 
attention), which will become a core element of radical care.54
In its addressing of these key concepts from the preceding and succeeding parts, Scene 
B does so through practice, and recalls an ongoing experience of having done so and 
continuing to do so within being. The scene thus constitutes a clear distillation of 
‘iterative refracted practice, theorising and being’. The dates of the texts, within the 
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 5.54
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PhD period, further emphasise this: placing the times of writing, and times of events 
recalled, within the iterative feedback loop in complete enmeshment with theorising.  
It is important that Scene B is an arttext. In being presented and denoted as such (as 
opposed to e.g. the un-reconfigured texts simply being included as an appendix), its 
production through a methodology of ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ is 
emphasised. Whereas most typically throughout the research project ‘embodied 
flattened allegorical montage’ sits as one element within the meta-method of ‘iterative 
refracted practice, theorising and being’, Scene B’s position as an arttext within Lexis 
reverses this. Here, instead, the surrounding context of the production of a 
disseminable research project through a process of ‘iterative refracted practice, 
theorising and being’ is reflexively considered as part of the context for this arttext. 
This serves to emphasise the continuous reflexive consideration of the relationship 
between self and context that is at the core of both methodological contributions (and 
which is, by extension, a key aspect of radical care when considering how it might be 
practised).    
Even more so than for Scene A,  in their meta-textual forms the ‘characters’ in Scene B 
attempt to articulate a text as a living thing, in a continuous process of contestation, 
appropriation and re-presentation as it shifts through different contexts of encounter 
with plural readers. In differing ways, each of the two scenes pulls apart a teleological 
premise of forward progression. This breaking with a-critical ‘progress’ emphasises 
reflexivity and ongoing reconsideration, important aspects of critical care which will be 
brought into radical care.
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Within the technospheric context, this holding open of the textual record or archive 
might function as a never-closing-down contestation of the incontestable, proprietorial 
textual structures we are subject to.
Part 3: Care
How can we imagine critical agency within a would-be totalising hegemony?
What could constitute a way of being through which sustainable resistant equality might form?
Building on the preceding arguments, Part 3 fully articulates radical care as a way of 
being enabling resistant agency in relation to the technosphere. In forming a 
framework within which change might be imaginable (wherein the co-caring human 
might reclaim agency), this part focusses upon the encounters between entities, such as 
unequal individuals or a human and a system. I examine what the qualities of these 
encounters are and how they are affected by, and affect, the relations between the 
encountering entities before and after. These encounters can be both discursive and 
material. 
Part 3 begins by considering ‘computational thinking’ as a means by which the 
technosphere, itself contingently produced, acts to foreclose the potential for 
subsequent change, for example towards greater equality (thus requiring the radical 
intervention as a disruptive promulgator of encounter within but not determined by 
the system).   55
 James Bridle, New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future (London: Verso, 2018), p. 4.55
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The socio-political ramifications of a world premised on aleatory event-encounters are 
explored through a detailed examination of a Lucretian ontology (and writings upon 
this by Louis Althusser, Alain Badiou and others).  The event-encounter is proposed as 56
a site within which the artistic intervention should focus the potential affect it might 
have, as a destabilised moment where agency can be enacted to disrupt stasis. Aleatory 
materialism, within which motion is primary, implicitly asserts change, a future, and 
agency.  57
Part 3 proceeds to examine Jacques Derrida’s notion of hospitality, premised on a 
situated perpetual indebtedness of guest to host.  I argue that there is an equivalence 58
between the guest in actuality being permanently upon the threshold, subject to the 
host’s power, and the technosphere’s control over us at the perpetual point of evental 
threshold. Considered in such a way, hospitality is a materially inscribed and 
embodied manifestation of indebtedness within which life must occur, which presents 
itself as a false form of care. Rather than being a specific financial-capitalist form, I 
 Thomas Nail, Lucretius I: An Ontology of Motion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 56
2018).
Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-87, ed. by François Matheron 
and Oliver Corpet, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006).  
Alain Badiou, Being and Event [1988], trans. by Oliver Feltham (New York, NY: Continuum, 
2005).
 Althusser.57
 Jacques Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’, trans. by Barry Stocker, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical 58
Humanities, 5:3 (2000), 3-18.
Jacques Derrida, ‘The Principle of Hospitality’, trans. by Ashley Thompson, Parallax, 11:1 (2005), 
6-9.
Anne Dufourmantelle and Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
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consider debt (introduced in Part 1 as a key mechanism in technospheric abstraction of 
the human into individuated subject-resource) as a broader manifestation of a power 
relationship: an inequality of which the specific mechanics can transform through 
multiple different technologies of power.  Via hospitality, a contingently arrived at 59
indebtedness is inscribed upon the vast majority of humans, and is subsequently 
presented as inevitable. Using the Lucretian discourse to emphasise its aleatory 
contingency though, we might remind ourselves that this hospitality-stasis is transient 
and contestable. Connecting together indebtedness, Derrida’s writing on hospitality, 
and a Lucretian ontology in this way is a key original sub-point which elucidates a 
present logic of proprietorial stasis requiring a radicality to de-stabilise. 
Having thus established the urgent need for the radical act, Part 3 considers ideas of 
love and friendship as means of producing a pro-human equality, addressing Arendt’s, 
Badiou’s and Derrida’s writings on these subjects.  Though each holds helpful aspects, 60
their respective grounding in the sovereign individual and tendency towards 
connections premised on proximity lead me to turn, in preference, to care. 
 This broader understanding of debt follows Lazzaretto, Virno and Graeber.59
Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. 
by Joshua David Jordan (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2012).
Virno.
David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (New York NY: Melville House, 2011).
 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine.60
Alain Badiou with Nicolas Truong, In Praise of Love [2009], trans. by Peter Bush (New York NY: 
The New Press, 2012).
Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London: Verso, 1997).
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A multifaceted understanding of care, and its urgency, is built up through considering 
the advocated de-individuation and relations of embodiment and disembodiment 
developed through the preceding parts. At a meta-level, care for the concept and text in 
all of its complexity, contextuality, potentiality and affect is held alongside critical care’s 
equal focus on the material.  The material, corporeal implications of textual violence 61
(and resulting urgency of multifaceted care) are emphasised, drawing on Anne Boyer’s 
and Christina Sharpe’s visceral depictions, in the contexts of pharma-capitalism and 
the wake of transatlantic slavery respectively.  62
Care is developed as a ‘fidelity’ according to Badiou’s use of the term, wherein it can 
pass through the ([in]hospitable, appropriated) threshold to the future.  This is a key 63
sub-point, which enables inter-human care to operate in relation to, as well as with 
autonomy from, the technosphere.   
Part 3 concludes by offering a cohesive articulation of radical care. A simultaneous bi-
directionality between the caring and the radical is emphasised: only through one 
another can they be sustainably held thinkable, and thought hope-able. With the 
contributions of the research project iteratively refolding through one another, the 
introduction to radical care which follows below will frame the reader’s encounter 
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics.61
Michelle Murphy, ‘Unsettling care: Transnational itineraries of care in feminist health practices’, 
Social Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 717-737.
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with both Praxis and the parts and scenes to come within Lexis, which will themselves 
feed into the full conceptualisation of radical care offered in Part 3.  
The interconnected elements of individuating, dehumanising processes within the 
technosphere, and the self-perpetuation of this profoundly unequal structure as framed 
in the preceding parts, form the context radical care is a response to.
Radical care closely connects with ‘critical care’ as developed by Maria Puig de la 
Bellacasa; Aryn Martin, Natasha Myers and Ana Viseu; Michelle Murphy; and others.  64
Critical care emphasises a self-reflexivity and continuous reconsideration and 
contestation of what it itself is: care for the concept itself. As part of this, Puig de la 
Bellacasa especially emphasises a need to care for the existent discourse; to see the new 
contribution not as a superseding replacement, but instead as a further supplementary 
perspective to be weighed by others alongside what is already there, taking care to 
acknowledge those whose work one is building upon.  Thus I do not propose radical 65
care as a ‘development’ of critical care, but as an augmenting difference of focus.    
Critical care incorporates a slowing down and acknowledgement of complexity, an 
emotional co-investiture over sustained time, material acts of labour and provision for, 
attention and concern for something (something which one may not be the principal 
 Puig de la Bellacasa, ‘Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling neglected things’.64
Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics.
Aryn Martin, Natasha Myers and Ana Viseu, ‘The politics of care in technoscience’, Social 
Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 625-641.
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 Puig de la Bellacasa,  Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics.65
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affectee of), a troubled-ness with the current state of things, and both affect and 
affection.  It sets out a need for these forms of care in response to the escalating 66
inequality continuing through accelerating forms of proprietorial dehumanisation.
I argue that while critical care offers an absolutely vital way of being in response to 
technospheric inequalities, it risks being too slow at times and thus falling into a 
responsive, reactive position in relation to the ever faster abstract systems affecting our 
lives. Radical care (which can only come out of an established, nurtured, reflexive basis 
in critical care) is thus proposed as a means of having proactive, disruptive affect 
within this context. The radically caring act (which might be an artistic intervention) is 
paradoxically carelessly flung forward into and ahead of the paths accelerating out 
from the systems and structures constituting and reproducing our world. In anarchic, 
playful, wild uncontrolled-ness, might the carefree act (nevertheless rooted in care) 
disrupt and diverge (im)possible futures?    
The majority of these radically caring careless acts will inevitably be ineffective, or 
worse: harmful. However, the need for systemic change, which I establish, nevertheless 
necessitates the attempt, with the current state of being increasingly exploitative and 
unequal, and permitted modes of critique or challenge foreclosed or ineffective. Here 
though, critical care again becomes integral to radical care. Not only does the extensive 
work of critical care affect that which might be thought in the moment as being the 
urgent act, but critical care must be cast forward into the future along with the act, by 
both actor and potential affectee. That an expansion of critical care might be intuitively 
intended to be the future result of the immediate, radical act by the actor is premised 
 Murphy, p. 721.66
Puig de la Bellacasa,  Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 5.
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on their preceding commitment to critical care. This is vital in holding the intent of the 
act away from either self-interest or nihilism. The potential affectee’s casting forward of 
critical care is harder due to the potential for unintended harm. A pre-commitment to 
an acceptance of the unintentionality of this eventuality, and a pre-forgiveness is 
needed here. This is the hardest part of radical care, and can only be realised through 
the mutual ongoing commitment to critical care. It is vital though, in order to act and 
instigate possible change, in a proactively disruptive, resistant way, towards the 
accelerating systems and structures affecting us all and extending inequalities. 
 Radical care is thus an ethics: rather than being a rigid moralistic imposition, it is self-
reflexively developed through networks of encounter-events. 
It is also a politics: it is promulgated through the social and necessarily full of 
discussion, compromise, and ongoing re-consideration. It is worked out, and worked 
on, together. 
Through this ethical and political basis, a set of advocated methodologies of both art 
and ‘being’ emerge. These include, but are not limited to: a commitment to the other, 
an investment of time in their life and their concerns, an ongoing attempt to further 
one’s understanding of their context; an acknowledging of the importance of affection 
and emotive bond; a recognising and discussing of difference and inequality. And 
through a committed critically caring basis, a permission to act with proactive 
immediacy into, and in instigation of, unknown futures.  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PART 1: WORK
How does the technosphere use de-humanising abstraction to subsume labour, the body, the 
artist and the future?67
Part 1 begins by introducing the concept of the ‘technosphere’, and the economic logics 
which underpin it. An abstracting reduction of agency is identified as running through 
the technosphere, manifested in textual forms. Of these manifestations, the 
unavoidable imposition of indebtedness upon the subject is particularly notable. 
Focus then shifts to art’s enmeshment and complicity within currently dominant 
structures. This becomes clear in tracing its entwined history within them, 
necessitating a critical self-reflexivity which art has frequently insufficiently held. Part 1 
ends in considering how, through an acknowledgment of this and an emphasis on ‘pro-
human’ qualities, artistic interventions might conceivably enable resistance.
 As noted in the Introduction, though Part 1 begins with this question, it goes on to start to 67
further unfold the concerns and questions of the research project as a whole.
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The technosphere: an all-encompassing textual context
I use the term ‘technosphere’ as a placeholder to stand in for the fluidly indefinable, 
un-fully knowable, entangled global system of capitalism, technology, economy and 
socio-cultural relations within which we by definition exist. I use this term following 
on from the Technosphere Magazine research project convened by Haus der Kulturen der 
Welt, exploring the ecologically affecting and creating implications (in the broadest 
supra-biological sense) of our current and future technological context.  68
Text and language are central to the technosphere, thus at the outset I want to briefly 
divert into etymology. The technosphere is a structural entity formed with and through 
the period frequently termed the anthropocene.  However, whereas the suffix ‘-cene’ 69
evokes a temporal epoch (holocene, pleistocene, etc.), ‘-sphere’ is suggestive of a 
complex self-perpetuating system, possibly somewhat spatially situated (hydrosphere, 
biosphere, etc.). In the discussion which follows, I explore a temporal compression into 
only the present, negating the relevance of -‘cene’. ‘-Sphere’, on the other hand, does 
accurately reflect the tendency towards a totality implicit within our current 
technological neoliberal hegemony. Turning to the prefixes, while the ‘techno-’ is (thus 
far at least) human made, it has become a structure which subsumes and, I will argue, 
diminishes the human (or at least the majority of us). Thus a focus on ‘techno-’ is more 
 Technosphere Magazine [website/research project initiated by Haus der Kulturen der Welt] 68
(2015-19) <https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 While alternative designations such as the ‘capitalocene’ can be argued as being more 69
accurate, ‘anthropocene’ is the most prevalent of such terms within the general discourse.
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applicable than the now somewhat nostalgic ‘anthropo-’.  If a temporal designation is 70
to be used, ‘post-human’ seems more apt. However, I do not accept this term of self-
extinction: ways of reasserting the human, ways of being human, will be a central 
thread running throughout this text. This seeking of ways of being for all, as indicated 
in its title, is the fundamental spine of this research project.
The technosphere as a concept describes our increasingly networked and digitised 
ecology, but also increasingly determines it. Like any ecosystem, it feeds back into the 
actions and thinking of the organisms within it: us. The matter forming the 
technosphere is text, and especially the vast and exponentially increasing subset of it 
which we call data. A constellation of key technologies have matured in the fields of 
communications and computation with the effect that the means by which we 
experience the world around us, and are experienced (and recorded) by it, are 
increasingly written. Written in hypertext, in algorithm, and in quantified data-sets. 
The digital, textual world is no longer something we opt into through sitting down at 
the computer terminal, but is something we are continuously part of: through the 
cloud, the mobile phone recording and broadcasting data from our pocket, the voice 
assistant devices listening in at home, the cameras recording ever more of our activity, 
and the abstracted (and increasingly automated) global financial flows affecting funds 
available for everything from the local school to the next war. Our communications and 
relationships increasingly pass through digital channels, and even the most ‘human’ 
areas of activity; imagination, love and death; become digital through virtual reality 
 Tsing also argues that ‘anthropo-’ prevents useful attention from being given to the non-70
human elements (technological or otherwise) of the assemblages within which we live. And 
additionally, typical use of the prefix exclusively connects the notion of the human to the effects 
of capitalism, overlooking other facets.   
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), pp. 19-20.
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and 3D rendering, artificial intelligence and robotics, and killing by drone strike from a 
computer-game interface in a bunker on the other side of the planet.  
Benjamin Bratton uses a different term, ‘the stack’, but in exploring this he outlines a 
multilayered architecture of the technosphere: an overlapping sequence of 
interdependent layers of earth, cloud, city, interface, address, and user.  He 71
emphasises, importantly, that while the technosphere becomes all-encompassing as a 
contemporary context, it is not a singular totality (and certainly not a singularly 
authored or designed one). Rather, it is a meta-network of entwined pseudo-totalities 
and would-be totalities overlaying one another, operating through different vertically 
stacked levels, sometimes incongruous to one another. The cumulative effect though, is 
to build up this experienced meta-structure of contemporary life rendered in code, 
algorithm and text. Also importantly, Bratton observes that rather than heralding the 
end of physical geographies (or nation states and other entities conceived in such 
terms), the technosphere is witnessing a rapidly shifting still-in-flux set of possible 
relations to these.  How these settle will be key to our collective future. Dematerialised 72
digitalisation of life and work does remove some of the historic centralities of 
geography, but national and supra-national boundaries, digital citizenships, variable 
 Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2015), p. 71
11.
The un-fully-graspable nature of the entity under consideration results in a range of terms 
which variously centre attention upon different aspects of it. Guattari’s concept of ‘Integrated 
World Capitalism’ is another overlapping label, in this case particularly emphasising the 
reflexive affect of the structure within the individual’s mind. 




tax regimes, and territorially determined legislation around data have never been more 
important.    73
A multifaceted context, the technosphere describes and (re)produces our current 
experience, but is comprised of an agglomeration of elements that have coalesced over 
time. Key underpinnings include, on the economic side, the emergence of a singular 
interconnected global hegemony of neoliberal capital; and on the political side, the 
unquestionable authority of the state and security apparatus to conduct surveillance 
and collect data, with the continuously reiterated threat of the terrorist acting as a kind 
of trump card, as brought to prominent attention by Edward Snowden. 
In its networked decentralisation, the technosphere in some respects might resemble 
Karl Marx’s foresighted notion of the general intellect.  However, as Paolo Virno 74
argues, if publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of the public sphere 
(e.g. is not considered in a public political space) then rather than proving liberatory, 
this false ‘general intellect’ drastically increases forms of unequal submission and 
exploitation.  As I will go on to explore, despite the utopian potential sometimes 75
claimed for it, the technosphere carries through itself all of the structures of privilege, 
inequality and exploitation which precede it, and more.
 Sites, material or otherwise, and our location in relation to them, are a key subject which will 73
be specifically addressed in Part 2.
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [1857-61], trans. by 74
Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 690-712.
Part 2 returns to address this idea in greater depth.
 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For An Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. by 75
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 
39.
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Platform capitalism: economic driver of accelerating inequality
With technologies and data becoming increasingly pivotal within our context, platform 
capitalism can be considered the technosphere’s currently hegemonic, data-centric 
economic logic. Platform capitalism is key in expanding the technosphere into the 
rapidly shrinking spaces in which it is not yet dominant, and at the same time 
diminishing agency for the majority of subjected individuals.  
It is important to explore this economic context. Work, debt and value are ingrained 
into us from an early age as intricately connected to identity, esteem and agency: both 
the neoliberal capitalist and the Marxist acknowledge this.   
Nick Srnicek argues for the adoption of the term ‘platform capitalism’ to describe the 
current economic and by extension social, political and cultural hegemony emanating 
out of Silicon Valley ideology.  The institutions and activities underpinning it, and best 76
exemplifying it, tend to emerge from, or are most developed in, high-income North 
America and Europe (as borne out by Srnicek’s case studies), but integral to the form is 
that it can rapidly spread across the globe, operating primarily in ephemeral, digital 
space.  Platform capitalism can be considered a specifically current new form within 77
post-Fordism, and as was the case within labour structures expressive of that paradigm 
 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2016). 76
(Part 2 examines how the economic has subsumed the social, political and cultural.)
 This is a generalisation. Other high-income countries such as Israel or Australia also fit the 77
pattern.
China, with its largely distinct internet ecology, could well be another core site of platform 
capitalism. However, the country’s semi-separation from the ‘global’ internet has (until recently 
at least) acted as a partial brake on the broader spread of platforms originating from China.
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as they became increasingly hegemonic from around 1970, while it tends towards 
totality or at least preeminence, it does not exclude the possibility of localised pockets 
of previous structures. In fact, it relies upon them, an irony which I will return to. As a 
presently dominant logic, it is important here to outline platform capitalism and assess 
how it might be differentiated from broader post-Fordist structures, forming a related 
but new paradigm.
Key to Srnicek’s conception of platform capitalism is an emphasis on data and 
information, principally recording human characteristics, activities and relationships.  78
The collection and deployment of this data, he argues, is key to the emerging economic 
regime, with control of information beginning to supersede ownership of (other) 
means of production. This centrality of data will be returned to and explored in depth.
As suggested by the name, the key institution within platform capitalism is the 
platform. These are private companies, or parts within companies, which position 
themselves at the point of exchange between two or more other parties making use of 
exponentially increasing networked technology. Nothing material is produced, and 
frequently a service is not directly provided; rather, the platform facilitates the 
exchange between the party that wants and the party that offers. An example such as 
Uber or Air BnB is very clear in this regard: the platform simply connects together 
drivers and lift-seekers, or hosts and accommodation-hunters. In these two cases an 
immediate profit in the form of a financial cut is instantly taken from the transaction, 
however an additional profit is the data extracted. It is this data (on location, on time, 
on willingness to pay, on congestion, on frequency, on popularity and so forth, as well 
 Ibid.78
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as identity characteristics of the users at both sides of the exchange) that is 
continuously collected and analysed, which allows these platforms to increase scale 
and efficiencies and out-compete would-be rivals (operating temporarily at a loss, 
when necessary, to do so). Thus, a tendency towards monopolisation is a characteristic 
of platform capitalism. 
I will not go into detail regarding the financial conditions enabling the burgeoning of 
platform capitalism here, other than to note that the extreme concentration of capital at 
present, combined with (by 1945 to 2008 standards) low growth rates, means 
speculative investments in new tech start-ups are frequent (fitting the financialised 
trend of speculation on risk being a chief economic characteristic of neoliberalism).  79
The sector acts as a repository of surplus capital as well as a generator of it. 
Uber and Air BnB are examples of what Srnicek labels ‘lean platforms’, the functioning 
of which is relatively simple, as outlined above.  In other forms of platform, the data-80
extracting underpinnings of the company can be somewhat more hidden, or 
interwoven with preceding forms of profit generation.  
 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge 79
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
 Srnicek, p. 49.80
It is worth noting that the micro-targeted extraction and exploitation of bodily labour around 
which other lean platforms are built (detailed examination and first-hand recollection of which 
is included in Part 2) is not so directly the case for Air BnB. However, while property acts as a 
distancing layer, Air BnB makes a significant contribution to the ongoing translation of 
‘dwelling’ towards becoming a potentially profitable (and thus exploitable) asset. At a structural 
level, it is thus no less complicit in bodily violence through the resultant inadequacy and un-
affordability of urgently needed homes in many locations around the world. 
Furthermore, opportunistic ‘sub-platforms’ directly exploiting bodily labour, of cleaners or 
launderers for example, are usually part of the Air BnB ecology in cities where it has a large 
presence.
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 The ‘advertising platform’ category is dominated by two companies: Facebook and 
Google (accruing 12.3% and 55.2% of 2016 global online advertising revenue 
respectively).  Each generates a financial profit through adverting. Each offers various 81
financially free services to users (who number in their billions) such as access to 
information, or social interaction. Data is collected on all aspects of each user’s every 
engagement with the platform.  This data enables a constantly improving micro-82
targeted product to be offered (warding off competition), but also enables highly 
segmented and specified advertising to be sold on an enormous scale. These 
advertising platforms indisputably operate within Herbert Simon’s concept of the 
‘attention economy’, as Claudio Celis Bueno explores.  However, whereas the 83
‘attention economy’ is still rooted in labour time (albeit in relatively non-strenuous 
activity), I will argue that the key distinguishing factor of platform capitalism is an 
extraction of value from individuals’ ‘being’, irrespective of time or attention. 
‘Cloud platforms’ and ‘industrial platforms’, as Srnicek labels them, are less well 
known as they do not primarily orientate themselves towards the general public.  84
Amazon Web Services (AWS) is an until recently little known but increasingly 
 Ibid.81
Christian Fuchs, ‘Towards the Public Service Internet as Alternative to the Commercial Internet’, 
ORF Texte, 20 (2017), 43-50.
 Through apps on our phones, the browser we use, and dowloaded cookies, along with 82
conveniently being able to log-in to other sites using our Facebook or Google identity (not to 
mention numerous corporate acquisitions), interaction with these platforms now expands far 
beyond what might immediately spring to mind.
 Claudio Celis Bueno, The Attention Economy: Labour, Time and Power in Cognitive Capitalism 83
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 10.
 Srnicek.84
Though I follow Srnicek’s five platform taxonomy here, it is arguable that his cloud platforms 
are a (particularly important) sub-type of ‘product platform’, with rental within the cloud 
replacing capital investment in e.g. a server.
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profitable part of Amazon. It is a cloud platform: flexibly renting remote server space 
and associated services to whoever wants them. (And many of those who want them 
are themselves platforms using the service to enable extremely rapid scaling up, Uber 
being a notable example.) Amazon can then extract vast amounts of useable data from 
the raw information stored on its servers. This not only enables the continuing market 
dominance of AWS, but also feeds into myriad other aspects of Amazon’s business 
(many parts of which also function as types of platform). Platforms on the scale of 
Amazon, Google and Facebook, with vast capital reserves, are complex multifaceted 
businesses, veering far away from the strip-back-to-the-core emphasis of the preceding 
generation of business orthodoxy. A wide variety of new services can be developed, all 
ultimately connected to the exploitation or collection of data. Different services can 
cross-fertilise data with others, with some at times being subsidised in order to further 
facilitate this. 
The principal ‘industrial platforms’ are highly funded projects within companies which 
would not immediately be thought of as platforms. Siemens and General Electric 
continue to be manufacturers, but in addition to this they are both competing with 
their own versions of a universal standard for an intelligent production process.  Both 85
are investing heavily to become the adopted standard, but whichever platform comes 
to dominate will be able to collect huge amounts of information on industrial processes 
(including competitors’), all the more so as automation increases. Being less directly 
connected to individuals, some of the discussion that follows is less relevant to 
industrial platforms.  
 Ibid.85
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Srnicek’s final platform type are ‘product platforms’, employing a model where 
something that would once have been a one-off capital investment is instead sold as an 
ongoing rental agreement, with the behaviour of the renter then providing ongoing 
usable data.  Spotify would be a familiar example of this type of platform. As with the 86
lean platforms, there is a direct financial profit extracted in this type, however, it is the 
harvesting and deploying of data that enables established companies to deter would-be 
competitors. It should though be noted that for lean and product platforms this 
deterrence is imperfect: much more so than for Google, Amazon or Facebook; Spotify, 
Uber and their like do face realistic competitors. They do not have the same scale and 
breadth of means of collecting data to completely lock others out.  
In concluding his overview of platform capitalism, Srnicek notes its colonialist impulse: 
seeking new areas of human (inter-)activity as terrains to be colonised for the 
extraction of data.  As I will address, this colonising impulse also has a strong 87
temporal element, seeking to control and own individuals’ futures and deny their 
agency over them. Puncturing the liberating, non-hierarchical rhetoric the platforms 
employ, Srnicek observes ‘this is not the end of ownership, but rather the concentration 
of ownership’, and within this we can expand the meaning of ownership out from the 
financial or commodified to incorporate body, agency, time and future.  At present, 88
Srnicek’s call for not-for-profit collective or publicly owned platforms seems 
unachievable given the general public’s apparent willingness to give over their data. 
The entrenched positions of the big platforms means legislation rather than 
competition would seem to be the only way to challenge their position, but despite 
 Ibid.86
 Ibid., p. 98.87
 Ibid., p. 92.88
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attempted European Union regulation, this seems unlikely in the current neoliberal 
context.89
 ‘European Commission Antitrust: Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive 89
practices in online advertising’, European Commission website (20 March 2019) <https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Foo Yun Chi, ‘Facebook in EU antitrust crosshairs over data collection’, Reuters website (2 
December 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-facebook-antitrust/facebook-in-eu-
antitrust-crosshairs-over-data-collection-idUSKBN1Y625J> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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The emergence of post-Fordism
To more fully contextualise platform capitalism, it is important to address some of the 
key underpinning elements of post-Fordism which have carried through into it, 
sometimes becoming further exacerbated. 
A concept originally introduced by Baruch Spinoza, Virno presents the ‘multitude’ as 
the resulting social organisation under current neoliberal conditions of labour and 
capital.  For Virno, the multitude is statically reproduced through economic 90
conditions, a differing emphasis from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s view that it 
holds the potential of liberation from current capitalism.  Virno’s multitude stands in 91
place of ‘the people’, existing in a continual state of displacement and isolated anguish. 
The multitude are reliant on their cognitive and linguistic capability to seek connection 
where there are no longer communities, and work is rendered more and more 
‘virtuosic’.  Even when an individual’s formal employment might include the 92
production of something, Virno argues that they are subject to a dominant regime of 
virtuosic labour, where both in and out of nominal work they must linguistically 
perform merely to survive. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Theodore Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer set out an argument that the culture industries did in fact still conform to 
the Fordist criteria of serialisation, parcelization, and so forth.  However, for Virno it 93
was the performance or creation rendered at those sites, rather than their economic or 
 Virno.90
 Pascal Gielen, The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude: Global Art, Politics and Post-Fordism 91
(Amsterdam: Valiz, 2009), p. 24.
 Virno, p. 56.92
 Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], trans. by Edmund 93
Jephcott (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 94-136.
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institutional underpinnings, which has borne more relevance in subsequent post-
Fordism.  That virtuosity has unfolded across all sectors of labour. 94
Whereas for the Frankfurt School unhappiness was derived from separation from 
society, Virno argues it is the opposite, the absolute interweaving, which creates 
perpetual pathological crisis as any distinct sense of self is lost and linguistic 
reassertion must be continually performed.  In concluding, he notes that in rendering 95
linguistic-relational capabilities its primary productive resource, contemporary 
capitalism has shifted to seek profit in precisely what makes us human.  Virno was 96
writing before the large-scale uptake of social media, and network and data storage 
capacities have increased vastly since; platform capitalism can be viewed as a more 
coordinated attempt to directly monetise and exploit those linguistic-relational 
capabilities being used outside of the formal workplace.   
Looking to the emergence of a post-Fordist labour context (coming about with and 
through the ’68 revolutions, Fiat strikes, oil shocks, fragmenting of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971, and myriad other related events), Pascal Gielen offers a hypothesis that 
the early modern art world had long foreshadowed this new model, being rooted in 
the very same labour characteristics which came to define post-Fordism.  He argues 97
artists had functioned as a vanguard for the new regime, with their work being rooted 
in communication, virtuosity, informality, mobility and opportunism long before 1968. 
This positioning of artists as hyper-flexible is rather romantic and can certainly be 
 Virno, p. 58.94
 Ibid., p. 79.95
 Ibid., p. 98.96
 Gielen.97
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questioned, ignoring as it does the messy complexity of any individual artist’s social, 
familial, economic and legal context, and their varying need for stability and security. 
Art fairs and biennials (and in some cases residencies) often function as abstracted 
spaces without commitment to the reality of their site, and presume a similarly 
abstracted disembodiment of the artist: without commitments or responsibilities. The 
model presumed is one of a modernist engagement of abstract surface to abstract 
surface, ignoring the complexities of politics, production, labour and life that lie 
behind: ‘being’ is erased.   98
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello also see an important role played by art in the shift to 
post-Fordism.  However, whereas Gielen emphasises forms of labour undertaken by 99
the artist, they focus on the role of artistic critique of the preceding Fordist regime. 
While a simultaneous social critique coming from the political left and rooted in 
equality was defeated, it was in accepting and incorporating (or coopting) the artistic 
critique rooted in freedom and liberation from constraints (including the constraints of 
Fordist work) that Boltanski and Chiapello see Fordism shifting into post-Fordism.  100
Silvia Federici’s critique of Hardt and Negri’s use of the term ‘affective labour’ offers 
an alternative starting point for the emergence of post-Fordism.  In arguing that the 101
 These are key ideas expanded on in Parts 2 and 3.98
As discussed in Praxis, ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ as a methodology of artistic 
practice explicitly looks to move beyond these abstractions of both artist and site within the 
encounter.
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’, International Journal of 99
Politics, Culture and Society, 18 (2005), 161-188.
 Ibid.100
 Silvia Federici, ‘On Affective Labour’, in Cognitive Capitalism, Education and Digital Labour ed. 101
by Michael Peters and Ergin Bulut (New York NY: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 57-73.
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unacknowledged core of the term is (typically female) reproductive labour taking place 
in and around the kitchen, the bedroom and the home, she constructs an argument that 
Tronti’s ‘social factory’ began in the home and progressed out from there to the 
acknowledged workplace, rather than vice versa.  It was in predominantly female, 102
unvalorised affective labour that the key qualities of post-Fordism (a blurring between 
work and not-work, ‘remote’ working, flexibility, informality, communication, etc.) 
originated. Despite these characteristics now being highly valued in nominally 
productive and financially remunerated labour, they are still completely overlooked in 
their domestic and reproductive contexts. Where reproductive labour does on occasion 
cross over into the financial economy (in the form of outsourced childcare, cleaning, 
care work, etc.), it is almost always low-paid (and devalorised) and disproportionately 
conducted by (typically female) immigrants and/or ‘people of colour’. Fraser notes 
that within certain strands of feminism an overemphasis on ‘emancipation’ from 
previous social control, allied with marketisation and neoliberalism, has led to a new 
triangulation where social reproduction is increasingly re-externalised onto those who 
face compound inequalities of race, class, nationality and so forth.  This mirrors the 103
 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist Struggle 102
(Oakland CA: PM Press, 2012).
Mario Tronti, Workers and Capital [1966], trans. by David Broder (London: Verso, 2019), pp. 
12-35.
 Nancy Fraser, ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’, New Left Review, 100 (2016), 99-117.103
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disjuncture opened up between ‘freedom’ and equality which Boltanski and Chiapello 
articulate.  104
As Helen Hester observes, current discourses of post-work and automation, 
predominantly coming from men, too often overlook the potential for furthering 
equality that well-considered application of technology to reproductive labour could 
bring.  We should perhaps not be surprised to find platform capitalism and the 105
technosphere it inhabits to be premised on a profound inequality, when the post-
Fordist context out of which it has emerged was similarly premised on structurally 
embedded hierarchies from its very beginnings. Alongside limitless natural resources, 
a second false premise of capitalism is a limitless supply of unpaid care, and this is not 
changing in the emergence of platform capitalism.  In being unpaid, this care, while 106
relied upon, is accorded no value according to the logic of the technospheric structure.
 Boltanski and Chiapello. 104
Srnicek and Williams’ concept of ‘synthetic freedom’ offers a means of addressing this 
disjuncture; arguing that any freedom is synthetic, e.g. produced, and the conditions of that 
production (which affect it) are formed within a context of (in)equality. Thus freedom cannot be 
considered independently of equality.  
Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work 
(London: Verso, 2015), pp. 78-83.
 Helen Hester, After Work: What’s left and Who Cares?, presentation at Goldsmiths College, 105
University of London, 22 February 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ynnGV3RHy2c> [Accessed 2 January 2021].




A new paradigm centred on data
Certainly technological development and the further prevailing global dominance of 
neoliberal structures mean that there has been a quantitative acceleration of tendencies 
already present within post-Fordism. Whether platform capitalism marks a qualitative 
shift to a wholly new paradigm will likely only be able to be authoritatively argued in 
looking back with greater hindsight. However, I hold that its particular basis in data 
acquisition and exploitation sets it apart.
A blurring of the boundary between work and not-work, an ever-increasing emphasis 
on affective and immaterial labour more and more rooted in linguistic-relational 
capability as the source of value, and a convergence of consumption and production. 
All of these elements, notable within post-Fordism, can be seen reaching a further 
extreme, simultaneously both cause and effect, within platform capitalism. Gielen 
argues that it is speed and acceleration in these areas which distinguishes the current 
state of post-Fordist work from previous iterations.  The argument I make here goes 107
further, tallying with Matteo Pasquinelli’s assertion that the emergence of ‘big data’ is 
the centre point making platform capitalism qualitatively different, with individuals 
now economically functioning as infinite sources of data, rather than predominantly 
being recipients of it.108
Datafication and the computational potential for ever more sophisticated real-time 
analysis has two particularly concerning implications. A de-humanised, algorithmic 
 Gielen, p. 13.107
 Matteo Pasquinelli, ‘Italian Operaismo and the Information Machine’, Theory, Culture and 108
Society, 32:3 (2015), 49-68.
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real-time presumption of what is ‘likely’ or ‘normal’ is only a very short step away 
from ‘anomalies’ then being flagged-up or automatically permitted or disallowed.  109
With all aspects of our lives being ever increasingly trackable and traceable in such a 
way, datafication as a process (irrespective of the use that data is then put to) seems to 
promote conformity (in line with Michel Foucault’s understanding of governmentality 
being constituted in the practices of control, more so than their necessarily intended 
use).   Secondly, David Lyon notes that the surveillance tendency of big data acts to 110
tilt emphases all across consideration of events, behaviour and activity towards the 
future.  The potential to predict, manage and ultimately perhaps control the future 111
shifts the gaze away from attempting to understand or question complexities of history 
or context preceding or surrounding the present point. Control over what will happen 
negates the need for exploring how, or why, or what might have been.112
It is also interesting to note the continual use of security and safety as a justification for 
our data being collected. Lyon observes that the familiarity with, and general 
acceptance of, the need for data surveillance as a state security measure primes the 
digital public for giving over their data.  If it is already out there, being recorded for 113
security purposes, it is an easy slippage to then accept its economic use as well. There 
is an echo here of Guy Debord’s exploration of the terrorist figure as a returned to 
 David Lyon, ’Surveillance, Snowden and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique’, Big 109
Data & Society, 1:2 (2014) <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053951714541861> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. 110
by Michel Senellart, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2009).
 Lyon.111




device presented as justifying general paternalistic surveillance and control.  114
However, the technological advances made in the decades that have passed since its 
writing mean Debord’s caveat that ‘the quantity of data demands constant 
summarising: much of it will be lost, and what remains is still too long to read’ now 
only serves to remind us that the opposite has become the case.     115
It is worth reemphasising that new labour paradigms do not immediately completely 
replace the previous. Preceding forms continue to exist, often indefinitely, subsumed as 
anachronisms within the new hegemony. Though they may be devalued, they are often 
in fact crucial foundations; consider for example the vast manufacture of hardware and 
infrastructure that underpins the supposedly dematerialised businesses of platform 
capitalism. 
Federici makes the important point that this persistence of previous regimes is not 
neutral.  In an echo of unacknowledged reproductive labour being chiefly put upon 116
women outside of the acknowledged (and paid) sphere of production, a (neo-)colonial 
structure pushes and off-shores these preceding forms of labour (chiefly primary and 
secondary sectors) to lower-income regions of the world. Simultaneously with being 
pushed away, these forms of labour are also devalued under a dominant discourse 
further and further privileging linguistic-relational and immaterial labour, though not 
when these labour types fall within the reproductive sphere. That Apple products 
display their ‘designed in California’ (not even the USA) status ahead of their 
 Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle [1988], trans. by Malcolm Imrie (London: 114
Verso, 1998), p. 24.
 Ibid., p. 81.115
 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero.116
68
‘assembled (not even made) in China’ materiality is succinctly illustrative of this. As a 
broader evocation of the aforementioned abstracted surface non-realities of the biennial 
or art-fair, platform capitalism likewise presents itself as a free-floating shimmer, not 
acknowledging its hidden roots connecting deeply back into the devalorised physical 
and material. The continuous global (re)presentation of such a steep differentiation of 
value (and thus aspiration) presents profound ethical questions around e.g. 
immigration and deportation when we acknowledge that it is in fact rooted in an 
ongoing implicit colonial geography of enforcement and exploitation.  117
One of the most devalorised categories of labour by necessity remaining physically 
proximate to privileged individuals and societies is material care work, particularly 
that which involves direct engagement with bodily matter. That this work exists (and 
as populations age it increases, e.g. in caring for the elderly) directly contradicts the 
Silicon Valley drive towards superseding the body. There is a devalorising of the work 
as it sits low down on the virtuosic labour ladder, but there is simultaneously an 
intentionally stubborn overlooking and under-recognising of it as it forces us to 
confront our own messy bodily-ness. This most material of cares is vital to recognise. 
Capitalist technologies of automation, scaling-up and commoditisation are frequently 
less applicable to care work like this, thus there is a rational capitalist incentive to 
maintain a pool of un- or under-paid workers as a means of providing this essential 
labour while limiting its relative ‘expense’, so long as the presently hegemonic logic of 
capital is accepted as an inevitability.  Part 3 will develop a multifaceted notion of 118
 I explore this spatiality further in Part 2, including how processes of micro-targeted, 117
individuated subjectification produce a ‘proximate periphery’ of devalorised labour, in addition 
to a remote one.
 Micki McGee, ‘Capitalism’s Care Problem: Some Traces, Fixes and Patches’, Social Text, 38:1 118
(2020), 39-66 (p. 42).
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care incorporating political, textual and self-reflexive aspects, but this material care is 
essential to acknowledge as an element amidst these which is co-equal. Only in so 
doing can the critical and radical conceptions of care which are developed be held 
away from hypocrisy in their abstracting theorisations. 
A point of departure for an argument that platform capitalism does constitute a 
qualitative shift from post-Fordism might be Virno’s summation that ‘the primary 
productive resource of contemporary capitalism lies in the linguistic-relational 
capabilities of humans’.  Virno’s argument emphasises the means by which actively 119
engaged linguistic-relational capability is now the primary producer of value both 
within the nominal workplace and also in the ’social factory’.  However, that 120
capability must be actively performed by the subjects: as Virno writes, it operates as a 
flow or methodology of production of value. I propose that under platform capitalism 
(sixteen years after Virno’s writing), linguistic-relational capability (‘the very thing 
which makes us human’) is, furthermore, a more static (or at least automatic) resource 
from which value and potential profit can be extracted even when that capability is not 
made manifest in actual productive enactment.  We exist as exploitable 121
agglomerations of data even when we do not enact ourselves. As we allow platforms to 
intercept and mediate our interrelations, as data storage capacity means everything is 
recorded and available, as algorithms enable automated and immediate analysis and 
deployment of findings from that data, and as we are ever more permanently and 
deeply physiologically and psychologically connected into the network, that linguistic-
 Virno, p. 98.119
 Tronti, pp. 12-35.120
 Virno, p. 98.121
70
relational capability increasingly does not need to be actively performed by us.  It is 122
becoming something which is more passively always available to be mined and 
extracted from, rather than something actively done: our agency is diminished. It 
moves from functioning primarily in a verb-like way in Virno’s writing to additionally 
hold increasing noun-like qualities.  123
This passive subjectification might at first seem to contradict the speed and activity 
popularly associated with contemporary life. However, Gilles Deleuze provides a route 
through this apparent paradox.  Following his argument, all this busy-ness, necessary 124
to render ourselves perceptible as subjects within our context, is a simulacrum from the 
perspective of the structure we inhabit. It holds no affect or potentiality, serving solely 
as the necessary requirement to be rendered sensible to the enveloping structure as a 
subject. From the perspective of that structure (the technosphere) however, this mass of 
activity, read in aggregate, is passivity. It is the exhausting de-facto activity of base-line 
technospheric being.  125
 There is an irony in our word ‘data’ originating as the Latin plural of ‘datum’, meaning ’that 122
is given’. The active, conscious act of giving is becoming increasingly irrelevant to data in the 
contemporary context.
 Similarly, Boltanski and Chiapello’s ‘project-orientated cité’, rooted in activity (e.g. Virno’s 123
linguistic-relational virtuosity), can be seen as already being joined, if not surpassed, by a new 
cité where passivity (from the majority) suffices.
Boltanski and Chiapello.
 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense [1969], ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester 124
(New York NY: Continuum, 2004), p. 310-313.
 Another way of articulating this (which Part 2 will address in depth), is to consider the 125
political, while framed as being a site of dynamism, as becoming a subsumed, ‘bracketed-in’ 
space of inactivity within a broader conforming to the presumed busy-ness of the economic 
realm.
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This transfer to effective passivity is a gradual process, not a sudden change, but it is 
where I identify the paradigm shift into platform capitalism. To be clear, the active 
verb-like qualities of linguistic-relational capability are still very significant; the noun-
like qualities are emerging as an addition, not a replacement, for the moment at least. 
Quantified, datafied, abstracted human existence is becoming a resource, outstripping 
the need for human agency and creativity, especially given the parallel rapid 
developments of artificial intelligence and automation.126
 For the foreseeable future the technosphere will find some need for (i.e. profitability within) 126
human agency and creativity. As developed below though, the minority segment of society of 
whom these attributes are desired is becoming increasingly discrete from the remainder.
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Extending biopower
For Foucault, ‘life’ (in its modern, scientific conception) and labour as a recognised 
source of value emerged in tandem.  The mid-twentieth century welfare state can be 127
viewed instrumentally as being the most effective form of biopolitical governance to 
ensure some kind of control over the labour force, combined with reproduction of a 
future labour force. The trend towards data as pivotal resource, combined with the 
decline of the welfare state, allows and necessitates new forms of biopolitical control. 
However, the private ownership of our data upon which platform capitalism is 
premised means companies and other capitalist entities beyond the state are 
increasingly seeking to exert biopower upon us.128
Linguistic-relational capability becoming a deployable data-set has profound 
implications for biopolitics. An immanent future of massive extracted knowledge of 
this key aspect of our contemporary selves being instantly available and exploitable is 
emerging. It is becoming exponentially more feasible to influence desired patterns of 
action or thought at scale through the selective re-presentation back to us of that which 
we are algorithmically deemed susceptible to, whether for economic, political or other 
 Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era (Seattle WA: 127
University of Washington Press, 2008), p. 5.
That life and labour are thus entwined makes overt the connection between the emphasis on 
labour in this part (and Scene A which follows it) and the ‘ways of being’ of the project title.
 Though the terms ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ have been deployed with various meanings 128
and emphases, I use them here as established by Foucault. Biopolitics is a political logic which 
assumes the life of its subject population as its sphere, while biopower is the affect with relation 
to life which can be brought to bear upon that population.    
Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: I, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin, 1998).
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purposes.  Hardt and Negri emphasise the bi-directionality of the affective 129
relationship between individuals and data through the technological interface: as well 
as collecting vast data-sets which can be subsequently deployed, the technologies, and 
our panopticon-esque awareness of them, (both now much advanced from when Hardt 
and Negri wrote) can feed back into our brains and bodies to reciprocally affect our 
thinking and acting.  There is an easy slippage between selective use of data (which is 130
presented as representing ‘reality’), and an overlooking of the ensuing affect of the 
choices made in that data selection and representation within the reality that ensues 
following that event of re-presentation. Our world, including ourselves within it, cannot 
remain unaffected by these encounters with its purportedly ‘accurate’ representation. 
Gielen writes that the immaterial labour orientated working contexts of post-Fordism 
might offer opportunities for less traceable forms of unproductive resistance than was 
the case under previous regimes.  However, this argument under-reflects the 131
capability of surveillance and control. Furthermore, even if we do for the moment 
accept that resistance of some type can occur through unproductivity, that resistance is 
then premised on some form of active-ness to be unproductive within. If, as argued 
above, linguistic-relational capability is shifting to have a noun-like passive quality 
 Though perhaps atypical in being initiated with such clear specific intent, the recent 129
Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandal in which tens of millions of Facebook users 
unwittingly had their data ‘harvested’ such that they (and others assessed as having similar 
attributes and inclinations) could be targeted for electoral manipulation is a prominent recent 
example. This was a disturbing demonstration of how collected data can be, and will continue 
to be, used for much more significant psychologically embedded activity-determining purposes 
than targeted consumer advertising alone.
‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, Guardian website (2018-) <https://www.theguardian.com/
news/series/cambridge-analytica-files> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 130
p. 23.
 Gielen, p. 28.131
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under platform capitalism as well as an active verb one, then that route of resistance is 
shrinking as we no longer need necessarily be active to be productive; simply being is 
enough. The frequent use of the term ‘harvesting’ when describing the collection of our 
data is reflective of this: emphasising the passive, resource like positioning of the 
individual. (Even if it were possible to remove oneself and cease being within the 
world through total disconnection, this would entail alienating oneself from 
everything. Despite any proclaimed symbolic value, this abandonment of society 
would almost certainly be politically meaningless.)      
Maurizio Lazzarato writes of how through indebtedness (either in immediate personal 
form, or through living within a socio-economic logic permeated with debt) labour 
goes hand in hand with work on the self.  Our engagement with society becomes one 132
of continual promising, while at the same time working on our ability to meet those 
promises, and projecting an image of being able to do so. For Lazzarato, debt (rather 
than ‘neutral’ exchange) is the archetype of social relations and thus an asymmetry and 
 Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. 132
by Joshua David Jordan (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2012), p. 42.
Lazzarato emphasises, for example, how the unchosen act of being born connects one to the 
public debt of the state of which one is automatically rendered a citizen.
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inequality modelled on that of debtor and creditor is the basis of society.  Virno writes 133
similarly of the post-Fordist worker being employed on the basis of their potential 
virtuosic labour: their promise to deliver.  In projecting forward through demanding 134
continual promises of the worker, capitalism operates control over the future. However, 
as linguistic-relational capability gains its noun-like role and active-ness becomes less 
required under platform capitalism, with simply ‘being’ becoming increasingly 
sufficient (mediated via platforms extracting value), it is less labour that goes hand in 
hand with work on the self, and instead bare existence. Capitalism’s forward-projected 
control of the future is enacted through our simply continuing to exist in any at all 
socialised form.    
‘Self-care’ is interesting to briefly consider in these terms. In principal, caring for the 
self in the sense of granting oneself respite from the continual emphasis placed on 
being productive under neoliberalism makes sense, albeit with this self-care effectively 
being synonymous with the ‘work on the self’ discussed above (in preparing oneself 
 Ibid., p. 33.133
This point echoes Holloway, and Graeber also makes a similar argument: that debt is in origin 
an asymmetric power relationship stemming from property. Finance is merely a technology of 
encoding and enforcing this inequality and has, Graeber argues, in part developed specifically 
to serve this function.
John Holloway, ‘In the Beginning Was the Scream’, Common Sense, 11 (1991), 69-77.
David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (New York NY: Melville House, 2011) pp. 21-22.
This dystopian debt is very different to the positively framed positioning of debt as a basis for 
society and community which Foucault argues for. Whereas Foucault focusses on a reciprocal 
debt of care functioning as a premise for an ethical community, Lazarrato is writing in a more 
structurally and contextually grounded sense of an individuated debt of (potential) production, 
including of the future self. 
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, ed. by 
Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by David Macey (New York NY: Picador, 2003).
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for future productivity). However, the increasing circulation of representations of self-
care through channels such as Instagram over the past decade is indicative of self-care 
becoming fetishised as a commodity connected to an aspirationally envisaged form of 
being, alongside its established function in enabling the promise of future productivity. 
Echoing the means by which we passively produce value within platform capitalism, 
self-care is also shifting to having a ‘passive’ commodified value through its circulated 
representation, in addition to its function in preparing bodies for future work. In other 
words, it too is acquiring a noun-like, as well as verb-like, function and the image of 
self-care gradually supersedes any actuality of the process of self-care in economic 
importance (all the more as passive being increasingly becomes the required role of the 
majority). The individualism at the centre of a contemporary neoliberal understanding 
of self-care makes it very different from the forms of care which will be developed in 
Part 3.135
 Foucault’s writing on care for the self (which is returned to in Part 3) is, crucially, care for the 135
self and the other. In contrast to this neoliberal self-care, it is premised on committed, active 
participation in one another’s mutual self-examination.   
Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(New York NY: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 53.
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Subsumption of the future
A number of ways by which platform capitalism and the technosphere more broadly 
are exerting control over the future have been touched upon already, such as 
datafication tilting emphasis towards prediction (and through it control).  Going 136
further though, the technosphere is premised not only on predicting and controlling 
the future, but on collapsing the infinite possibilities inherent in ‘future’ and pulling 
and constraining them into the present. A belief in an open future, and a restating of 
that which is utopian, is pivotal to any real egalitarian agency: a holding out that things 
might be better is a key first step in actually achieving any element of that. A 
completely collapsed future denies any possibility of change, and thus any possibility 
of agency or autonomy. 
The technosphere’s drive to control the future can be likened to an attempt to reduce 
the Husserlian thickness of the present. Edmund Husserl theorised the moment as 
having a ‘thickness’, with the past and future present within it, holding an uncertainty 
within itself for a brief window before being inscribed into memory or history with 
attributed meaning.  Inherent to that thickened moment is a contestability and 137
plurality of agency to affect that inscribing, and the forming of future history. The 
accelerating foreclosing of this uncertainty, and increasingly singular logic of control 
over it, reduces this window of agency and instead supports the continued 
reproduction of an ossified future-present. This research project sets out to ‘enable 
resistant agency’ but here this is reversed. Contestation is needed to prevent the total 
 Lyon.136
 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. 137
by John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
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appropriation of this space of possibility, through which potentially resistant acts might 
be manifested.    138
That finance and data are collapsing together is a premise of the technosphere. As has 
been discussed, data is becoming an increasingly valued, monetised commodity; but 
equally, financial activity is increasingly being undertaken in datafied terms, whether 
in the literal coding of the blockchain basis of digital ‘currencies’, or the algorithmic, 
quantified trading of more traditional financial instruments. And increasingly, this 
trading is being automated. Gerald Nestler describes the resulting ‘derivative 
condition’, whereby real-time data analysis in futures markets and other financial 
derivative products means the current price increasingly already factors in, with 
greater and greater rational accuracy, diverging paths and variations that might take 
place in the future.  The future is pulled back into the present moment and subsumed 139
to the speculative interests of capital, with the anarchy of the unknown annihilated 
before it has a chance to exist.  Human affect over what may or may not play out is 140
priced into a tradable asset. An arms race of technologies of automation seeks to find a 
market edge in trimming-off the future closer and closer to the present. At the forefront 
is ‘high frequency trading’, where fully automated systems take advantage of being 
able to respond to real-time data with buy and sell orders between different markets 
more quickly than those markets are able to correct themselves. However, technologies 
are not infallible and contain risk of encoded error causing exponential disruption. A 
 This points towards the need for the radical within radical care, which will be explored in 138
Part 3.
 Gerald Nestler, ‘The Derivative Condition: A Present Inquiry into the History of 139
Futures’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2016) 
<http://research.gold.ac.uk/20534/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 This is then an opposite holding of the future in the present to Husserl’s conception. 140
Husserl.
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rapidly escalating feedback loop resulting from a glitch in a particular high frequency 
trading algorithm resulted in the ‘flash crash’ of 2010, when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average dropped 9% within a few minutes, only to almost fully recover after just over 
half an hour.  Such glitches contain a hint of the potential to resistantly misuse the 141
technosphere’s own structures. 
This structural, systematic subsumption of the future complements the indebted basis 
and promising of the future self Lazzarato outlines, to reduce the individual to passive 
acceptance and a lack of forward looking imagination from both within and without.  142
It is important to emphasise that this debt, a debt in the present moment to the 
abstracted speculative interests of capital, is very different to the intergenerational debt 
(placing the cost of one’s future care when elderly onto future workers) that formed the 
basis of social welfare systems in the twentieth century. Unlike the subsumption of the 
future, this forward passed debt of care was premised on envisioning a good future, 
not on collapsing it into the present.  Mark Fisher’s call for an emancipatory politics 143
rooted in envisaging that which is systematically being rendered unimaginable behind 
 Gerald Nestler, ‘A-Symmetry - Algorithmic Finance and the Dark Side of the Efficient 141
Market’, Technosphere Magazine website (2015) <https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/A-
Symmetry-Algorithmic-Finance-and-the-Dark-Side-of-the-Efficient-Market-
Ung2aMUKzh2Qk5eVRvT4W> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Lazzarato.142
 Envisioning a good future is to hold thinkable the ‘ways of being’ of this project’s title: a vital 143
precursor to any materialisation. This collective social welfare form of debt, holding open a 
good future, is much closer to that discussed by Foucault. 
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended.
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a fait accompli of ‘capitalist reality’ is vital here, and is a space in which artistic activity 
holds affective political potential.144
Marina Vishmidt speaks of an overemphasis on ‘resilience’ when it comes to 
conceiving of a global future.  She argues this resilience is typically framed as one of 145
managing continual shocks (perhaps even hedging against and profiting from them) 
rather than bringing about a better world. While this is a valid point, the perpetuating 
embodied and experienced material inequalities of our world must be acknowledged, 
and for those whose day-to-day human needs are not being met, a degree of resilience 
might be an understandable precursor to envisaging a better world.  
All discussion of the future in our present global context sits in the shadow of 
imminent climate catastrophe. A humanity predominantly bereft of meaningful agency, 
with any radical envisaging of the future rendered unimaginable, seems particularly 
ill-suited to any kind of collective action in the face of this that is not extremely 
negatively affecting of all but the most advantaged few. The annihilation of the future 
at the heart of the technosphere serves the interests of the few, embedding and 
accelerating an inertia of inequality and cutting off all other possibilities. 
 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (London: Zero Books, 2009).144
This need to envisage the unimaginable is core to why diverse, creative practices are needed in 
holding open the possibility of new futures, and thus why artistic practice is integral to this 
research project.
 Marina Vishmidt, ‘Figure Eight is Half of 4’, presentation at After Work symposium, 145
University of West London, 27 January 2018 <https://autonomy.work/portfolio/work-life-
labour-automation-conference-photos-recordings/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
Edelman makes the same point: that resilience alone does not address structural inequalities. 
Elijah Adiv Edelman, ‘Beyond Resilience: Trans Coalitional Activism as Radical Self-Care’, Social 
Text, 38:1 (2020), 109-130 (p. 112).
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It is worth briefly touching on the past. At a systemic level, the past seems increasingly 
destroyed: like the future, subsumed into the present and only reconstructed as often-
kitschy narratives in the service of capital. Francis Fukuyama’s premature ‘end of 
history’, only manifested through neoliberal platform capitalism in place of liberal 
democracy.  For the individual though, the past is paradoxically inescapable, a 146
perfectly archived data ghost to which they can be held to account at any moment.
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man [1992] (London: Penguin, 2012).146
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Seeking the human
The implications of the exploitation of data and resulting biopolitical control, and 
subsumption of the future through platform capitalism and within the technosphere, 
point towards fissures of entrenched inequality opening increasingly widely within 
society. 
 In combination with the emerging condition of platform capitalism whereby simply 
being (as opposed to acting) suffices to enter us into those relations, we are placed 
perpetually and unavoidably in the anguish and isolation of Virno’s multitude, 
without having had any agency in arriving there.  Not needing to work has a long 147
history in utopian thought, but a social and political structure rooted in and 
perpetuating of inequality is currently overriding any post-work liberatory potential 
technological advance might hold, and subsuming it to its own ends in reducing 
agency.   
The isolated, anguished individual sits at the centre of the capitalist system, the debtor 
relationship, and productive labour. Platform capitalism seems to be micro-targeting 
this and locking us into our increasingly individuated selves. From our genetic code to 
our digital avatars, our data-selves are increasingly inescapable shadows. This is not 
the sovereign individual of Weberian Christianity (though that lineage is at times 
drawn upon, as will be addressed in Part 3) but instead the individual as an 
economically rational, instrumental segmentation of the multitude. In universal digital 
storage and instantaneous analysis and prediction, this hyper-individuation is also 
 Virno.147
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carried backward and forward in our permanently recorded pasts and increasingly 
accurately priced-in futures. 
In zooming in on each of us in ever greater detail, platform capitalism looks to record, 
analyse and ultimately profit from precisely what constitutes us as human; moulding 
the human into the passively productive individuated subject.  It points towards a 148
form of post-humanism where the human is lost in a fractal of ever more fine detail or 
abstracted feature, only to be reconstructed as ability sets or consumption masses at 
will, when suiting the purposes of capital. What if, instead of this dystopian vision, we 
were to envisage not an inevitable post-humanism, but a pro-human post-
individualism? In other words, might there not be a path forward in eschewing our 
individuation while at the same time, to return to Foucault’s optimistic premise of a 
debt of care to one another, accentuating our mutual human-ness?  Could we use the 149
hyper-networked infrastructures of the technosphere to emphasise reciprocal caring 
connection, while reducing or short-circuiting data-harvestable individuated 
segmentation? These questions are central to the concept of radical care as it looks to 
leap ahead of the technospheric encoding of the subject. 
——
 (As I have argued, exploitation of linguistic-relational capability, which Virno describes as 148
‘the very thing which makes us human’, underpins platform capitalism.) 
Ibid., p. 98.
 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended.149
I use the term ‘human-ness’ rather than ‘humanity’ when referring to the qualities of being 
human in an attempt to avoid the transcendental, idealist associations use of the latter term can 
carry.
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Layered on top of the inbuilt inequality of capitalism, Virno identifies opportunism as 
an opening fissure between strata within society.  As he and Gielen note, 150
opportunism is a highly valued characteristic to possess under post-Fordism, expected 
of knowledge workers in the workplace.  However, Virno observes that for those in a 151
more precarious position, opportunism is less something desired in the workplace than 
something required simply to proceed in living: to meet basic needs for oneself and 
any dependents as the welfare state is dismantled. Far more often than would be 
proportional, as Federici draws attention to, it is women (and other historically 
disadvantaged groups) engaging in un- or under-acknowledged reproductive labour, 
and workers in lower income countries to which subsumed and devalorized (but 
required and persistent) labour fitting previous regimes has been outsourced, who 
must most frequently engage opportunism in simply being.  This serves to 152
compound already present inequalities and widen the fissure. 
Kerstin Stakemeier and Marina Vishmidt evoke Marx’s position that we as humans 
need some form of autonomy to be happy.  However, as linguistic-relational value 153
production becomes a more potentially passive activity under platform capitalism, less 
and less agency is required of, or available to, the majority. Simply in being, via our 
data, value is produced. How that value is produced is the terrain in which Virno’s 
fortunate upper strata will increasingly engage their opportunism within work. Thus, 
unchecked, platform capitalism points towards a dystopian, atomised way of being 
where a small minority opportunistically engage autonomous agency in extracting 
 Virno, p. 106.150
 Gielen, p. 32.151
 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero.152
 Kerstin Stakemeier and Marina Vishmidt, Reproducing Autonomy: Work, Money, Crisis and 153
Contemporary Art (Berlin: Mute, 2016).
85
value from the passive mass of the majority. (To some extent, this is the case under any 
form of capitalism, but the data extracting potential of platform capitalism is 
substantially further removing agency from the majority, and is shifting what is being 
exploited from labour to existence.) This serves to alienate the majority from their 
autonomy, and thus happiness. It constitutes a form of abstracting, de-humanising 
anti-care. Some of the libertarian and right-accelerationist discourse emanating from 
Silicon Valley seems to actively advocate for such a disturbing future.   154
Fisher emphasises the increasing importance of nominal work being targeted towards 
producing the representation of work, and portraying the self as productive.  While 155
this clearly follows from the discussions of biopolitics and surveillance above, it can 
also be seen as a mechanic in relation to the fissure of opportunism. We must enact a 
perpetual performance of taking opportunity, or displaying agency. Those who do not 
do so are read as accepting their fate as part of the struggling mass from which data is 
 Mark O’Connell, ‘Why Silicon Valley Billionaires are Prepping for the Apocalypse in New 154
Zealand’, Guardian, 15 February 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/15/
why-silicon-valley-billionaires-are-prepping-for-the-apocalypse-in-new-zealand> [Accessed 2 
January 2021]. 
Quinn Slobodian, ‘How the libertarian right plans to profit from the pandemic’, Guardian, 1 June 
2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/01/coronavirus-libertarian-
right-profit-coronavirus-pandemic?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Fisher, p. 53.155
Recalling Deleuze, one needs to articulate oneself as active in terms translatable to the 
technosphere; unreadable forms of activity are discounted and processed as passivity.
Deleuze, pp. 310-313.
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extracted.  Fear of slipping out of the ‘upper’ strata, and notionally claiming some 156
sense of autonomy, is yet another bond holding us firmly in the perpetual anguish 
Virno notes as a chief characteristic of the multitude, even if we are lucky enough to be one 
of the few on the fortunate side of the fissure of opportunism.  The remote, digital 157
technological basis of platform capitalism has radically ‘democratised’ the 
dissemination of image and representation, furthering and accelerating this process. 
Images and representations spread seamlessly and instantaneously around the 
digitised world, yet the surveilled individuals remain fixed by rigid boundaries and 
apparatuses of control.  This fault line between projected desirability and inequitable 158
distribution of agency is extremely socially and politically divisive on a global scale.    159
——
Virno sees a potential for optimism in ‘idle talk’: untethered from reference, an 
opportunity for endless discursive invention, experimentation and play.  Perhaps 160
 A small (though inherently visible) exception to this are the celebrities, influencers, 156
Instagrammers, etc. who have managed to exploit and render fungible the representation of 
their own leisured ‘fulfilment’ through ‘self-care’. Here, conversely, the underpinning 
entrepreneurial labour is purposefully hidden. There is a mirroring of work and this type of 
self-care underway, with each increasingly becoming an image-representation of itself. This 
group perform a role of rendering the debt to future self apparently fulfillable, which in turn 
keeps the performance of work towards repaying that debt desirable. 
While valorised within the technosphere, this is a form of self-exploitation: a leaning-in to 
individuation, and willing acceptance of alienation from one’s own (and others’) human-ness.
 Virno.157
This point is particularly important in countering any argument that critique of the fissure of 
opportunism stems from envy.
 The extent of this fixing is heavily dependent on racialised and gendered logics, along with 158
other unequal means of subjectification.
 This spatialised inequality is further explored in Part 2.159
 Ibid., p. 90.160
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even a reassertion of agency. Idle talk overlaps with Roland Barthes’ understanding of 
the text as a playful, fluid actor.  However, idle talk, in implying the act of speech, 161
brings the body of the speaker to more immediate consideration. Text holds a certain 
implication of ‘writer’, but the expanded textual context of the technosphere 
incorporates exponential reams of text which are not humanly authored. In re-centring 
a bodily materiality amidst these, idle talk holds a potential to reassert the human. 
Care needs to be taken though: if we consider idle talk in conjunction with the fissure 
of opportunism, as well as the emergent emphasis on the noun-like function of 
linguistic-relational capability coming about through platform capitalism, then idle talk 
risks itself being exploited. For those who need to be opportunistic simply to survive, 
idle talk becomes a moment of relief and respite, but in exhaustion is understandably 
unlikely to reach any heights of invention or experimentation. 
Where something approaching idle talk is achieved, it will frequently occur across the 
channels requiring least effort, and these will increasingly be platform interfaces where 
that idle talk becomes another data-set to be exploited. And yet while acknowledging 
this, as I will explore, I hold that there is scope for reinvigorating idle talk as a site of 
agency and potential disruption through artistic intervention, particularly through 
asserting the human who may or may not be bodily present.162
 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ [1971], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 161
(Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 155-164.
 Part 2 explores the possibilities of embodiment and disembodiment in both the artistic 162
intervention and personhood of the artist.
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Whereas Virno’s idle talk takes place out in the open, murmuring, as discussed by 
Gielen, is, publicly at least, an almost inaudible conversation amidst the dark matter.  163
However, without as yet any realistic likelihood of the publicly owned or collectivised 
platforms Srnicek advocates, the unavoidability of the private platform in our hyper-
networked world means the murmur too, in almost-inevitably taking place across 
platforms, becomes in itself exploitable: audible to the algorithms if not humans.  164
Despite this challenge though, idle talk, murmured or otherwise, is a site at which 
textual artistic intervention embracing subversion, irony and play, and exploiting the 
presumption of its own exploitability, could hold potential as a graspable corner of the 
textual core matter of the technosphere. 
A brief comparison of Twitter and Facebook might bear some relevance on the 
potential of idle talk. Whereas the latter, hugely profitable, seems to epitomise the 
individuation and data harvesting I have been discussing, Twitter, in its 
conversationality (as opposed to a digital projection of a more static self), seems 
perhaps least problematic of the mainstream social media platforms and most 
facilitating of this idea of idle talk.  It is far from without legitimate criticisms and 165
 Gielen. 163
Sholette introduces the term ‘dark matter’ to describe the unrecognised mass of artistic and art-
adjacent activity which enables the visible apex.
Gregory Sholette, Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture (London: Pluto 
Press, 2011).
 Srnicek, p. 128.164
 The features which Facebook offers, and use to which it is put, have shifted over time. The 165
presentation of an on-screen self, which was the central premise of Facebook in its early years, 
has been diluted (and for many, superseded) by its use as a facilitator of business or project 
information pages, event promotion, local neighbourhood or specific interest groups, etc.       
It could be argued that the prime position of epitomising individuation amongst social media 
platforms has now been taken by Instagram. However, as of 2012, Instagram is owned by 
Facebook.
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certainly contains aspects of individuation, but it at least suggests the possibility to 
operate through looser, more playful connections and ripples. With this in mind, it is 
perhaps unsurprising both that it only in 2018 posted a quarterly profit for the first 
time, and also that it is a site of much more creative and playful experimentation 
(through Twitter bots, artistic projects, streams of consciousness and other varyingly 
playful or absurd forms) than Facebook.  Some of these do evoke Virno’s optimistic 166
description of idle talk as free of referential paradigm or burden of correspondence to 
the non-linguistic world, and enabling of invention, experimentation, and endless new 
discourses.  In this playfulness, there is a key potential to imagine, even if through 167
random generation, more egalitarian futures which might otherwise be erased. As the 
following section will explore, moving beyond the strict confines of platforms 
themselves, artistic (mis)use of idle talk can take on much broader potential forms.
 See for example Empathy Deck.166
Erica Scourti, ‘Empathy Deck’, Twitter [artwork / bot] (2016-2018) <https://twitter.com/
empathydeck?lang=en> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Virno. p. 90.167
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Artistic possibilites
This part has thus far set out the key processes of abstraction by which the 
technosphere is denying our agency and diminishing our human-ness. This is the 
urgent contemporary context within which any artistic intervention comes into being. 
As discussed above, Boltanski and Chiapello observe that it was in the failure of social 
critique and appropriation of artistic critique that post-Fordism emerged.  However, 168
the extending inequality of platform capitalism demands an urgent social critique, 
including through (but not limited to) artistic critique. A re-connection between these 
two critiques is required.  169
There has been a degree of re-orientating towards engagement with the political, social 
and economic within artistic practice.  As Praxis emphasises, I advocate this. 170
Especially given the vanguard or blueprint role Gielen argues it played in the 
emergence of the post-Fordist labour model, it is vital that art reflects on the positions 
being taken with regard to both itself and society as a whole, and the complexity of the 
contexts in which they function.  In doing this, art might be able to co-support a 171
 Boltanski and Chiapello.168
 It is important not to mistakenly fall into a reactionary jettisoning of freedom-emphasising 169
artistic critique in pursuit of the social. Rolnik emphasises the positive role played by desires for 
freedom in challenging totalitarian regimes, arguing that the freedom (e.g. resistance to co-
option and instrumentalisation) of art is essential in order to produce the egalitarian imaginaries 
that are so vital to social critique. In short, the two critiques must operate together. 
Suely Rolnik, ‘The Geopolitics of Pimping’, trans. by Brian Holmes, transversal texts (2006) 
<https://transversal.at/transversal/1106/rolnik/en> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Sabeth Buchmann, ‘Under the Sign of Labour’, in Art After Conceptual Art, ed. by Alexander 170
Alberro and Sabeth Buchmann (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 179-196 (p. 181).
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social critique of platform capitalism, rather than allowing itself to be subsumed by it. 
A self-reflexivity and recognition of positionality is vital: only in continually 
reconsidering its own enmeshment within the logics of platform capitalism might art 
generate resistances to it. Stakemeier and Vishmidt support this position, calling for art 
to address the conditions of its own production if it wants to claim any autonomy, and 
to acknowledge and confront how those conditions of production intersect with, and 
are reliant upon, un- and under-acknowledged forms of reproductive and other 
material/female/immigrant/bodily labour.  Much supposedly self-critical artwork 172
operating within the market-institutional paradigm happily fits within the alleged 
pluralism of contemporary art, but it is only when it engages politically that important 
questions are raised.  All of this is to reiterate the contemporary need for a 173
productivist positioning of art: only in confronting and addressing the politics and 
processes of (re)production of the context in which it resides (and not shying away 
from inevitable complexity and likely complicity) can art establish any real autonomy 
in its own terms.  174
——
The ’new aesthetic’ has emerged in recent years as, in some senses, an aesthetic 
response to the technospheric condition.  However, as Bruce Sterling argues, much of 175
 Stakemeier and Vishmidt, p. 46.172
 Boris Groys, Art Power (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 4-6.173
 This ‘productivist’ positioning for art is articulated by Benjamin.174
Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’ [1934], in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 2, 
Part 2 1931-34, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone and others (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 768-782 (p. 770).
 James Bridle, ‘#sxaesthetic’, booktwo [personal blog] (15 March 2012) <http://booktwo.org/175
notebook/sxaesthetic/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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the artwork to which the label is applied is overly caught up in the uncritical use of a 
set of visual tropes, and is overly focused on representation and the image.  This is 176
not necessarily without any value, but much of the artwork labelled new aesthetic 
(sometimes, arguably, inaccurately) sits a little too comfortably within the market-
institutional paradigm. Glitches and oversized pixels recur, but too often go no further 
than attempts to seduce. A subset of artworks associated with the new aesthetic label, 
for example, seem to commodify the ‘poor image’ as an artefact which might be 
owned. This is a capitalist inversion of the freely circulated and exchanged poor image 
as resistant and subversive towards repressive structures which Hito Steyerl explored 
when introducing the term.  Those new aesthetic artworks which do go further than a 177
surface engagement, such as Steyerl’s How Not to be Seen: A Fucking Didactic 
Educational .MOV File, reflexively engage in, and beyond, their own social, economic 
and political positionalities as much as, if not more than, their formal-technological 
presentation.      178
Returning to Srnicek, his hope is that artists might play a role in rendering 
comprehensible the ‘technical sublime’; that artworks might enable a greater revealing 
of the escalating complexities of data and network that underpin platform 
capitalism.  While this revealing of ‘cognitive maps’ he advocates certainly could play 179
 Bruce Sterling, ‘An Essay on the New Aesthetic’, Wired website (4 February 2012) <https://176
www.wired.com/2012/04/an-essay-on-the-new-aesthetic/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Hito Steyerl, ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, e-flux journal, 10 (2009) <https://www.e-177
flux.com/journal/10/61362/in-defense-of-the-poor-image/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Hito Steyerl, How Not to be Seen: A Fucking Didactic Educational .MOV File (2013), available at 178
<https://www.artforum.com/video/hito-steyerl-how-not-to-be-seen-a-fucking-didactic-
educational-mov-file-2013-51651> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Nick Srnicek, ‘Navigating Neoliberalism: Political Aesthetics After the Crisis’ presentation at 179
The Matter of Contradiction, Treignac, France, 1-7 September 2012 <https://vimeo.com/
52434614> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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a critical role, some interpretations can lean towards the problematically instrumental 
and/or illustrative, if not a-critically sycophantic.  In attempting to avoid this, 180
‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ (my methodology of artistic practice-
research, elucidated in Praxis) specifically seeks to acknowledge and interrogate the 
positionality of the self and co-production of the encounter (which could be with the 
‘technical sublime’), fully acknowledging the broader contextual siting within multiple 
unequal contexts. 
Both the new aesthetic and cognitive mapping are overly focused on the 
representational, and an uncritical presumption of the possibility of some kind of 
artistic objectivity. It is vital that there is an artistic engagement with the technosphere 
and platform capitalism, but to become enraptured in the visual languages and 
technological potentials themselves is to miss the critical point. Aesthetics are bound 
up in politics, ethics, process and production, and a real critical engagement with the 
technosphere necessitates a meaningful, considered engagement with all of these in 
fluxing combination, acknowledging where the artist themself sits. Artistic processes, 
labour-forms and visual manifestations are much more deeply embedded into platform 
capitalism than solely at the aesthetic level (as has been explored through discussion of 
Gielen and Boltanski and Chiappello’s arguments for art’s role in pre-figuring post-
Fordism).  What are urgently needed are artistic interventions engaging in and 181
critiquing the problematic social, economic and political shifts (and accompanying de-
 Cognitive mapping, which will be briefly revisited in Parts 2 and 3, is proposed by Jameson.180
Fredric Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. by Cary 




humanising abstraction) that are occurring in and through the technosphere: new 
forms of data-enabled biopolitical control, a subsumption of the future, and escalating 
inequality. Digital technologies themselves are ultimately built upon neutral 
mathematics: it is their embedding within the social and ideological that politicises 
them.  Thus for an artwork to substantially critically engage with the technosphere it 182
must confront and question the full context of its own production, its own exploitation, 
and its own complicity.
I do not mean to place art in a position of overly instrumentalised duress though, even 
with resistant counter-hegemonic intent. Playfulness, anarchy, absurdity: these all have 
a role to play. A form of acceleration, but not accelertionism by and for the structure 
potentially leading to its supposed self-inflicted demise. (History shows this to be an 
unlikely outcome, as capitalism demonstrates a recurring ability to reconstitute itself in 
a new form, whether mercantilism, imperialism, industrial capitalism… or platform 
capitalism.) Instead, an acceleration of playful human-ness: absurd and anarchic and, 
above all, rendered with care. An artistic approach centred on making ourselves too 
human, too irrational, to be quantified and harvested. An assertion of bodily-ness. 
 
The networks and infrastructures of the technosphere can be made use of to 
disseminate and expand these activities, but in so doing radically undermining and 
subverting their neoliberal underpinnings. Virno presents the political options for the 
multitude as being disobedience or exit.  If we discount a hypothetical complete exit 183
as an ultimately selfish giving up on of society, the very site I am arguing art must 
 This is not to assert that there has necessarily ever been any representation of mathematics 182
that it not in some way contextually inflected.
 Virno, p. 70.183
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engage with, then we are left with disobedience as the only possibility, and a form of 
disobedience is what I here seek to articulate: to disobediently care. For Virno, 
disobedience holds much more disruptive potential than protest. Protest, in the act of 
challenging it, implicitly supports the logic and coherence of the opposed structure, 
whereas disobedience goes further, undermining that presumption.  184
Rather than a reactive dialectical response, this disobedience is the beginning of an 
alternate logic. Perhaps a logic of imagination or care in a context which pushes us to 
act without. It is an exit, an exit from the biopolitical governmentality of the 
technosphere, but a firm remaining within the actual and potential human-relational 
social arena. A turning in on of the connective potential of the repressive structure 
upon its own presumptions of rational, productive, useful data-producing activity. To 
illustrate with a prosaic example, it is not necessary to completely eschew social media. 
It is, however, necessary to enter into engagement with it in informed awareness of its 
data harvesting, platform capitalist functioning. Disrupt this, play with it: engage in 
the entangled and complicit space being a twenty-first century human entails, but 
subvert and question its assumptions. 
The technological infrastructures themselves need not necessarily be accepted as 
repressive. They do hold the potential to move closer to something resembling an 
equitable general intellect, and the artistic approach suggested here seeks to support 
this while, and through, subverting the passing of ‘surplus’ value upward to capitalist 
interests.  Indeed, working and disseminating through the technosphere’s established 185
networks offers a potential route to reducing the fissure of opportunism. Just as there is 
 Ibid., p. 70.184
 Marx, pp. 690-712.185
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a split within platform capitalism between those in a position to act opportunistically 
within work and those who must do so in order to simply survive; taking 
opportunities for disobedience likewise presumes the individual has the capacity and 
resources remaining to do so beyond bare existence. Artists’ privileged position here 
must be acknowledged.  (Mis)using the textual networks of the technosphere holds 186
the potential that artistic interventions might be less exclusive and more democratically 
accessible. For while the use to which technospheric infrastructures have been put and 
their underlying ideologies are exacerbating of inequalities, a positive within them is 
that they have enabled a degree of democratisation of connectedness (in potentiality at 
least, if not always actuality). 
The differentiated position of the artist also necessitates a further clarification: this 
positioning of art in such a way that it might undermine, subvert and critique the 
technosphere is not being presented as a single solution to its observed problems: other 
forms of contestation are vital. I have argued against art as protest, and have noted 
Vishmidt’s argument against resilience.  However, these and other forms of, or 187
supports to, resistance are in fact vital, especially in contexts of platform capitalism’s 
most ruthless exploitation. My argument, however, is that into this resistant mix the 
most important function art can play in challenging the inherent structural inequalities 
of the technosphere is to be anarchically and playfully disobedient through the 
structure’s own networks, architectures and languages: to textually subvert. 
 This privilege should not be mis-interpreted as a solely socio-economic one, which many 186
artists do not significantly have. It is a more complex privilege of possibly holding the potential 
to act. There will also be numerous other aspects to any person’s positionality in a given 
context, some of which may reduce or remove this potential.
 Vishmidt.187
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In such a way, a disruptive idle talk might spread. With value being ever increasingly 
linguistically and relationally produced, significant resistance can be found in 
redirecting that linguistic-relational capability elsewhere (though following the shift 
from active to passive value production, this needs to be a reorientation of ongoing 
being as well as discrete actions). Platform capitalism presumes that conversations 
taking place through its channels can be harvested as data, but in parallel with the 
argument to (mis-)use the networks of the technosphere with informed awareness of 
their intent, might we not similarly be able to knowingly disrupt the surveillance of 
our chatter? The most playfully human tools of irony, absurdity, pretence, persona and 
secret languages are at the same time those which might be least intelligible to and 
exploitable by surveillance, datafication and algorithmic real-time analysis.  
I have already introduced the liberatory possibility of a post-individual, pro-human 
stance, and it is in combination with this that these disruptions hold the greatest 
potential. It should be emphasised, though, that the pro-human side of this stance is 
not a metaphysical celebration of ‘the human’.  The pro-human-ness called for is both 188
a materiality with the body, and a rejection of the neoliberal individual, but is not 
essentialist. The human is an imminent being, continually reasserted through a mutual 
process of care. 
 Campbell views Heidegger a succumbing to this.188
Timothy C. Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics From Heidegger to Agamben 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), pp. 26-27.
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In an expansion of Fordist and Taylorist approaches, platform capitalism seeks to 
segment and parcelise all aspects of our lives into individuated sources of data.  The 189
dominant emphasis on provenance and (singular) authorship within the commercial-
institutional contemporary art market is a direct echo of this. Effective resistance could 
be found in the radical, perpetual destruction of the individuated artist self; in a 
celebrating, enabling and valuing of more human, more fluid, more potent multitudes 
of creative self-hoods. Technospheric infrastructures might be partly co-optable into 
enabling a more post-individual future, but careful critical consideration and mutual 
care for one another will be essential in so doing. 
——
The Japanese word for ‘human being’ consists of the characters meaning ‘person’ and 
‘in-between’, thus ‘human being’ is literally ‘between person’.  Though ‘merely’ 190
semantic, if for a moment we substitute the Japanese characters into this project’s 
titular seeking of ‘ways of [human] being’, the title is already inscribed with dissolving 
individualism. This post-individual must come with pro-human. In fragmenting 
ourselves out of technospheric surveillance we make ourselves vulnerable, and it is 
here that Foucault’s reciprocal debt of care is vital.  As we de-centre ourselves into a 191
greater focus on the relationships, the encounters and the collaborations between and 
amidst us, we have to come with trust that we will not be exploited, and likewise 
 Thus, while our labour becomes increasingly virtuosic, when we turn attention to the 189
datafication of our being, where value is increasingly produced, key Fordist premises still hold 
sway.
 Yoko Akama, Penny Hagen and Desna Whaanga-Schollum, ‘Problematising Replicable 190
Design to Practice Respectful Reciprocal and Relational Co-designing with Indigenous People’, 
Design and Culture, 11:1 (2019), 59-84 (p. 67).
 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended.191
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demonstrate trustworthiness. Care is not only an outcome, but a vital initiator of, and 
thread within, the process which might lead to this point. Our containing skins 
constrain us as controllable discrete units, but in embracing their porosity we can seep 
out into a caring disobedient human-ness rooted in the spaces in-between, the 
connections. As part of this challenge to the technosphere, it is important to address the 
somatic, embodied forms these connections might take through and around artistic 
interventions. This is a focus of Part 2.
To return to Virno, he observes that the experience of the fragmented multitude is one 
of isolated dread and terror.  This part has developed and expanded on this, 192
examining mechanisms of de-humanising technospheric abstraction through shifting 
economic and technological contexts, and the present centrality of indebtedness. The 
responses to this urgent context which have begun to form will be considered and 
progressed further through the parts to come. I argue for a flipping of the technologies 
rooted in the individuating structures perpetuating technospheric dread. Instead, a 
reclaiming of them to produce a synthesised more human voice comprised of 




[Please read Praxis at any break between parts and scenes prior to the Ana-conclusion]  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SCENE A: A CONVERSATION WITH AN ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF 
THE VOICEOVER FROM THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF HARUN 
FAROCKI’S ARBEITER VERLASSEN DI FABRIK [WORKERS LEAVING THE 
FACTORY], 1995  193
Cast of characters: 
• VOICEOVER (monotone and unexpressive, unnamed and 
uncredited) 
• RESPONDENT (unspecified) 
VOICEOVER: 
The first film ever brought to 
the screen is referred to under 
the title Workers Leaving the 
Factory.  
It shows men and women employed 
by the Lumière company in Lyon 
leaving the factory through two 
exits, in the film image to the 
right and left. 
RESPONDENT: 
Thus, in its very initiating, 
the new medium emerges into a 
context of preformed labour 
relations.  
The image, in its movement, is 
bound up in those relations: 
what sits behind the workers 
streaming out, both in the 
projected image on screen and 
in the rationale (economic and 
perhaps other) of the entire 
enterprise, is a factory 
producing photographic 
equipment.  
Or rather, a building to 
structure, organise and control 
 Harun Farocki, Arbeiter Verlassen di Fabrik [Workers Leaving the Factory] (1995) <https://193
vimeo.com/59338090> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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the actions of these exiting 
people into labour which 
collectively produces these 
goods.  
The owner of the factory has 
already shifted to occupy an 
adjacent space as the owner of 
the image. 
VOICEOVER: 
These images were supposed, 
above all, to show that it is 
possible to render movement in 
images.  
The remaining impression from 
this first screening is of 
people hurrying away as if 
impelled by an invisible force. 
No one remains behind. 
1975 in Emden: the Volkswagen 
factory.  
RESPONDENT: 
The technological means of 
representing movement and the 
desire to do so have hardly 
changed in eighty years, and 
barely more so another two 
decades later when Farocki 
makes this work.  
In 1975, the workers are still 
leaving the factory.  
The stasis of the 
representation of movement. 
VOICEOVER: 
The workers are running as if 
something were drawing them 
away.  
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1926 in Detroit: the workers 
are running as if they had 
already lost too much time. 
Again in Lyon, in 1957: they 
are running as if they knew 
somewhere better to be.  
Again in Detroit, in 1926: the 
Ford workers leaving the 
factory, their numbers prove 
the size of the enterprise 
which can feed this multitude.  
Never can one better perceive 
the numbers of workers than 
when they are leaving the 
factory. The management 
dismisses the multitude at the 
same moment. The exits compress 
them, making out of male and 
female workers a workforce. 
RESPONDENT: 
Does this multitude live in 
perpetual anguish and fear?  
Detroit. Ford. The very name of 
an era. 
From 1926 to the multitude of 
the post-war welfare state. 
Perhaps a feeling of 
suffocation by the state, by 
society.  
But at least something. 
Something to occasionally 
deflect some of economy’s 
logic.  
Romantic nostalgia distorts our 
rearward gaze.  
VOICEOVER: 
An image like an expression… 
which can be suited to many 
statements. 
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An image like an expression. So 
often used that it can be 
understood blindly, and thus 
not have to be seen.  
A song to glorify work, so the 
music already suggests, but the 
workers turn their backs on 
work when leaving the factory.  
Workers and employees from the 
Siemens factory in Berlin, in 
1934. They are grouped into 
military formation and leave 
the factory to join a Nazi 
rally.  
Here are the block of the war 
victims. 
Marching in white coats, a 
symbol of militarised science 
and technology: a preview of 
the worst.  
RESPONDENT: 
Soon Farocki will take our 
attention towards unions. A 
territory, an important one, an 
understandably defended one 
when the terms of any 
engagement in a public 
discourse affecting oneself are 
rendered through one’s labour. 
But an exclusionary one too, a 
bounded one. The workers we see 
leaving the factory are white, 
predominantly male, in Europe, 
North America.  
The union functions as a 
territory of resilience, but 
one mapped onto the permitted 
space of the factory. Labour 
comes first and the hard-fought 
loosenings of life (of the 
‘family wage’, of sick pay, of 
time off) are permitted into 
the space of discussion upon 
acceptance of those terms.  
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Siemens provided vital war 
materiel to the Nazi state, and 
exploited concentration camp 
labour, in part to produce the 
infrastructures of industrial 
extermination. It is quite 
feasible some of these 
imprisoned workers produced the 
very machines of their own 
death.     
Do we judge the Siemens 
employees as they fall into 
rank? Their position within the 
bounded security of employment, 
steady wage and union is 
predicated upon acceptance of a 
set of terms which in this case 
includes the boundaries of a 
horrific ethno-nationalism.  
Siemens now, amongst other 
things, produces high-speed 
trains to ever more quickly and 
seamlessly spirit those within 
fortress Europe between cities, 
as national boundaries dissolve 
in material significance.  
Boundaries are not dissolving 
for those excluded on the 
outside. And meanwhile, the 
descendent technologies of film 
project the life lived within 
ever more comparatively 
desirably.  
Siemens is also staking out its 
own platform; invisible 
proprietorial boundaries around 
potential data.   
The workers are dead. Long live 
the workers.  
VOICEOVER: 
Workers changing shifts in the 
film Metropolis. Uniform dress 
and equal step.  
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This vision of the future has 
not been fulfilled. Nowadays 
one cannot tell with a glance 
whether a passerby is coming 
from work, sports or the 
welfare office. 
Workers Leaving the Factory, 
that was the title of the first 
film ever made. It was the 
first time that pictures of 
people in motion could be seen. 
It was as if, with film, the 
world would become visible for 
the first time.  
RESPONDENT: 
In rendering visible, for the 
first time, there was a hope 
for a new democracy, a new 
politics of transparency and 
participation. But a logic of 
economy, of capital, of vested 
interest had always been there 
for film. This remained hidden. 
The flickering image projected 
was rarely one of factory 
gates. It was one of action 
progressing through a narrative 
arc, of new human achievements, 
of the American dream. We were 
shown a whirl of change and 
progress, masking an ossified 
stasis of real power. 
VOICEOVER: 
The factory out of which the 
workers are streaming is 
austere and has no company 
sign. There is no indication of 
industrial power or importance.  
Nor is there any indication of 
the workers’ power. After all, 
when this material was filmed 
the European governments still 
feared a workers’ uprising in 
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the event of war, as in Paris 
in 1871.  
RESPONDENT: 
There is a recognition of the 
potential power of the 
conceptual-discursive 
promulgated through these 
moving images. Then though, the 
material was not yet so beaten 
down, so devalorised. The 
factory, though gradually 
diminishing, still operated as 
a site of politics of some 
equivalency to film. For a 
while.  
 




Picketers in the portrayal of a 
dockers strike in Hamburg, a 
Soviet film completed in 1933. 
The industrial disputes turn 
the area outside the factory 
into a dramatic scene of 
events. 
The picketer.  
Unemployed, waiting for an 
opportunity.  
   
The strikebreakers, one of whom 
cannot take the strain.  
The picketer takes a closer 
look at the collapsed betrayer 
of the working class.  
The unemployed push forward to 
occupy the empty space.  
The picketer looks into the 
face of this old man. A face 
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which stands for millions of 
undernourished and destitute 
people obliged to take on any 
job and unable to preserve any 
honour. He turns away.  
RESPONDENT: 
The crowd at the dockyard 
gates. In this particular 
instance they are shut out from 
the work they desire due to 
strike. But this insecurity and 
instability, placing all risk 
upon the would-be workers, was 
standard day-to-day practice 
for casual dockyard labourers 
(who performed the majority of 
the work).  
 
The unexceptional state of 
exception. 
As they look through the gate, 
these men’s bodies are doubly 
present. They are a site of 
hunger, fatigue, cold, no doubt 
viscerally felt after a few 
days not picked for work: their 
bodies serving as physical 
fixing points for the risk to 
abstract capital that would 
otherwise have to circulate.  
But their bodies are also 
performatively presented. A 
virtuosic show of strength and 
good health the darkly ironic 
pre-labour necessary to secure 
the labour. The crowd at the 
dockyard gates.  
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
In this German film about a 
strike in the Hamburg harbour, 
the battle between the strikers 
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and the strikebreakers 
resembles a playground fight.  
The big wars and civil wars in 
this century, prisons, camps, 
dictatorships. So many are 
caused by exploitation and 
underproduction, but the 
industrial disputes themselves 
are not particularly violent.  
RESPONDENT: 
This is a narrow definition of 
‘industrial dispute’. Are not 
all of these counter-examples 
forms of industrial dispute 
themselves?  
The sanctioned, permitted 
industrial action is by 
definition an action which will 
have no structural consequence, 
the vapid representation of 
dispute. Sit back and watch 
from a cinema seat for all it 
matters. 
Where to draw a bounding line 
between industrial dispute and 
civil war? Were the ‘gilets 
jaunes’ categorically engaged 
in one and not the other? Were 
the Communards, the striking 
miners? Too narrow an 
understanding of ‘industrial 
dispute’ closes down our 
ability to stand alongside an 
‘other’ in a positionality we 
are not, but for whom we care. 
It permits power to segment and 
fracture our bonds.   
In the post-Fordist social 
factory, this fragmentary 
denying of the right to stand 
alongside becomes more acute as 
we are pushed to proceed 
towards ever more individuated 
factories of the self. 
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The reinforced aspiration to be 
one’s own boss.  
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
A strike by English car workers 
in 1956. The workers’ disputes 
are far less violent than those 
carried out in the name of the 
workers.  
Once again, the industrial 
reserve army.  
In this film by the American, 
Griffith, the industrial 
dispute resembles a civil war. 
RESPONDENT: 
The civil wars inscribed in my 
mind (the Spanish -, the 
American -) were fought between 
forces, if not equal, then at 
least of roughly similar orders 
of magnitude of capability.  
This resemblance of civil war 
is not that. The workers have 
nothing to lose. The workers 
have nothing to be taken but 
their labour. The workers do 
not even fight, they simply 
refuse to fulfil their 
prescribed role. 
VOICEOVER: 
This is probably the largest 
shootout in front of a factory 
gate in one hundred years of 
film history.  
RESPONDENT: 
Asymmetric civil war. 
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Uncivilised war.  
War.   
VOICEOVER: 
A quieter horror comes from 
these images, from the faces of 
these men who don’t have any 
workplace and therefore no 
place in working society.  
RESPONDENT: 
The factory enfleshes beyond 
its gates. It constitutes and 
deconstitutes the individual.  
VOICEOVER: 
Behind the bars of the factory 
gates, the people look as if 
they were already locked up in 
a camp.  
Pause 
Workers are leaving the factory 
here because the police are 
clearing the grounds and 
locking them out. Among the 
workers is one particularly 
concerned about his personal 
honour.  
Pause 
This film shows workers 
evicting the police from the 
factory. A film made in 1948 in 
the Soviet occupied zone in 
Germany.  
The workers move like an opera 
chorus on stage.  
This is sufficient to drive 
away the police. The police 
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fear the significance of the 
workers more than a beating.  
RESPONDENT: 
The asymmetrical reverse.  
The police - agents of the 
state, of the current order, of 
incumbent power - are in the 
secure position of their bodily 
materialisation being 
vulnerable to a mere beating. 
It is the privilege of power to 
concern itself chiefly with the 
disembodied fluctuations of 
discourse which may circulate 
through the disseminated images 
which might subsequently 
manifest.  
For those risking death, one 
imagines their involuntarily 
situated bodily vulnerability 
would be a chief concern.  
The agency to be presently 
embodied or disembodied, or to 
render others such, is not 
equitably distributed.  
The drone strike, determined by 
an operator a hemisphere away, 
kills the forcibly returned, 
visa-denied migrant.  
The police officer, granted the 
cloak of state-uniform 
collective anonymity, kills 
another black person who is 
inescapably present in the 
bullet’s path.   
VOICEOVER: 
Workers in uniform.  
In the GDR, a workers’ militia 
in military vehicles. They are 
going out on an exercise.  
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Workers leaving the factory as 
soldiers.  
Pause 
1975. The Federal Republic of 
Germany. The VW factory in 
Emden.  
Outside the factory, the trade 
union is playing songs by 
Mayakovsky sung by Ernst Busch.  
Through this invocation, 
historical importance is 
conferred upon the location.  
The management is of the 
opinion that the square in 
front of the gate is not a 
public space but rather private 
property, and threatens to call 
the police.  
RESPONDENT: 
The boundaries are creeping 
outside the factory.  
The idea that there could be an 
alternative public sphere 
outside the confines of the 
factory is unthinkable. And 
yet, it’s 1975: fewer and fewer 
of us are working in the 
factory.  
The factory is itself leaving 
the factory.  
VOICEOVER: 
Some workers remain, but most 
have moved on.  
Protection of property. 
Equipment to fortify the 
factory.  
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Here the resistance of a road 
block is tested and 
demonstrated. A truck is driven 
into the road block at eighty 
kilometres per hour and 
shredded into pieces.  
Also this fantasy of violence 
gives the square in front of 
the factory historical 
importance. 
Memories of strikes and strike 
breaking, factory sit-ins and 
closures, struggles for wages 
and justice, and the 
accompanying hope.  
RESPONDENT: 
Memories of strategies of 
resistance from a time when we 
possessed something to 
withhold.  
 
Memories we might reenact to 
momentarily feel better.  
VOICEOVER: 
The road block remains 
undamaged from the collision.  
RESPONDENT: 
This text denies you the ocular 
image of the truck hitting the 
road block. In interceding, in 
abstracting, it cushions the 
impact. A cushioning not 
available to those whose bodies 
are shredded like the truck.  
It also obfuscates the material 
reality. A textual hiding of 
the power of that image, an 
image which in turn hides the 
bodily siting of violence by 
using an empty truck as 
placeholder.  
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An acknowledgement that that 
image, the one we’re not shown, 
might have some power.  
VOICEOVER: 
The factory as a scene of 
crime. Not workers but 
gangsters are leaving the 
factory. They have stolen 
wages. 
Protection of property. The 
gangsters entered the factory 
disguised as workers.  
The false workers are to be 
feared more than the real ones.  
RESPONDENT: 
Living in the aftermath-of-
the-2008-financial-crash-as-
justification crisis we know 
well that when the system fails 
it isn’t the abstract 
structures which bear the pain.  
The worker has everything to 
lose in the chaos of systemic 
collapse. The criminal plays a 
role not unlike the terrorist. 
External to the system we 
inescapably find ourselves 
within, they are an imagined 
threat which justifies 
countless injustices. We watch, 
and alongside the brief 
escapism of seeing our 
fantasies enacted safely on 
screen, find our thoughts 
nudged into alignment with 
those of our momentarily more 




Where the first camera once 
stood, there are now hundreds 
of thousands of surveillance 
cameras.  
RESPONDENT: 
They point both outward at 
those who would enter and 
inward at those who would 
escape. No longer an image on 
film.  
Analogue, chemical, organic, 
decaying, bodily. 
Instead, a representation of 
text, itself a translation of 
ones and zeros. We increasingly 
cannot read these texts, even 
when they are renderings of 
ourselves, full of 
incontestable consequence, 
other than when they are 
purposefully presented back to 
us.  
  




We watch one another. 
We watch ourselves. 
VOICEOVER: 
This camera has spotted a woman 
who tugs at another woman’s 
skirt before they separate.  
She tugs at the woman’s skirt. 
The other woman does not dare 
to retaliate under the watchful 
eye of the camera. 
This game is an action which 
has found no reaction, thus a 
discrepancy is caused.  
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Disequilibrium and balance, 
this is the law of cinema 
narration.  
RESPONDENT: 
A disequilibrium within the 
representation masking the 
closed loop behind.  
 
Could the film, the artwork, 
ever produce a disequilibrium 
within the material? The 
material that matters? 
The (art)worker has everything 
to lose in the chaos of 
systemic collapse. 
The (art)worker has everything 
to lose in the stasis of 
systemic continuation.  
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
A woman waiting for a man.  
A rubbish dump. Marginal work. 
Badly paid and done by women. A 
pimp is waiting at the exit.  
RESPONDENT: 
Women’s work. Unacknowledged 
reproductive, domestic and 
affective labour, until a state 
of exception permits entry to 
the factory. 
The work within the factory was 
always reliant on the work 
without the factory.  
There is no without the self-
factory.  
Do it yourself. Self-initiated. 
Project spaces marginal to 
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markets and institutions are 
applauded. 
Pause 
What else could we do? 
VOICEOVER: 
A man waiting for a woman.  
The workers disperse. The lives 
of the solitary individuals can 
begin.  
Most narrative films begin 
after work is over.  
RESPONDENT: 
Self-care very easily slips 
into work on the self, which in 
turn segues into reproduction 
of the self better able to 
promise more. To further indebt 
oneself to the abstractions 
enclosing the self-factory.  
We make time for self-care when 
the work is over.  
When the work is over.  
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
A woman leaving the factory, a 
man is waiting for her.  
The lives of the solitary 
individuals can begin.  
The two solitary individuals 
move away from the factory and 
the camera is only too happy to 
follow them.  
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The camera accompanies them as 
they move further and further 
away from the factory and 
detach themselves increasingly 
from this background. 
RESPONDENT: 
The idea of a background that 
one can detach oneself from is 
a common cinematic technique. 
We cut in to the close up, 
follow the tracking shot. Or 
ignore the multitude of others 
alongside ourselves in the 
auditorium.  
There is a singular focus which 
we are drawn into to feel an 
intimate proximity, a short 
focal length. 
Pretending the surrounding 
context isn’t there doesn’t 
diminish its reality. That 
intimate, private moment is 
fully social. We look to the 
screen to do, to feel, what we 
no longer can in life.  
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
The workers are leaving the 
factory, a woman is waiting for 
her man.  
The piece rates have been 
raised to increase the absolute 
surplus value.  
They walk together slowly as if 
following a coffin.  
They do not look at each other, 
absorbed in another image.  
Death seems a relief to them. 
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Working in the factory is hell.  
RESPONDENT: 
The humanity of hell appears 
almost heavenly from the 
factory floor.   
Pause 
VOICEOVER: 
This truck brings the woman 
back into prison with the 
others. 
The woman has committed a crime 
out of false love.  
In one hundred years of film 
there have probably been more 
prison gates than factory 
gates. 
RESPONDENT: 
The prison is a much simpler 
site of enclosure than the 
factory.  
In the prison the human, the 
individual and the body stay as 
one. Physically incarcerated, 
disciplined.  
In the factory the coalescing 
together is much looser. The 
individual floats into an 
imagined future of aspiration, 
a recorded past of 
employability. They remain 
tethered to the factory 
irrespective of where the body 
is when outside the gates.  
This single axis is now more 
complicated. There were other 
tethers then, but the factory 
was principal, through which 
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the political and social were 
controlled.  
Now we float ‘free’, multi-
tethered as multiple non-
presences. Multiple pullings 
down. The human used to conjoin 
with the individual in the 
sacramental factory on a daily 
basis.  




The truck brings the women from 
the prison to the factory. The 
factory is a kind of house of 
correction.  
In one hundred years of film we 
can see more prisons and houses 
of correction than factories 
and factory gates.  
Whenever possible, film has 
moved hastily away from 
factories.  
RESPONDENT: 
Film seeks to obscure itself.  
The culture industries brought 
about a new means of organising 
society.  
 
The Lumière brothers’ film 
functions as a bridge from the 
old to the new, connecting the 
soon to be antiquated economies 
of labour (through which 
society was structured), via 
their representation, to the 
emergent new form of 
dissemination of ideologies of 
ways of being.  
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VOICEOVER: 
Factories have not attracted 
film. Rather, they have 
repelled it.  
If we line up one hundred years 
of scenes of people leaving 
factories we can imagine that 
the same shot had been taken 
over and over. 
Like a child who repeats its 
first word for one hundred 
years to immortalise its 
pleasure in that first spoken 
word. 
Or like far-eastern artists, 
who repeatedly paint the same 
picture until it is perfect, 
and the artist can enter the 
picture.  
RESPONDENT: 
We used to see static when we 
turned on a television screen. 
A stasis of infinite activity. 
Molecular workers engaged in an 
arduous simulacrum of sameness.  
Farocki’s film montage was 
broadcast on television in 
Germany. The workers left the 
factory and gathered in the 
auditorium. Then, they watched 
themselves from the comfort of 
their own homes.  
VOICEOVER: 
When we could no longer believe 
in such perfection, film was 
invented.      
RESPONDENT: 




How does technospheric abstraction manifest in differentiated inequalities at the pivotal sites of 
the collective political body and individuated human body?
How might artistic use of (dis)embodiment enable critical affect at these sites? 
Having outlined the historical development of the technosphere and processes by 
which we are de-humanised and abstracted through it in Part 1, focus in Part 2 turns to 
the locating of the unequal effects of this abstraction. ‘Site’, as the situated event-
encounter at which abstract violence can be materialised, is explored. In looking to 
assert and enable a human-ness, the body is crucial as such a site. Prior to focusing on 
the physical human body though, I examine the collective political body as a site 
within which technospheric ideology seeks to foreclose the possibility of contesting its 
logic of abstraction and ensuing materialisation of inequalities. 
I use the term ‘political body’ (in addition to e.g. discussing the public sphere) in order 
to draw specific attention to the biopolitical framing of bodies as the base unit of a 
foreclosed political space. However, as Judith Butler argues, in addition to bodies being 
a vector of this subjectification, in coming together in public an assembling of physical 
bodies also holds the potential to reassert a space of politics.  At the same time, the 194
nominative claiming of the link to the discursive and conceptual in my use of the term 
political body also seeks to expand the body out from the confined, overly literal and 
 Judith Butler, ‘Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street’, transversal texts (2011) 194
<https://transversal.at/transversal/1011/butler/en> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Theory of Performative Assembly (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).
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empirical use to which Marina Vishmidt observes it is too frequently put as a 
theoretical device.     195
In its latter stages, this part considers the interweaving of these differing but related 
senses of ‘body’ through the ‘zone’ and precarious labour within the gig economy.  In 
ending, specific focus is returned to would-be resistant, critical artistic practice, 
considering strategies of embodiment and disembodiment.196
 Marina Vishmidt, ‘Bodies in space: On the ends of vulnerability’, Radical Philosophy, 2:8 195
(2020), 33-46 <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/bodies-in-space> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Embodiment and disembodiment are central to Part 2, which considers how varying 196
structures differentially embody and disembody (and, relatedly, subjectify and desubjectify) us, 
and how agency might be asserted at this crucial site. 'Embodiment’ is addressed from different 
angles throughout this part but in foundation my use of the term draws upon that of Deleuze 
and Guattari (which will be further discussed). 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1980], trans. 
by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
Embodiment as a concept bears a strong relation to the corporeal human body in all its 
enfleshed, sensory and variably vulnerable forms. Despite increasingly projected post-somatic 
imaginaries, we are all subject to this embodiment, though in vastly unequally different ways. 
However, my use of the term embodiment extends beyond the enfleshed body. An artwork or 
text might embody a concept or idea, holding it within itself in a more inherent way than 
description or representation. This is not simply a second parallel uses of the term; the two 
senses need to be held in intrinsic interconnection. One’s enfleshed embodiment, in its infinitely 
complex connection to context (one’s being), needs to be held in continuous reflexive co-
consideration in any attempt to extend a creative act of embodiment, bringing a critical 
awareness of positionality to the artwork or text. This reflexivity is especially vital as the 
capacity to produce such extra-somatic embodiment is highly unequally distributed. 
The disembodiment of the artwork which this part will go on to advocate is paradoxically a 
partial return back, in negation, to the corporeal aspect of embodiment. The artwork, unlike the 
enfleshed human body, does have the capacity to be dispersed in space and time as a means of 
evading subsumption, while nevertheless holding a coherence through its disparate elements.
That the term embodiment can weave in interrelationship between these aspects is what makes 
it such a vital theoretical device for this part, and for the research project as a whole.    
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Embodiment within site
The projected image of the technosphere is one where location and sited-ness cease to 
matter, with subject, action and object floating in a de-spatialised network of 
instantaneous connection. However, this is to consider the technosphere only as a 
surface: in the terms in which it projects itself and in the interests of the dominant 
hegemonies operating through it. It is to deny the complexities and histories of 
context.  197
As Benjamin Bratton observes, there is clearly a reformulating taking place in the 
relationship of geography to structures of power, with the technosphere having a 
different relationship to space to previous dominant structures.  The Westphalian 198
nation-state premise is collapsing: certainly through sub-nationalisms and the 
offshoring of wealth outside of state oversight, but perhaps more urgently and 
immediately in the growing migrations towards the technospheric core that can be 
viscerally seen. Whether it be Mexico or the Mediterranean, the escalating 
concentrations of wealth, agency, prestige and security in specific locations are having 
urgent corporeal affect. A new paradigm of globalised bodily violence stemming from 
this is being normalised.199
 Furthermore, it also dismisses differentials of sticky positions on that networked surface 197
which cannot be easily untethered from. Opaque means of surveillance and identification are 
increasingly inescapably archived onto us, fixing us in place, as was discussed in Part 1.
 Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2015).198
 As, for example, made powerfully apparent in Forensic Oceanography’s work on the 199
Mediterranean ‘migrant crisis’.
Forensic Oceanography [part of Forensic Architecture], Death By Rescue [project website] (2016) 
<https://deathbyrescue.org> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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The interfaces and information of the technosphere might occur in dispersed, 
ephemeral encounters, but this is built upon an under-recognised continuing 
materiality. A surface ephemerality is hugely reliant on unseen hardware which must 
be manufactured and maintained, and the emplaced infrastructures of network 
connectivity are also particularly relevant to consideration of site. As Alberto Toscano 
outlines in his discussion of financial markets, the ‘overcoming’ and ‘surpassing’ of 
questions of space and geography has paradoxically led to a reassertion of the 
importance of spatial infrastructure.  However, where previously what mattered was 200
the siting in proximity to one another of human individuals who carried relevant 
embodied knowledge and skill, we now observe an abstraction where it is the siting of 
infrastructure which is significant. Machinic algorithms trade with one another, but 
with trades occurring in nano-seconds (far swifter than the human brain can conceive), 
being marginally closer to the market’s server and having a fractionally shorter 
connection time to it can give the competitive edge and enable the capturing of the 
profit. Toscano explores an interesting repercussion of this: that in chasing ever 
increasing speeds of connection, we have now arrived at a place of Einsteinian 
relativity in financial markets, where there is no longer a ‘universal truth’ for the best 
price of an asset, but instead this is dependant on location.  A spatial variability is 201
 Alberto Toscano, ‘Gaming the Plumbing: High-Frequency Trading and the Spaces of Capital’, 200
Mute, 3:4 (2013) <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/gaming-plumbing-high-
frequency-trading-and-spaces-capital> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Ibid.201
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thus realised which can be exploited by existent power and capital.  We have moved 202
through centralised certainty back to something more akin to ‘local time’ before 
railways made it uniform; a set of infrastructural connections which acted to align is 
being superseded by another reopening difference. Toscano concludes his argument by 
noting that there has historically been an oscillation in capitalism between periods of 
spatial and technological strategies to accrue excess profits. The former would include 
building colonial monopolies or offshoring labour to cheaper locations while the latter 
can be seen in the industrial revolution, through the Fordist production line, and on 
into automation. However, Toscano notes, this current re-spatialisation of financial 
speculation could mark a paradigm shift into an aligning between spatial and 
technological strategies.  203
Site, in a very physical sense, thus continues to hold relevance within the structures of 
the technosphere. In the sense of a ‘territory’, it also has importance in resisting the 
technosphere. Kristin Ross observes that defending a territory holds the potential to be 
much more generative of solidarity than a position of resistance or protest which does 
 By way of example, Toscano describes private fibre-optic cables built through the Allegheny 202
mountains, to cut the time of transaction between New York and Chicago by three milliseconds, 
at a cost of $300 million. Such infrastructural investment is only possible with existent capital. 
Ibid.
Bridle describes proprietorial microwave relays being used similarly between data centres 
across London.  
James Bridle, New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future (London: Verso, 2018) pp. 
103-112.
 Toscano.203
Conversely, it is possible to argue that this has always been the case, and that despite different 
emphases these preceding forms and developments of capitalism were all premised on 
entwined spatial and technological exploitation.
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not have a site which can be claimed.  Whereas the latter accepts a coherent logic of 204
complete hegemony of the repressive system; a territory, somewhere to be defended 
through dwelling within, proposes a more potent counter-power. ‘Defending’, as Ross 
uses it, is evocative of ‘dual power’: an alternate way of being within and alongside the 
dominant structure, but something which persists and has potency.  Where 205
hegemony forecloses the possibility of an outside, the territory of resistance might need 
to be asserted within, but not according to, the repressive system. A site which can be 
resided in and returned to, rather than the possibly much more fleeting and 
insubstantial moments of contestation created in non-territorial resistance.  206
——
 Kristin Ross, ‘Making a Territory’, in The Zad and NoTAV: Territorial Struggles and the Making of 204
a New Political Intelligence, by Mauvaise Troupe Collective and Kristin Ross (London: Verso, 
2018), also available at Mauvaise Troupe Collective website <https://mauvaisetroupe.org/
spip.php?article229> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Lenin made use of the term ‘dual power’ to describe a counter apparatus of power operating 205
alongside, but distinct from, the state; in contestation with it. 
Vladimir Lenin, ‘The Dual Power’, Pravda, 9 April 1917, trans. by Isaacs Bernard, available at 
Marxists Internet Archive <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/09.htm> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Ross’s argument pertains to the specific context of the ZAD (Zone a Défendre) movement 206
occupying land demarcated to become a new airport. However, it holds more general validity if 
we take site in a less physical sense, as a way or place of being in relation to the world.
Ross.
The ZAD movement began in western France with the long-term occupation of the site of a 
proposed new airport. Beginning in 2009 and still ongoing, this initial occupation has expanded 
out to many others elsewhere in France and beyond.
129
The site of the artistic intervention is complex. It is continually shifting and formed in 
relation to the (non-) presence of artist and artwork as well as all other contextual 
elements. Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion that we consider artistic engagement with site-
context as ‘being in common’ rather than ‘common being’ is important, recognising the 
subjectivity and plurality that is carried into any experience of site.  The site is an 207
assemblage with diverse components, including the artist and artwork. Affinities 
within this can be found and emphasised or amplified: being attracted together but at 
the same time being held open as distinct, in relation to rather than part of. Miwon Kwon 
views recent efforts (including her own) to rethink the specificity of the art-site 
relationship as being symptomatic of the post-modern condition of trying to find 
specificity and location within a sea of abstracted, homogenised fragmentation: site has 
shifted from being principally a location, to becoming a discursive vector or 
methodology.  This chimes with Ross’s argument: critical, resistant art is seeking site, 208
foregrounding the context of this, and acknowledging the simultaneous cause-effect 
nature of the artist in relation to it, as a means of trying to establish a sustainable 
territory out of which to challenge the presumptions of the technosphere.209
Site is a slippery thing. It has shifted from being something principally structured 
spatially to being formed (inter-)textually, as we navigate the world and our 
engagement with it through interwoven and networked codes, languages and packets 
of information. Sites are continually forming and dissolving as these come together and 
 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Of Being-in-Common’, trans. by James Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, 207
ed. by Miami Theory Collective (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 
1-12 (p. 4).
 Miwon Kwon, One Place After Another: Site Specific Art and Locational Identity (Cambridge MA: 208
MIT Press, 2004) pp. 3-8.
 Ross.209
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pull apart. Where our bodies materially reside is no longer so central to our siting as it 
historically might have been. And yet, recalling Bratton and Toscano, these 
(inter-)textual engagements with site do still have to take place somewhere.  210
Considering this, Kwon’s title One Place After Another evokes the argument she makes: 
that site might best be thought of as fragments occurring one after another, through 
spaces.  However, this is to under acknowledge the plurality: that each site-event of 211
encounter might be simultaneously different for each subject, as we each bring our 
own contexts to our encounter.  212
One of the key differentials of these subjectively variable site-events is the physicality 
and materiality we are told we have overcome. Not only are sites themselves variably 
material, but the very same site (to the always impossible extent we can ever be at the 
exact same site as another who is not ourselves) is encountered with differing degrees 
of materiality. This is a political, unequal element of the experience of site. As Silvia 
Federici reminds us, there is devalorised material labour occurring at both distant and 
near peripheries, and the technosphere instigates countless exhausting migratory 
journeys, and tragic deaths.  This is the dialectical tension within site (but not an 213
abstracted one, one rooted in visceral embodiment): while we may have something of a 




 Within the book, Kwon does acknowledge a vast difference of experience, and thus a need to 212
consider fragments next to one another, rather than invoking equivalences after one another. 
However, as the choice of title indicates, this is a side point to her main argument.
Ibid., p. 166.
 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist Struggle 213
(Oakland CA: PM Press, 2012).
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in the physicality of the experience of site. The artist and artwork must thus engage not 
in the specificities of site, but in the specificities of plural encounters with site, and the 
politics which ensue. 
Artist residencies are problematic. The term has expanded to encompass a wide range 
of variations, but I principally refer here to the ‘traditional’ model of an artist spending 
a period of time in a site other than their own. This already contradicts the above: an 
artist cannot be within an ‘other-site’; they are part of the continual constructing of it 
while being in continual encounter with it (‘it’ being differently experienced by them to 
anyone else). The premise of moving into a generalised ‘other’ site is a false one, and 
yet, paradoxically, in seeking to counter the inequalities of the technosphere, we need 
to at least seek to understand the situations of others. An important potential of the 
artwork within site could be in trying to connect or bridge a gap between different 
encounters, recognising their plurality: to create an encounter between encounters so to 
speak.   
Embodiment and disembodiment are key in bridging this gap between individual 
experiences of site. The body itself constitutes a site, and we have vastly different 
degrees of embodied-ness in our engagements with site, depending on our position 
within the hierarchies of the technosphere. Part 1 called for a post-individual pro-
humanism and it is important to clarify a distinction of embodiment with regard to 
this. The technosphere seeks to embody us as individuals: entities of data, productivity, 
linguistic-relational capability and capitalist consumption. A falsely clean embodiment, 
an inescapably encapsulated archive of past activities and a controlled and surveilled 
(non-)future. This ‘embodiment’ ignores the sensual, the visceral and the painful: the 
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body that bleeds and seeps and desires.  The body upon which hugely unequal 214
violence is enacted, but still the body which we all inhabit. 
If an embodied engagement with site premised on positive agency rather than 
technospheric control is to be found, this will be in a human rather than individual 
embodiment. This entails making ourselves vulnerable alongside one another across 
the breadth of our being; sharing vulnerabilities and frailties, and mutually caring. 
Acknowledging, in the residency context for example, that I am not an abstracted 
virtuosic individual come to reflect on and engage with site, but rather, that I am 
another messy human in need of care, tethered in infinite complexity to the world 
around me. 
The body itself can also be a territory of resistance: an unquantifiable site of human-
ness.  To fulfil this though, it needs to care and to be cared for, be cared about. The 215
human-ness of the body is manifested in these caring relationships: in the connected, 
co-constituted sites of encounter beyond our non-discrete selves. 
Strategically then, what is needed is a parallel embodiment and disembodiment: 
always seeking to place ourselves in co-vulnerable and co-caring embodied-ness in 
human-to-human encounter, while at the same time always seeking to disembody 
 Where somatic materialities are permitted within the technosphere, it is only in highly 214
commodified exploitable forms, such as pornography or the ill body as a site for invasive 
pharma-capitalism as explored by Boyer.
Anne Boyer, The Undying: Pain, Vulnerability, Mortality, Medicine, Art, Time, Dreams, Data, 
Exhaustion, Cancer, and Care (London: Allen Lane, 2019).
 Strategies of playfulness and irrationality, as discussed in Part 1, might be part of this 215
unquantifiable human-ness.
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ourselves, or enable the disembodiment of others, out of the individuation and 
corporeal violence of the technosphere.216
 It is important to emphasise that the embodied human-to-human encounters I advocate 216
placing ourselves within should be co-caring. This includes making a judgement of when the 
other human is not caring for us (perhaps acting as an agent of technospheric violence or 
exploitation) and choosing, if possible, to remove ourselves from that vulnerable encounter.
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Subsumption of the public sphere
At the other end of the scale, though built upon our embodied selves, is the public 
sphere: our collective political body. This is a key site in the perpetuation and 
‘legitimisation’ of inequality within the technosphere, and it is thus relevant to examine 
its emergence and contemporary functioning in order to explore in what ways it might 
be possible to operate critically, or present counter narratives, within it. 
The relations of public to private (be it in material assets, rights, or information) have 
been at the core of the discussion of inequalities since at least the 1700s when Jean-
Jacques Rousseau located the origins of inequality as having occurred in the 
privatisation of property.  The public sphere is where those relations are formed. 217
Jurgen Habermas presents a comprehensive exploration of the development of the 
liberal public sphere, in relation to which our contemporary context emerges.  What 218
he charts developing in the eighteenth century, he links back to Greek antiquity: the 
‘bios politikos’ constituted in both discussion (‘lexis’) and common action (‘praxis’). 
However, underpinning this bios politikos, and similarly reestablished in the bourgeois 
society Habermas describes, is an absolute separation of public and private.  The 219
freedom and autonomy of equal participation within a dynamic public sphere of 
political life is premised upon absolute mastery and control of a household private 
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, 217
or, Second Discourse’ [1755], in Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. by 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111-231.
 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 218
of Bourgeois Society [1962], trans. by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 
1992).
 Ibid., p. 3-4.219
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sphere. The head of the household exercises complete authority over this private 
sphere, within which is held all ‘menial’ and reproductive labour, and furthermore all 
economic activity. On this basis, the bios politikos was only ever accessible to a 
minority (excluding the vast majority of women, the poor, etc.); and similarly the 
bourgeois public sphere presents access barriers almost as unsurpassable, premised on 
exclusionary discourses such as those around class, gender and race. 
This strict separation of public and private then shifts with the emergence of the 
modern state and development of the category of the social.  The public sphere 220
maintains its original meaning of being ‘public’, but comes to paradoxically be at least 
in part defined by its private (or ‘civil’) ownership, in contrast to the state. Habermas 
describes this as the authentic public sphere, residing in the private realm.  However, 221
the inequality of this bourgeois public sphere is significant: not only through the 
discursively constructed identity barriers to access mentioned above, but also in the 
extending of their underpinning material and economic inequalities. The bourgeois 
elite are the beneficiaries of this material divergence as capitalism proceeds, and 
correspondingly secure their dominance over access to, and influence within, the 
public sphere. This creates a closed loop of foreclosed critique of the structures which 
enable that foreclosing of critique.  222
Discourses of unequal identity categorisation continue to affect our relations to the 
public sphere as both subject and object in the present: our access to active 
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958], 2nd edn (Chicago IL: University of Chicago 220
Press, 1998), p. 28.
 Habermas, p. 30.221
 The implications of this stasis, and possible responses to it, will be developed in Part 3.222
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participation within it, and how those aspects of perceived identity contributing to our 
social configuration are discussed in our absence. Moreover, material ownership, while 
increasingly opaquely hidden in tax havens, ‘dark pools’ and privatised data, only 
grows in dominance over the public sphere.  Where once a flawed public sphere was 223
a much needed counterweight to state power, we now find ourselves looking to 
underpowered states as checks on what has become of it, a role they are manifestly 
unable to fulfil. The mutated public sphere, now dominated by the formerly not even 
acknowledged economic, consumes and directs the state out of which it originally 
emerged. 
Nancy Fraser’s critique of Habermas’s conception of the bourgeois public sphere 
centres on his lack of recognition of a plurality of public spheres, or ‘counter publics’.  224
These are clearly visible in the likes of working class unionisation and feminist 
movements but, Fraser argues, have emergent precedents going right back to the 
eighteenth century. There was never a singular uncontested public sphere without 
counter publics already present. These counter publics are vital in contesting the 
‘bracketing out’ of material status differences that Habermas’s public sphere is 
premised upon.  That social inequalities are merely overlooked rather than addressed 225
and engaged with is to ignore the necessity of questioning what constitutes the public 
sphere.  Counter publics are vital in questioning the acceptance of these bracketings, 226
 ‘Dark pools’ are discussed by Bridle: they are private trading forums existing beyond 223
mainstream financial markets, outside regulation.
Bridle, pp.108-109.
 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 224
Existing Democracy’, Social Text, 25/26 (1990), 56-80.
 Habermas, pp. 36-38.225
 In an art context, this underpins the need for art to acknowledge and address the conditions 226
of its own production.
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which we might more descriptively name ‘exclusionary structural legitimisations of 
inequality foreclosing the discourses they claim to facilitate’. 
This is a recurring fallibility of liberalism. There can be no true tabula rasa of a singular 
universally equal public sphere: the necessary barriers between the space of public 
discourse and the deep inequalities of culture and economy within society can never be 
made fully impermeable. Making such a claim only further entrenches the inequality.227
Counter publics are vital in two simultaneous ways. They are both a site to withdraw 
to and recuperate, and also bases or training grounds out of which broader public 
engagement, disruptive of the hegemonic public sphere, can be initiated.  As such, we 228
can think of them as in some ways corresponding to Ross’s territory which can be 
defended.  A place to be defended and dwelt within, but the counter public is a useful 229
concept in helping us escape the literal spatial sense that frequently seeps into 
‘territory’. It also, in emphasising the meeting of ideas and voices that constitutes the 
public sphere, reasserts the dynamic agency and connection of (potentially embodied, 
human-to-human) discursive encounters. The counter public launch point for critique, 
subversion and disruption of the hegemonic public sphere, better than ‘defence’, 
reflects the active, invasive agency required in contesting inequality. 
Counter publics can themselves fall foul of the same bracketing out and excluding as 
the hegemonic public sphere. They must not be allowed to ossify, and need a continual 
 However, making such a claim speculatively, with explicit or implicit acknowledgement that it 227
is not the present reality, might serve a purpose. This is very different to claiming it to be the 
case.
 Fraser, p. 68.228
 Ross.229
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process of ‘counter counter publics’ and beyond, fractalling out, to emerge in 
connected contestation with them and each other.
Fraser writes that we are all situated in relation to these multiple public spheres with 
differing enmeshments amidst them; we cannot neutrally observe them.  Rosalyn 230
Deutsche builds on this argument: while there may be occasional need to aesthetically 
reveal or represent, to singularly emphasise this is to ignore the site from which we 
inescapably speak and view; our own positionality of subjectivity, context, territory 
and (counter) public.  Deutsche uses this argument to contest Fredric Jameson’s call 231
for cognitive maps, which Part 1 previously critiqued for their lack of 
acknowledgement of an underpinning structure.  Bringing in Deutsche’s argument, 232
we can add to this that the strategy insufficiently addresses our own subjectivity and 
positionality.  This acknowledgement of both the ‘self-to-world’ aspects of our 233
embodied positionality (the manner in which we encounter the world) as well as our 
‘world-to-self’ structural and contextual reading and encoding (the manner in which 
the world encounters us) is central to the methodological approach of ‘embodied 
flattened allegorical montage’ as set out in Praxis.    
——
 Fraser.230
 Rosalyn Deutsche, ‘Art and Public Space: Questions of Democracy’, Social Text, 33 (1992), 231
34-53.
 Fredric Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. by 232




Ed Finn outlines what we might consider the ‘inversion’ of our current public sphere as 
it has become further debased through the trajectory of liberalism. With our access to, 
and participation within, public discourses and the political and journalistic arenas 
becoming increasingly dominated by the internet, actors within this space which claim 
relied upon de facto public service roles, but are in truth private capitalist interests 
(often forms of platform), occupy key positions of power.  Facebook’s functioning as 234
an echo chamber of aligned opinions and susceptibility to manipulation has been well 
documented, but Finn turns attention towards a site widely perceived to be much more 
neutral and objective: Google search. Pagerank is the opaque algorithm by which 
Google determines what we are presented with when we search, and its ordering: 
essentially it is a tool for creating a hierarchy determined through an unknown, 
shifting set of criteria.  Habermas’s idealised public sphere was premised on every 235
opinion or argument standing or falling based on its own discursive merit (a utopian 
ideal which was never possible), but now access to, and dissemination of, the material 
of discourse is largely beholden to a single dominant corporation using proprietary 
algorithms and bearing specific vested interests.    236
For Finn, Bitcoin is the mirror image of Pagerank. Where the latter provides us with 
access to content, knowledge, news and information, but determined through an 
opaque algorithmic structure; the former renders the content (what is exchanged and 
 Ed Finn, What Algorithms Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT 234
Press, 2017).
 Ibid., p. 157.235
 Habermas.236
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who owns it) invisible, but makes the anonymous record and network completely 
visible in the form of the publicly accessible blockchain.  237
In considering blockchain, the event of exchange and its map and subsequent trace are 
all meshed into one in the ever-increasing record of transactions that constitutes the 
chain. It is its own algorithm. With Pagerank on the other hand, we still generally hold 
onto a presumed separation between the two: a belief that a ‘neutral’ algorithm is 
somehow enabling us to access something objective, or truthful, rather than being 
similarly bound up in and entwined with that which it delivers to our screens. 
As exemplars of broader contemporary shifts (of ownership and profit being abstracted 
into a computational arms race, and of algorithmic mediation of access to discourse), 
Finn argues that Bitcoin and Pagerank taken together point towards a public sphere 
increasingly inverted from that which Habermas describes.  Whereas previously the 238
private and economic realm was (problematically) bracketed out leaving only the 
‘content’, we now appear to be coming full circle with the financial exchange being 
publicly accessible and the content being ‘bracketed in’ to an opaque algorithmic 
structure.  
 Finn, p. 169.237
A misplaced utopian streak sometimes enters into the discourse around blockchain algorithms, 
largely premised on an idea that human labour (Marx’s source of all value) can be transcended 
by machinic labour. In the example of Bitcoin mining though, the ‘machinic labour’ is purely a 
game: an abstracted race to see who can claim ownership of appropriated value premised on 
out of sight human labour. In this sense, it is a clear example of those who can disembody 
themselves within the technosphere exploiting those for whom that option is denied.
 Ibid., p. 173.238
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The economic thus becomes dominant as the new pseudo-public sphere, and becomes 
gatekeeper to any ‘public’ discourse. It is the record and the network. Journalism is 
increasingly quantitatively valued, in terms of views and clicks, irrespective of what is 
said. The old enlightenment values were themselves flawed in many ways, but did at 
least operate as a counterweight to market forces, albeit unequally and partially. They 
are losing relevance.  A similar shift can be observed taking place within art, with 239
financial market-value feeding back into perceived ‘artistic quality’ through 
mechanisms such as Frieze Tate Fund, creating a self-perpetuating loop of an under-
critiqued and under-critical market-orientated institutional canon.  240
This subsumption of the political by the economic proceeds in parallel with the 
subsumption of the social, the private and the intimate by the economic; as our 
conversations, desires, identities and relationships are rendered fungible data through 
the likes of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Tinder.  
The coming to dominance of the economic echoes Hannah Arendt’s earlier theorising 
of the social’s rise to preeminence.  The bios politikos had been premised on a form of 241
highly exclusionary ‘equality’ rooted not in a notion of justice but in ‘collectively’ 
 Ibid., p. 174.239
 And beyond this, there is a wholesale neoliberalisation of art institutions, increasingly 240
operating according to populist and/or marketised logics. This entails reduced funding for, or 
other forms of enabling of, the critical or controversial (other than when safe performances of 
such can be commodified).
 Arendt.241
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agreed upon freedom of public debate.  However the private sphere, a negative space 242
of privation upon which it materially relied, was completely authoritarian: the realm of 
necessity devoid of either freedom or equality.  243
The social as a realm rises with modernity between these spaces of the public and the 
private. The social sees the state become manager, developing governmentality in 
seeking to maximise the bio-economic efficiency of the population.  The hierarchical 244
family model is generalised across society, with (so long as the social held sway over 
the economic) a false sense of equality, or at least security, under hierarchical power.  245
By the twentieth century, a developed apparatus of governmentality means conformity 
is effectively fully internalised amongst the population and the visible authority figure 
at the hierarchical apex is no longer required.  In place of the dynamism of the debate 246
and action of the polis, Arendt argues, once the social begins to dominate and subsume 
the political, conformist behaviour rather than dynamic action becomes the expected 
role of the individual.  Instead of accepting flux and shift, an ossified stasis thus 247
 As discussed, there was huge exclusivity in the group amongst whom this ‘collective’ 242
agreement was made.
Furthermore, this understanding of freedom as being akin to a void ignores the histories and 
contexts, inscribed with inequality, within which life occurs. As noted in Part 1, a strong 
argument for considering freedom as ‘synthetic’ (something actively constructed) instead of 
considering it as passive absence is made by Srnicek and Williams. 
Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work 
(London: Verso, 2015), pp. 78-83.
 This negative privation of the private applies to those held within it, not the individual held 243
aloft (within the public) by it.
 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. 244
by Michel Senellart, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2009).
 Arendt, p. 40.245
 Foucault.246
 Arendt, pp. 40-41.247
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becomes the encoded logic, with significant change rendered increasingly 
unimaginable. It corresponds then that in the post-Fordist social factory, the language 
and interrelations of the old public sphere have (for the large majority) been coopted 
into labour, and bracketed away from any political affect. Proceeding further, passive 
‘being’ then replaces action as the principally required function of the individuated 
human within platform capitalism, as discussed in Part 1. Within a logic of stasis, the 
value created through linguistic-relational capability is extracted simply through the 
basic requirements of existing. That capability, which Paolo Virno considers the centre 
of our human-ness, becomes affectless object.  Despite a mirage of ever-increasing 248
activity, an immobility pervades at both the personal and systemic scale. 
Arendt’s preeminent social is a space in which the continuation of life and labour 
becomes the collective focus. Where the bourgeois public sphere was centred on the 
idea or concept, supposedly evaluated irrespective of the body voicing it; under the 
hegemony of the social it is the maintenance and maximising of that body (both 
individual and collective) which is primary.  Mutual dependence for the sake of the 249
continuation of this way of being (encoded with not only established inequalities, but 
also tendencies toward further exacerbation of these) assumes public significance, and 
everything else is gradually erased form the public sphere.  Arendt’s articulation of 250
this argument clearly strongly foreshadows Michel Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, 
which was discussed in Part 1. In the social, the vital link between the physical 
 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For An Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. 248
by Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2004), 
p. 98.
 Arendt.249
This is only a very specific body: normalised, rationalised, abstracted and instrumentalised.
 Ibid., p. 46.250
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corporeal body and the political body, around which this part is structured, becomes 
emphatic.
The liberal public sphere was dynamic, but hugely flawed in ignoring and excluding 
the vast majority of people. Its succession by the social inverts it a first time, subsuming 
the public into the concerns of the social, itself a massively expanded hierarchy of 
control derived from the old private. (And the old private likewise becomes a space of 
social concern and control.) While significantly flawed, this socially dominated era did 
at least contain elements of some notion of equality, and a concern for life. Our present 
context, where the economic has followed the social out of the private to claim 
dominance over the other spheres, jettisons these mediating factors. We now inhabit 
the anguish of the multitude, with concern for life giving way to a primary concern for 
profit, growth, capital and other textual abstractions of property.  251
 
Arendt argues that anything approaching ‘objectivity’ in the public sphere can only be 
achieved through the simultaneous presence of (and hearing of) innumerable 
perspectives contesting discourse and action.  In other words: counter publics. The 252
social dispenses with this democratic plural subjectivity through contestation and 
debate of ideas, replacing it with a false objectivity based on the decreed fulfilment of 
needs.
To contest an often violent structure which denies its own contestability is one thing 
when that structure at least places some importance on a flawed understanding of 
human equality and life. It is altogether more risky and potentially harmful when that 
 Virno.251
 Arendt, p. 57.252
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structure, as at present, has jettisoned those concerns. Under such conditions, the 
counter public or territory is indispensable as a form of refuge or protection. When the 
hegemonic structure pertains to be a totality, as with the technosphere, it continually 
attempts to subsume anything beyond it.  Any possibility of resistance might 253
therefore rely upon somehow rupturing from within and recuperating amidst, when 
the denied outside is foreclosed. Thus considerable effort, attention and care is required 
to hold open the space or idea of the territory or counter public as distinct amidst the 
dominant structure, even before any contestation of the structure itself can be 
imagined. Often not discrete, these vital sites might be found as alternate codes or 
textures of being, or logics of acting, enmeshed within the technosphere.
 As has been discussed (and as Part 3 will further explore), this is not to present the 253
technosphere as an entirely coherent, discrete, reified entity. Its fuzzy, de-centred contingency 
does not prevent it from having extensive affect though.
146
Public and civil
Philip Dietachmair and Pascal Gielen make a distinction between civil and public 
spheres, with the latter being the realm of words and ideas in circulation which has 
been explored thus far. The civil sphere (not to be confused with the state-orientated 
‘civic’) is, they argue, the space of action that is mutually interdependent with the 
public sphere.  If they are to foster resistance, actions in the civil sphere require 254
collective reflection, consideration and coordination emergent through discussion in a 
(counter) public sphere. In order to have a civil sphere resistant to, and critical of, the 
state and/or the categories of the ‘economic’ and  ‘social’ through which power 
operates, a public sphere of active discourse out of which those generative reflections 
and coordinations can emerge is needed. At the same time though, in the face of the 
technological, economic and social means of control (as well as physical violence) 
which the dominant regime can exert upon a critical (counter) public sphere, civil 
action is equally needed to hold open that space of discourse. 
Art can play a key role here, through operating at the intersection of the public and the 
civil, as Dietachmair and Gielen distinguish them. In reflexively acknowledging its 
own context, the artwork can simultaneously work within the civil and the public, 
operating as a generative text connecting together (or perhaps focusing attention upon 
existing connections between) content, site, context, event and subject. The artwork 
that can do this effectively can insulate and protect itself from hegemonic subsumption 
in both directions: what it articulates in the public sphere giving directionality to its 
 Philip Dietachmair and Pascal Gielen, eds., The Art of Civil Action: Political Space and Cultural 254
Dissent (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2018), pp. 14-18.
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action, and its qualities as an action or event within the civil sphere making public that 
discursive positioning.255
Art acting in this way is all the more vital when we see increasingly brutal, violent 
repression of protest and direct action. The artwork enables a disembodied form of 
affect to occur, which avoids the vulnerability that comes with embodied human 
presence in the face of corporeal violence on the part of the dominant regime. This is 
not to say direct civil action does not have a role to play: history shows it to be crucial 
in overcoming repressive structures.  However, art as a vector of connecting the 256
action directly to the weak points of power, or as a means of (re)presenting the distilled 
idea precisely at the point of action, can play a vital role. It might be a catalyst or 
multiplier for more direct action, but equally it can be a means of disembodied counter-
action: of continuing to actively resist, perhaps to defend a territory, while giving 
vulnerable human bodies some respite.257
 This mutual support between public and civil (in some ways akin to lexis and praxis) 255
underpins the importance of practice as an element of research within a project, such as this, 
which seeks to have affect within the public sphere.
 As Part 1 emphasised, various strategies of resistance can be most effective when working in 256
some form of coordination.
 Care must be taken with this line of thought. Especially when combined with an 257
individualism, it can lead to an elitist hypocrisy within art, with the artist coming to view 
themself as exceptional. It is imperative this is self-reflexively critiqued. In addition to the 
arguments made against an individualism in Part 1, it might be necessary at times for artists to 
put themselves (their bodies and their being) at the site of contestation. This will be further 
discussed in the Embodiment within artistic practice section below.
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Privation in the society of control
In considering site, and especially the public sphere as a site, it is important to draw 
connections back to work and labour. As discussed, the economic, following the social, 
has come to dominate the political within the public sphere; and furthermore, 
embodied labour is a site at which violence (or its threat) is routinely enacted upon 
humans. 
Gilles Deleuze presciently described the ‘society of control’ we now inhabit as 
‘dividuals’: a context wherein we are subject to ultra-responsive, free-floating 
management; neither as discrete, enfleshed beings, nor as a collective mass.  Rather, 258
we are maximised as units of production on the one hand, while being analysed and 
collated in fragmented disembodied sets of data on the other. Deleuze views the 
corporation’s succession of the factory as the archetypal structure of production as key 
to this: an abstract entity to work for, seeping into the internal identification of the 
worker, replacing a simpler site at which work was conducted (and at which resistance 
could be orchestrated).  259
Opaque, graded pay scales and bonus systems are a key technology of this. Each 
dividual can be specifically targeted, managed and manipulated to maximise their 
productivity through personalised inducements, within a broader culture of both 
implicit and explicit fear and competition.  This technology serves to fragment the 260
Fordist counter public of the factory floor: the contestation with managers and owners 




in unionisation, collective action and the withholding of labour. To echo some of Part 
1’s discussions, the dividual is no longer enclosed within the factory site, but is instead 
indebted, including within their own minds.   
The privateness of the multitude Virno explores this dividual as inhabiting is one 
where privateness is viewed very much in the negative terms of ‘privation’ which 
Arendt described.  To speak, without choice, in private is to be denied the notional 261
freedom of the public sphere; to have to operate precariously without a voice to contest 
either that condition or any other thing. 
What might a strategy of reappropriation of the private look like though? Might there 
not be potential in the overlooked privacy of the multitude to act to subvert or 
undermine the dominant regime? It is here that it might be possible to find ways of 
being which emphasise the overlooked, human positives which privacy might offer, 
while minimising the negative aspects of privation. Importantly though, technospheric 
privacy (which will tend towards ever more isolated anguished individuation) is not 
the aim. Instead, a fifth column privacy which loops around and uses the overlooked-
ness and invisibility of the private to surreptitiously reopen a collective, functioning 
(counter) public sphere can be sought. 
This reappropriation is already taking place within the technologies of the 
technosphere. VPNs, mirror sites, BitTorrent, the TOR network (despite its military 
origins), end-to-end encrypted messages and so forth are all being used around the 
world as means of reclaiming privacy and avoiding surveillance, be it in China, Turkey 
 Virno, p. 24.261
Arendt, p. 38.
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or London.  However, it is not the infrastructures themselves (a set of era-specific 262
terms that will be replaced by others as technologies develop) but, rather, how they are 
used to bring counter hegemonic discourses into public that is key. The technologies 
themselves offer no resistance without counter publics which might work through 
them, and counter publics have always, by necessity, found ways to operate through 
the technologies, systems and structures they sit within and against. Older, off-line 
networks persist alongside the new, and these can also be useful in avoiding 
surveillance.    
Karl Marx’s conception of a general intellect holds some liberatory potential for the 
dividual, but it is vital that whatever constitutes the general intellect is brought about 
in parallel with some kind of functioning critical, progressive public sphere (including 
counter publics).  The linguistic-capitalist networks of Facebook, Google and the 263
‘legitimate’ internet in general have been argued to be enabling of a general intellect.  264
And just as these can be harboured to private gain (while being relied upon as de facto 
 VPNs are ‘virtual private networks’ which, amongst other things, allow connection to the 262
internet as if elsewhere, thus avoiding some spatially determined means of surveillance or 
control.
Mirror sites are replicas of websites hosted elsewhere, which might be accessible when the 
original is not. 
BitTorrent is a protocol for peer-to-peer (and thus unmediated, and largely unregulated) file 
transfer.
TOR is an acronym of ‘The Onion Router’ and is a means of connecting to the internet 
(including, notably, the ‘dark web’) anonymously.
End-to-end encryption enables communication where, in principle, only the parties sending and 
receiving can access the content. 
These technologies, and others, can be used in various combinations.
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [1857-61], trans. by 263
Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 690-712.
 Paul Mason, PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future (London: Allen Lane, 2015) p. 135.264
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public services), so can VPNs, TOR and so forth; whether through data theft, spam, 
pornography, drug selling or other exploitative uses. Virno describes the general 
intellect as something formed in the discursive relations between individuals, 
producing a social knowledge.  Either the ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ means of 265
enabling those relations can further that. TOR isn’t ‘good’ because it inherently 
opposes surveillance, just as, conversely, Part 1 argued that Facebook and its like need 
not necessarily be completely disengaged with.  These are tools formed through, 266
often in inversion or replication of, a dominant technospheric structure and thus 
inevitably reflect and refract some of its inequalities in their socio-economic use. 
However, this does not preclude their (mis)use in pursuing this idea of a general 
intellect alongside, and as part of, a functioning public sphere. Where Marx saw the 
potential of a general intellect as residing in the machines themselves, Virno 
contrastingly views it as existing in the intra-human capacity of linguistic 
communications.  As the two collapse together within the technosphere (as argued in 267
Part 1), it is vital to hold onto and prioritise the human in a plural, co-relational, co-
affective and co-vulnerable sense, not an individuated one.  
Echoing the previously described role art might play in simultaneously bringing about 
a functioning, critical public sphere and civil sphere through the mutual enabling of 
one through the other, here what is needed is a simultaneous support for one another 
between the technological possibility of a general intellect and a politics premised on 
 Virno, pp. 42, 106.265
 To offer a specific example, according to friends’ first-hand experience Facebook Messenger 266
served as a vital means of communication during the Maidan occupation in Kyiv, Ukraine in 
2013-14. It was a quick, simple and accessible means of exchanging information and 
disseminating it to a wider audience, when many other channels were liable to surveillance by 
the very state which was seeking, with increasing violence, to repress the occupation.
 Ibid., p. 106.267
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equality and care. A functioning public sphere cannot really emerge without this: the 
bios politikos was premised on a supposed freedom of pure discourse which bracketed 
out anything bodily, social or laborious. Our contemporary context though, is one 
within which these are the very sites at which exploitative inequality is most 
powerfully and directly (re)produced. Thus something new, emphasising equality and 
care, is needed. This must be worked out in mutual parallel with the technological 
possibilities, not regressively turning away from them but iteratively edging and being 
edged forward in reflexive criticality.  The interrelationship between the 268
(mis)functioning of our collective political body and the material relations of our 
corporeal human bodies is vital to this.
 Within the technospheric context, these technologies increasingly affect, or even determine, 268




When considering a public sphere premised on discourse and idea, it is essential to 
recognise the embodied inequality of agency in affecting it. Virtuosic work has come to 
dominate, and as Guy Debord noted, communication itself is increasingly rendered a 
commodity.  The spectacle, as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer observed, has 269
taken on a dual nature: being both the product of the culture industries but 
increasingly also, as Part 1 explored, the dominant vector of our positioning and 
functioning within the socio-economic structure as a whole.  Those in the advantaged 270
position of being able to affect public discourse need to be hyper-vigilant not to 
perform a spectacle of criticality which in fact only serves to accrue further capital 
(perhaps not financial, immediately at least), but which does not in fact meaningfully 
address that which it professes to critique. That inequality of linguistic-relational 
agency is distributed highly unequally according to embedded structures (of class, 
race, gender, nationality, language, etc.) means that an accrual of capital through a false 
spectacle of critically and progressively contributing to a new public sphere only 
reinforces entrenched inequalities. Furthermore, it appropriates the precise sites at 
which counter publics could otherwise develop. To deploy one’s agency in such a way 
is to be complicit in the aforementioned inverting and hollowing out of the public 
sphere. 
 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle [1967], trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York NY: 269
Zone Books, 1994).
(For Debord, human communication becoming a commodity is central to the society of the 
spectacle.) 
 Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], trans. by Edmund 270
Jephcott (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 94-136.
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Of course, human fallibility is inevitable and the political is messy. There will be events 
when spectacle and entrenched privilege permeate a net-positive act; when doing 
nothing would be worse. This needs to be critiqued, but should not dissuade us from 
action in what will otherwise continue to be an exploitative stasis of profound 
inequality. In such a position, the disembodiment away from singular attributable 
authorship that the technologies of the technosphere can help enable might be a 
desirable, viable strategy in seeking to avoid reproducing inequality.  The radical, 271
perpetual destruction of the individuated self advocated in Part 1 again becomes 
relevant, both in terms of mitigating self-interested capital accumulation (conscious or 
otherwise) and, through co-equal inter-relation and collaboration, as a creative 
manifestation of a counter public of critical self-reflexive co-consideration.  The 272
ossified stasis of the present structure, while familiar, might be worth greater concern 
than the potential political act which contains unknown risk.   273
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari describe a reality of ‘bodies without organs’ wherein 
the centrality of the atomised body is dispersed across a shifting plane of assemblages 
of intensities of substance.  While vividly predicting much of the fluid, networked 274
experience of the technospheric reality we now inhabit in their conceptual rendering 
(with the ‘bodies’ in question encompassing a wide range of agglomerations which 
might previously have been uncritically accepted as distinct, cohesive entities), Deleuze 
 As will be explored, this technological enabling of disembodiment is highly unequally 271
distributed.
 To be specific, Part 1 proposed the destruction of the individuated artist self; the point made 272
here is more general. A return to specific focus on the artist will come in the Embodiment within 
artistic practice section at the end of this part.
 This need to speculatively act into the unknown, with the risk implicit in that, is a key 273
consideration of radical care as it will be developed in Part 3.
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 153.274
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and Guattari’s writing also places an intentional emphasis on the corporeal human 
body, in its somatic vulnerability. The black body, the female body, the migrant body: 
the bodies which do the under-valorised but essential labour of the technosphere and 
upon which its violence is routinely enacted, while being excluded from the hegemonic 
public sphere. The inequality of embodiment must be recognised in any discussion of 
it: there is a dealignment of agency between those bodies which are vulnerable, those 
who can proactively enunciate their vulnerability, and those who can enunciate a 
vulnerability upon others. (Such enunciation operates on complex, multifaceted, 
intersecting spectrums between intent and unintentionality, and between benefit and 
harm.) Furthermore, there is an inequality of access to the sites and technologies of 
desirable disembodiment (largely privileging those whose embodied selves are least 
likely to suffer violence).
For Deleuze and Guattari, we are bound by three things which prevent us from fully 
becoming bodies without organs: the state of being an organism, the notion of 
significance, and subjection (or subjectification).  However, they argue, while we can 275
to unequal extents seek to disembody ourselves out of these confines, it can be 
strategically beneficial to, to some small extent, remain connected and tethered via each 
in order to be able to operate and subvert through the systems of the dominant 
reality.  To undermine through its own languages and structures, pulling it down 276
from within, but not in such a way as to destroy ourselves, the rogue agent, in the 
process (which would almost always leave the vastly larger dominant reality 
effectively unaffected, with the pulled down part so minuscule as to be virtually 
imperceptible). To operate like a successful virus: spreading an alternate way of being 
 Ibid., p. 159.275
 Ibid., p. 160.276
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but not being so alien as to kill the host organism and in so doing the nascent idea 
too.    277
There is thus a strategic benefit in maintaining a reflexive relation to the fixing points 
preventing us from fully becoming bodies without organs. Conversely, as dividuals 
within the society of control, now formed through apparatuses of desubjectification as 
much as subjectifiation (which will be addressed below), it is similarly strategic to 
maintain a reflexive relation to those processes of becoming a body without organs, 
even if we now wish to contest this through asserting an embodiment.  An approach 278
of total embodiment in a wholly disembodied context cannot engage with it, while full 
disembodiment merely conforms. And in the inverted scenario, complete 
disembodiment or embodiment in a wholly embodied context is equally inaffective. 
Rather, a more nuanced strategy of resistance-resilience premised on entering into site 
and shifting tactically, unpredictably and uncontrollably, between embodied and 
disembodied states and events is called for, with the repressive structures and 
processes themselves becoming the vectors of their own undermining.  A keen 279
awareness of the apparatuses within which we exist and our (de)subjectification 
through them is essential in doing this.
 This strategy is premised on contesting a totalising hegemonic context, as at present. At a 277
certain point, to fully supersede it, it does become necessary to fundamentally undermine the 
dominant reality. And prior to this point, it can be crucial to do so in delineated territories as a 
means of establishing the aforementioned counter publics. The argument made here does not 
contradict this, but rather relates to the macro-contextual scale where a dialectical direct 
confrontation will presently prove ineffective and damaging.
 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’.278
 This discussion of embodiment is a broader, more general one than that of within the context 279
of would-be critical artistic practice (which will be specifically returned to at the end of this 
part).
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Dark kitchens and desert cities
The designated, demarcated zone within or adjacent to a city, or even the new city itself 
as a zone, is a chief spatial technology of the technosphere.  While sovereignties are 280
still enforced spatially, in part at least, the zone provides a means to effectively bracket 
out within space. Just as within the bourgeois public sphere the economic and domestic 
were bracketed out of the supposedly free and equal exchange of words and ideas, so 
within the spatial zone the very notion of public and civil spheres, or any kind of 
political contestation, are bracketed out through authoritarian legislation underpinned 
by imprisonment and violence. These zones, be they focused on trade, finance or 
manufacturing, become spaces where politics and critique are ruthlessly silenced in the 
face of economic hegemony. 
There are paradoxes, such as Dubai Media City, where the zone, though highly 
regulated in other ways, allows a greater degree of ‘free speech’ within its boundaries 
than is permitted outside.  However, this leniency derives from seeking an economic 281
edge, not out of any desire for situated public discourse.    
Keller Easterling describes the zone technology as being increasingly rendered via 
active, rather than object, form.  By this, she means that it has been abstracted away 282
from a specific design for a spatial environment. Instead, the zone is perpetuated and 
multiplied through a set of approaches and ideologies (which can be tailored where 
 Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 280
25-69.
 Ibid., p. 45.281
 Ibid.282
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necessary to local conditions). So the zone is not spread around the world in 
architectural plans, but instead in doctrines of free trade, tax exemption and digital 
connectivity, as well as the premise itself of managing a population through 
constructed spatial boundaries. Thus, from a spatial, physical origin, the zone becomes 
something encoded and perpetuated chiefly through text: the text of the legal clause 
and policy document, and the text of the algorithmic coding of its automated systems 
and telecommunications. 
The desert, perhaps in Saudi Arabia or on the China-Kazakstan border, is the preferred 
(non-)site for the zone.  Sparsely populated and ‘empty’, it enables the imposition of 283
this textual active-form in its purest way, least tempered by context: a real-world tabula 
rasa. Neoliberal presumptions can be writ large, neither hypothetical urban renderings 
in virtual reality nor economic ideologies need be much modified to the realities of site. 
While current legal frameworks do still require the zone to be physically situated, the 
valorised, opportunistic linguistic-relational workers who can do their job from 
anywhere, whom the zone seeks to attract, are beginning to be freed from this tiresome 
necessity. E-residency, for example, enables the juridical siting of oneself within a 
certain legislative environment without the need to be physically present (or ever have 
 NEOM, a new-city project in north-western Saudi Arabia, will have a juridical and tax 283
regime completely independent of the rest of the country.
 
Reuters with CNBC.com, ‘Saudis set $500 billion plan to develop zone linked with Jordan and 
Egypt’, CNBC website (24 October 2017)  <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/24/saudis-500-
billion-plan-to-neom-business-city.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Khorgas (sometimes spelled Khorgos), on the China-Kazakhstan border, will soon be the 
world’s largest dry port.
‘Khorgos: the biggest dry port in the world: A visual explainer’, South China Morning Post 
website <https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/
khorgos.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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been), enabling further disembodiment of the dividual.  And the global network of 284
offshore tax havens is already well established in providing this opaque service for 
assets (not least those of platform capitalist giants such as Apple and Amazon).  285
The zone is one of the most striking manifestations of the inequality of 
(dis)embodiment. While the valorised linguistic-relational worker is seamlessly sped in 
and out in constant connectivity and productivity, enabled in a disembodied 
performance of advanced global capitalism, the labourers who undertake the 
devalorised, physical work which underpins the zone find themselves forced into 
embodied subjection through the threat of violence, and kept hidden, out of view. 
Where the former is sped through automated immigration channels, the latter have 
their passports withheld until they have repaid the cost of their transportation from 
their home country to the zone, and live in segregated, cramped dormitories.  286
 See, for example, Estonia’s e-residency programme.284
Republic of Estonia, E-Residency application website <https://e-resident.gov.ee> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Nick Hopkins and Simon Bowers, ‘Apple secretly moved parts of empire to Jersey after row 285
over tax affairs’, Guardian, 6 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/
nov/06/apple-secretly-moved-jersey-ireland-tax-row-paradise-papers> [Accessed 2 January 
2021].
 Richard Morin, ‘Indentured Servitude in the Persian Gulf’, New York Times, 12 April 2013 286
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/sunday-review/indentured-servitude-in-the-
persian-gulf.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
David Batty, ‘Conditions for Abu Dhabi's migrant workers “shame the west”’, Guardian, 22 
December 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/22/abu-dhabi-migrant-
workers-conditions-shame-west> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Camplus ‘camp management software’ promotes ‘total control on [sic] labour camp activities’ as 
one of its key features.
Adept Business Solutions, Camplus - Camp Management Software <http://adeptsol.com/
products/camp-management-software-dubai-sharjah-abudhabi-soudi-bahrain-middle-east-
qatar-kuwait-ksa-oman-uae/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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The zone is effectively a site which is de-situated and decontextualised; the political 
nullified and efficient socio-economic management its raison d’être. This has been 
variously achieved in disparate locations around the world away and out of site of the 
technospheric core, within boundaries setting it apart from the ‘real’ and supposedly 
containing it. However, we can now witness the technology of the zone being applied 
within the core, within the metropolis. Whereas the spatially demarcated zone reflects 
a socio-industrial context of modernity, Deleuze’s ‘disciplinary society’, the much more 
individually focused and responsive ‘society of control’ now enables an individuated 
targeting and segregating within the core.  Out of sight need no longer be far away, 287
and the technology targets the dividual subject rather than the grouped, constructed 
mass. 
Platform capitalist companies such as Uber and Deliveroo (‘lean platforms’ according 
to Nick Srnicek’s definition) have been at the forefront of pushing this potential.  Just 288
as the zone provides a slick surface for the sought after linguistic-relational worker to 
maximise their profitability upon, so the consumer-facing interface of these companies 
is premised on frictionless, disembodied speed and ease. A few swipes of the 
smartphone screen and a taxi appears or meal arrives. But the embodied labourer at 
the other side of the platform has a hugely different experience. Established civil-
societal checks and numerous other differences of context mean that the embodied 
physical experience of being an Uber or Deliveroo worker in a city such as London is 
not equivalent to being an indentured labourer at a labour camp in a traditional zone. 
However, the same strategy is at play: individuals in a relatively precarious position 
are forced to embody themselves in increasingly harsh conditions through misleading 
 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’.287
 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).288
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economic inducements. So Uber drivers will sleep in their cars, unpaid, to be available 
for the next higher-rate nighttime job, and Deliveroo riders will go out in the worst 
(most dangerous) weather because there is a fee incentive to do so.  And both will 289
work through tiredness and ill health, because their supposed freelance status means 
there is no job security or sick pay.  All of this keeps costs to a minimum for the 290
consumer, while the platform is able to keep taking its cut from every transaction.
Contrary to the arduous physical embodiment enforced on the worker, the techniques 
by which their labour is extracted are as automated and disembodied as the 
consumer’s experience, except for a few key moments when human-to-human contact 
is either deemed potentially economically beneficial or is legally or functionally 
 Eric Newcomer and Olivia Zaleski, ‘When Their Shifts End, Uber Drivers Set Up Camp in 289
Parking Lots Across the U.S.’ Bloomberg website (23 January 2017) <https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/when-their-shifts-end-uber-drivers-set-up-
camp-in-parking-lots-across-the-u-s> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Gwyn Topham, ‘Uber drivers waiting in villages near Heathrow cause “huge distress”’, 
Guardian, 11 May 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/11/uber-
drivers-villages-heathrow-huge-distress> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Sabrina Barr, ‘UK Weather: Deliveroo Faces Criticism Over Driver Safety In Heavy Snow’, 
Independent, 2 March 2018 <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/food-and-drink/
deliveroo-driver-safety-uk-weather-snow-criticism-extra-charge-delivery-a8236966.html> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021].
Echoing the re-spatialised strategies now used to gain an edge in financial markets (physical 
proximity to servers and private fibre optic cables or microwave relays), an equivalent shadow 
phenomenon can be seen in the recent appearance of mobile phones hanging from trees outside 
Amazon delivery stations. Placed in precarious competition with one another, the would-be 
delivery workers tether together the phone in their hand with that in the tree, which is 
strategically positioned so as to gain a split-second earlier notification of work becoming 
available, thus giving them a better chance of claiming it.  
Spencer Soper, ‘Amazon Drivers Are Hanging Smartphones in Trees to Get More Work’, 
Bloomberg website (1 September 2020) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-09-01/amazon-drivers-are-hanging-smartphones-in-trees-to-get-more-work> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Naaman Zhou, ‘Accidents, stress and uncertainty: food delivery riders lift lid on work 290
conditions’, Guardian, 30 April 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/01/
accidents-stress-and-uncertainty-food-delivery-riders-lift-lid-on-work-conditions> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
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unavoidable. A few clicks through an easily navigable website allow you to select an 
appointment to become a Deliveroo worker. Numerous blog posts praising the 
flexibility, extra-income, and even health and social benefits of the work induce you to 
do so.  At the time I signed up, there was a ‘special offer’ whereby the jacket, helmet 291
and food-carrying rucksack were offered for free. As a ‘freelance contractor’ you would 
normally be expected to either pay £50 for this equipment, deductible from future 
earnings, or show that your own alternatives meet the stringent requirements (which 
mean the vast majority must purchase at least the Deliveroo-branded rucksack). 
In an inconspicuous small office in South London, I join a group of people who have evidently 
signed up for this slot. Far from an interview as suggested, this is a production line. We wait 
while the group ahead of us progress through the stages and then start the process ourselves. 
Buttressed by a legally required human-to-human interaction at the start, where ID and right-
to-work are visually verified, and another at the end, where kit is checked and the rider app is 
dowloaded to our phone and its functioning is explained to us, the remainder of the ‘training’ 
and induction involves digitally signing documents, inputting information, and clicking links 
to watch instructional videos, preferably through our own phones.      
 I suffered an injury shortly after going through the induction process so was unable to begin 
taking on work. I received periodic phone calls: a friendly voice at the end of the line ‘just 
checking in’ and encouraging me to ‘get going’. Text messages and emails began to offer a 
 Aoife Geary, ‘A Day in the Life of Deliveroo Rider Sean O’Farrell Power’, blog run by Jobbio 291
[employment platform] (20 February 2017) <https://blog.jobbio.com/2017/02/20/day-life-
deliveroo-rider-sean-ofarrell-power/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Carlton Reid, ‘Confessions of a Deliveroo rider: get fit by delivering fast food’, Bike blog on 
Guardian website (8 January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/bike-blog/
2018/jan/08/confessions-of-a-deliveroo-rider-get-fit-by-delivering-fast-food> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
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starting bonus. Many months later I continue to receive regular push notifications from the 
rider app, and text messages informing me of incentivising increased rates in certain areas, 
often coinciding with bad weather. 
The rider app manages the workers. Barring an emergency number, it is their point of 
contact with Deliveroo. The system flows in complete automation: directions to make a 
pick-up, directions to deliver it to. No need for verbal communication, monetary 
exchange all handled automatically. Except, of course, it is your legs pedalling through 
the rain and traffic, you who has to knock on that unknown door, you who is legally 
responsible, for example, for challenging their age if the order contains alcohol. All the 
while, building up and maintaining good standing through regular, frequent and 
efficient work unlocks early access to booking the best slots. 
Somewhat paradoxically, Uber and Deliveroo’s systems of economic exploitation are 
now starting to re-create sites of potential resistance. The precarious and structurally 
unequal broader economic context within which these companies operate, and the 
supposedly freelance, isolated, algorithmically managed means by which they exploit 
their workers, means these workers are now pushed to congregate and wait, unpaid, 
for the work to arrive. Deliveroo actively instructs riders to go to these congregation 
points, and Uber drivers join virtual queues at airports and major train stations.  A 292
twenty-first century equivalent of workers congregating at the factory gates this may 
be, but, as then, it does bring people together in a site of shared experience of 
exploitation and possible connection; a site out of which organisation and contestation 
might emerge. This has happened in the form of collective actions and protests to 
 Newcomer and Zaleski.292
Topham.
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somewhat improve working conditions for Deliveroo riders in the UK.  The 293
companies are pulled in two competing strategic directions: their economic 
ruthlessness, putting all unproductive time back onto the worker, causes those workers 
to congregate in potential contestation. 
Inflicting sheer exhaustion is an effective strategy in preventing this contestation. This 
may be functional in repressing embodied, exploited labour in distant spatially 
demarcated zones, where high-density cost-efficient dormitories serve to further 
exhaust the workers after extremely long hours in arduous conditions. For the lean 
platforms though, the economic premise of having a perpetual immediate excess of 
potential workers precludes this. Instead, they rely on the broader neoliberal socio-
economic structure to exhaust, and to constrain any contestation. 
Deliveroo has in recent years gone a step further, constructing ‘dark kitchens’ to further 
disembody the labour behind its business.  The ironic success of the disembodied, 294
dematerialised delivery of food created a problem. While the bodies that work were 
invisible to those placing orders, they became more visible to those same consumers 
when eating-in at the restaurants from which food was being collected. To maintain the 
segregation and illusion, Deliveroo has set up a strategically located network of 
functional, windowless kitchens in boxes in which meals, notionally from those 
 Sam Shead, ‘The Deliveroo strike is over as the company abandons plans to force couriers 293
into signing new contracts’, Business Insider website (17 August 2016) <https://
www.businessinsider.com/the-deliveroo-strike-is-over-as-the-company-abandons-plans-to-
force-couriers-into-signing-new-contracts-2016-8?r=USandIR=T> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 This is a very one-sided disembodiment, only such from the perspective of the platform and 294
their consumer.
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restaurants, can be cooked.  The restaurant chain disembodies its own labour away 295
from itself. These dark kitchens are often co-located with the designated rider 
congregation points, multiplying both the economic efficiency but also the potential for 
counter-organisation and contestation. 
Dark kitchens are triply dark. Literally, they are dark windowless boxes: utilitarian, 
unpleasant environments in which to work. Conceptually they remain in the dark: the 
consumer willing to engage in the conceit of this disembodiment and slick digitisation 
of the outsourcing of their own bodily needs. And racially they are dark: the 
structurally embedded and perpetuated inequalities of wealth and economic 
opportunity, along with the complicit racist hypocrisy of economic reliance on 
migration, mean proportionally more black and brown bodies work in the dark 
kitchens while more white bodies order via the app.296
The zone, in its modern form, was originally conceived as being a stepping stone. A 
temporary prioritising of the economic over the political in order to jump start 
development. It was believed wealth would trickle down and out, and the zone might 
eventually cease to be needed, or at least would not spread. This has not occurred. 
Instead, under a neoliberal hegemony and conditions of increasingly frictionless global 
capital, zones have multiplied exponentially.  Rather than being a temporary 297
measure, the zone has become the default. The conditions of the ‘freelance’ lean 
 Sarah Butler, ‘How Deliveroo's “dark kitchens” are catering from car parks’, Guardian, 28 295
October 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/oct/28/deliveroo-dark-
kitchens-pop-up-feeding-the-city-london> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Zubaida Haque, ‘How the gig economy is widening racial inequality’, New Statesman, 8 296
February 2018 <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2018/02/how-gig-
economy-widening-racial-inequality> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Easterling, pp. 33-41.297
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platform worker mirror this. Promoted as something temporary and offering flexibility, 
an economic stopgap before embarking on a career, the precarity and insecurity have 
instead spread out as the permanent ‘new normal’ for the unvalorised, embodied 
worker within the technosphere. Where a territory as a spatialised site of resistance, as 
Ross advocates, might be a suitable strategy within the peripheral zone, the 
individuated post-spatial control within the technospheric metropolis necessitates 
strategies of forming resistant and resilient networks subversively entangled within 
this hegemony.  The paradoxical moments of embodied spatial connection the lean 298
platforms’ structure is now creating can certainly be made use of, but within a broader 
strategy of a despatialised, disembodied contestation, in fluid evasion of the sites of 
violence being enacted upon vulnerable bodies. This research project does not presume 
to suggest specific forms of direct action, but sets this out as the terrain in which the 
would-be affective artist and artistic intervention are enmeshed.
 Ross.298
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Embodiment within artistic practice 
Notionally critical artistic engagements with sites of inequality are frequently 
problematic. In their process, or in their acceptance of implicit meta-structures (of 
charitability, paternalism, [post-]colonialism and so forth), they are often accepting of 
the logic of, and sometimes actively complicit within, the very inequalities which they 
present themselves as seeking to challenge.  As Kwon observes of ‘community-299
orientated’ site specific practice, the presumptions of the majority of projects are 
underpinned by a successful assimilation of neoliberal arguments: that through self-
improvement and self-realisation the individual, enabled by the artist, can overcome 
conditions of poverty, disenfranchisement or discrimination.  Meanwhile, the larger 300
structures of inequality are ignored, and the transference of responsibility, through 
work, onto the indebted individual is perpetuated.  
Beyond site specific practice, Josephine Berry critiques the premise of participation as 
an artistic aim more broadly, observing it to be in keeping with the fetishisation of 
action and productivity within modernity’s generalisation of labour.  Under 301
conditions of the need for a perpetual performance of productive labour (a continual 
demonstration of being on the desirable side of the fissure of opportunism explored in 
 The operation of such complicity is developed in the discussion of hospitality in the The 299
threshold section of Part 3.
 Kwon, pp. 138-142.300
The premise of ‘community-orientated’ practice itself can be critiqued for making many of the 
same presumptions of the artist as being outside of site and context as were discussed with 
regard to residencies.
 Josephine Berry Slater, ‘The Ghosts of Participation Past’, Mute, 3:4 (2012) <https://301
www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/ghosts-participation-past> [Accessed 2 January 2021].  
(While citing this text with the author’s name as published, with permission I have opted to 
refer to Josephine, whom I know in-person, by the surname she now uses within my writing.)
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Part 1) active participation’s perception within hierarchies of human practice has been 
reversed.  From being something ideally avoided; activity, busy-ness and visible 302
participation have become the dominant aspiration within the social factory as well as 
formal workplace, and also, through these discourses of participation, within the 
cultural arena.  This is another example of the social and economic (in the form of 303
activity) coming to precedence over a public discourse of reflected-upon ideas, though 
as Berry notes, we should not revert to too dualistic a reading whereby the exteriority 
is social and the interiority is not.  304
How then, is an artistic practice to critically engage in sites of inequality, in a 
materialised political sense rather than an oversimplified representational or 
unreflexive manner? The artistic intervention and the artist need to recognise their own 
partial constituting of the site they exist within, and the unequal functioning of 
embodiment that might take place there. One possible strategy might be to 
purposefully disembody not the artist but the artwork: fragmenting out the 
individuated, demarcated art object into a much more porous, shifting assemblage of 
encounters and events which remain fluid into the future, untethered from finite 
capitalisation (either financial or cultural).   305
 As Berry describes, unlike our present context, classical philosophy (and society) celebrated 302
the contemplation permitted by inactivity.
Ibid.
 This is the internalised position of the vast majority, though there are a tiny 303
(disproportionately visible) number of individuals for whom the performance of leisure 
becomes part of the leveraging of their capital (e.g. certain Instagrammers and influencers). 
Linking back to the fungible representation of ‘self-care’ discussed in Part 1, this performance of 
leisure is in fact a disguised form of activity and busy-ness.
 Ibid.304
 Praxis considers such a strategy of artistic intervention.305
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In considering the artistic intervention as an actively contextually enmeshed fluid 
assemblage like this, it can confront and engage with its site and sociality in a manner 
which recognises its own subjectivity and relativity within these. A shifting network of 
points of significance is created through multiple encounters, to which the artistic 
intervention must retain responsiveness. A fluxing set of relationships, conversations, 
moments and material objects can function as potential catalysts to affectively initiate 
critiques and counter narratives to the technosphere. They might also manifest, or 
speculatively invoke, potential resilient networks of care. Like the zone, this is an active 
rather than object form, able to multiply out in affect. 
This shifting, fluid networked-ness can camouflage easily within the systems and 
patterns of the technosphere. An appearance of assimilation might function as a vector, 
an ability to ‘pass’ within the hegemonic structure, and yet still hold the potential to 
coalesce as moments of direct articulation and embodiment when likely to be affective, 
and when any possible repercussions are known, so far as they can be, to be worth the 
risk. Many of these coalescences and embodiments will be brief flashes, petering out 
with no consequence, but as counter public networks, inclusive of artworks, shift and 
re-orientate and re-articulate themselves, some moments of critical resistance and 
contestation may gain traction, and feed into or even initiate new discourses or 
practices of other ways of being.   306
Giorgio Agamben writes of apparatuses (Foucault’s ‘dispositifs’) being something 
between network and assemblage, and describes their operation, as the chief 
technologies of power, as being through constructing and subjecting the (human) being 
 How these moments of event-encounter might ‘take hold’ and come to matter will be 306
explored in depth in Part 3.
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into relationship with themself, as subject.  (Within the technosphere, this is the 307
productive neoliberal subject.) However, the contemporary apparatus now operates 
through desubjectification as much as subjectification, creating a spectral idea of the 
subject divorced from the embodied human, but inescapably linked in surveillance, 
biometrics and data trails. There is both a danger and a potential for subversion here. 
The artwork being imagined, if carelessly manifested, could slip into echoing and 
evoking this desubjectification: unknowingly creating paths back to vulnerable bodies 
while holding no real affective potential. 
Agency is pivotal in avoiding this. The econocentric (de)subjectification apparatuses of 
the technosphere work through effectively displacing and emplacing, disembodying 
and embodying us beyond our will. We are coalesced into exploitable data-sets and 
isolated into quantified (in)dividuals as and when it suits. The value of our labour is 
variously displaced to the hidden technospheric periphery or emplaced within our 
psyches as something valorised, something we have to perform. We are embodied at 
sites of corporeal discipline and control, largely carried out through an unconfrontable 
disembodied structure. What unites these fluid, complex structures of repression, of 
de-humanisation, is the appropriation of agency. A key role the artist or artwork can 
perform is in initiating events where agency is reclaimed: where thought and action 
counter to, or outside of, the productive, efficient presumptions of the technosphere 
might emerge. This is the enabling of resistant agency which this project’s title seeks. 
The dispersed nature of the structurally embedded inequality we face means there is a 
need to connect differing parts of multiple spectrums. There is the spectrum of agency 
 Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella 307
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp.1-24.
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(including the agency to disembody), and there is the spectrum of vulnerability to 
embodied violence and exploitation. These two spectrums are distinct, but are also 
closely interlinked. A connection is needed whereby the agency at one end of the 
former can be positively brought to bear at the site of embodied violence in the latter, 
where it is often ‘other’ bodies which are at stake. There are, as already mentioned, 
clear potential issues to navigate here in terms of problematic tropes of ‘giving voice 
to’, ‘speaking on behalf of’ and so forth, but the visceral urgency of the present context 
means disengaging and taking an ethically ‘pure’ but affectively impotent position is 
insufficient. There is a political need to act, to engage, to navigate these potentially 
problematic pitfalls. Beyond the need to contest immediate embodied violence 
occurring unto others, there is a broader aspect to this. Those who can, need not solely 
to enact agency in contestation of specific violence, but also to enact agency in the 
ongoing enablement of others’ agency at myriad potential sites of violence. As well as 
contesting violence, this fractures the fissures which serve to concentrate it. 
What is needed is not the closed, delineated participatory project placed upon a site 
conceived as ‘other’. Nor is it the potentially exploitative designation of acknowledged 
situated activity as ‘research’, ‘workshopping’ or similar which always presumes 
within itself a subsidiary position to some subsequent, or possibly already envisaged, 
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exclusionary artwork.  Instead, what is needed is an embodied co-affect and co-308
vulnerability, and a building up of mutual human-to-human connectedness premised 
on care between all parties in the encounter. The artwork becomes a site not only of 
conversation but a site of care, of ‘caring with’, including the active dissemination of 
agency. It does not close in on itself and consolidate value, capital and affect to the 
singular artist-author, but opens out in generosity, an economically irrational sharing 
running counter to the presumptions of the technosphere. Time, openness and honesty 
are required. Even when one party cannot truly place themselves in the embodied 
position of the other (perhaps through gender, or passport, or skin colour, or 
(dis)ability) they must invest in an ongoing process of genuine care for one another. 
Only then is a sharing of potential agency possible: otherwise, whatever we might tell 
ourselves, we are complicit in exploitation and/or problematic paternalism.  
Expanding out from this, recognition of the contingency of the art-site is essential. 
Potential counter-narratives and contestations spill over from the artistic intervention 
into other related sites, and can certainly be learnt from. However, to draw generalised 
conclusions and attempt to universalise is to impose the same problematic paternalism 
 Kearney argues that Quinlan and Hastings’ recent work In My Room (the primary element of 308
an exhibition of the same name) operated in such a way, making selective use of ‘Birmingham’s 
Gay Village’ in a manner which suited, but which produced an exclusionary work, unaffected 
by the actually encountered complexities of that context. 
Ryan Kearney, ‘Can Film Assist in the Fight Against Gentrification?’, frieze website (1 October 
2020) <https://www.frieze.com/article/can-film-assist-fight-against-gentrification> [Accessed 
2 January 2021]. 
Hannah Quinlan and Rosie Hastings, In My Room, exhibition at Focal Point Gallery, Southend-
on-Sea, 2020 <http://www.fpg.org.uk/exhibition/rosie-hastings-and-hannah-quinlan/> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021].
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only one level abstracted. Relationships and connections should absolutely be drawn 
upon, but each site needs exploration in itself.  309
Strategies of embodiment and disembodiment within artistic practice are multifaceted. 
They entail moving with and through the technosphere and its structures and 
networks, but doing so one step ahead, with agency, finding the cracks in its control. 
Though there is contingent variability, when considering the artwork, disembodiment 
is most frequently advocated. The fluid arttext, taking such a (non)form, is often best 
able to remain outside the appropriative, coopting grasp of the technosphere and 
sustain a position critical and counter to it.  Conversely, for the personhood (or 310
‘being’) of the artist, strategic moments of embodiment will likely be required. Vitally 
though, this is a human embodiment, not an individuated one. In so doing, the artist 
places themself in co-vulnerability, putting themself at stake in the shifting network of 
art-site of which they are irremovably part. Only in such placing of oneself on the line 
can a Foucauldian parrhesiac truth, fostered in the between-space of the encounter of 
beings coming together, be enabled.  In place of an abstracted logic, this is a truth 311
operating through an embodied sensuousness where the other human is distinct but is 
 The setting out of original contributions within this research project seeks to reflect this. 309
Specific art-sites are examined in and of themselves within Praxis. While fully acknowledging 
these, ‘radical care’ and ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ are developed as approaches 
(to being and to artistic intervention respectively) which hold open extensive space for 
specificity, particularity, unknowability and agency within any singular event-encounter.
 Considering art as ‘text’ as opposed to ‘work’, as proposed by Barthes, aligns with this and is 310
extensively considered in Praxis. 
Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ [1971], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 
(Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 155-164.
 Michel Foucault, The Courage of the Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the 311
Collège de France 1983-84, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2011).
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in the perpetual process of becoming known. Part 3 will develop care as an articulation 
of this ‘truth’. 
 A fine balance is required: a commitment to being there at the pivotal moment when the 
presence of the embodied self at the point of contestation is vital, but also an awareness 
of when to attempt to fragment away, if possible. A commitment to being there at the 
pivotal moment, and making this judgement, entails a commitment to doing the work 
needed to recognise such a moment. There are occasions when a strategic 
disembodiment is almost always to be advocated. Such occasions might include when 
our embodied presence at a site would likely subject us, or others, to corporeal 
violence, or when we find ourselves utterly exhausted by the conditions of attempted 
resistant being within the technosphere.  
There may be specific instances when someone, operating with awareness and agency, 
does opt to put their corporeal self in harms’ way, having weighed up the risk and 
benefit of their embodied presence (and any subsequent dissemination of images or 
accounts of this) against the violence or harm they may be subjected to. A good 
example of this balancing act of body, risk, affect and site, where the artist does place 
themself at potential risk, can be found in Sanja Ivekovic’s 1979 work Trokut 
[Triangle].  Through a performance of sipping whiskey and apparent masturbation 312
on her own balcony (only visible to a single state-security agent on the rooftop 
opposite, as crowds line the street below to glimpse Tito’s entourage passing by), she 
uses her bodily-ness and presence to interrupt a set of relations of power, surveillance, 
conformity, sexuality and gender. The performance for the rooftop-viewer, who is not 
 Sanja Ivekovic, Trokut [Triangle] (1979), documentation available at <https://312
www.museoreinasofia.es/en/collection/artwork/trokut-triangle> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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watching her but is watching her, is shortly followed by police knocking at her door. 
The titular triangle of street, rooftop and balcony, and the bodies at those sites, are set 
within a mesh of hierarchical and potentially violent power relationships. Ivekovic’s 
intervention does not directly confront this, but more subtly undermines it. It does so 
in part through calling attention to the structurally undesired embodied human-ness of 
her watcher, as well as of herself. As already discussed, there is profound inequality 
around who can opt out of embodiment at the site of violence, necessitating extreme 
care in any consideration of placing bodies there. For those who have the relative 
privilege of being able to strategically use their embodiment and disembodiment to 
challenge and seek to affect this inequality of corporeal violence at the core of the 
technosphere, there is a political urgency to do so.
——
The artist could learn from the cyborg Donna Haraway envisaged. Both are the 
offspring of the capitalist system (the modern figure of the artist emerging in parallel 
with the bourgeoisie, and the cyborg being the ultimate fusing of the technosphere and 
biopolitics), but can take a position of reflexive criticality, unfaithful to these origins.  313
The cyborg transgresses boundaries and holds and fuses dangerous potentials. The 
(dis)embodied practice described above seeks to likewise subvert the structure and 
logic of the technosphere. Haraway describes the unfaithful cyborg as not being subject 
to biopolitical structures, having superseded them in invulnerability.  Instead, it can 314
 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York NY: 313
Routledge, 1991) p. 151.
 Ibid., p. 163.314
As discussed in Part 1, biopolitics is the politically neutered socio-economic management of life 
and labour; the ‘politics’ part of the term is misleading.
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engage in simulating a more potent field of actual politics: a reincarnated, 
Frankensteinian collective political body, but one which still bleeds, acknowledges this, 
and cares for and about this. Likewise artistic intervention, as proposed, can step 
outside the hegemonic socio-economic sphere and provide catalytic events for the 
reopening of a new public sphere of more egalitarian discourse and action.   
This unfaithful misappropriation is apparent in the strategies being advocated for the 
artistic intervention throughout this part disobediently echoing the structures of the 
technosphere itself: the fluidity between embodiment and disembodiment, the 
operating as a shifting assemblage, the fluxing in and out of spatial considerations of 
site or territory. The critical work is close to that which it critiques, but like a virus, can 
be more politically potent as a result.  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SCENE B: A CONVERSATION BETWEEN RECOMPOSED FRAGMENTS OF 
FOUR PREVIOUS TEXTS  315
Cast of characters: 
• Email sent on 25 July 2019 to one of the curators of 
the NEoN Digital Arts Festival where 6 Weeks in Kyiv 
was to be performed  316
• Transcription of a recorded conversation between Adam 
Walker and Vicki Thornton, who frequently collaborate, 
which took place in January 2019 
• Report for funders detailing activities undertaken 
during a research trip to Kyiv, Ukraine in June 2019 
• Answers to questions sent by the funding organisation, 
who wished to write up a case study of Adam’s research 
activities (sent on 2 October 2019) 
EMAIL: 
Kyiv was a chance encounter at 
first. As the title of the work 
alludes to, it’s not so much 
about Kyiv in any ‘objective’ 
sense, so much as with the 
specifics of that situation I 
found myself within, partially 
constituted by my being 
there.  My being there, on a 317
residency, was a contingent 
result of opportunism. I took 
the chance to go, certainly out 
of interest, but also for the 
sake of the cultural capital it 
would entail, the funding 
 These texts are transcribed as originally written, including any grammatical errors or 315
inconsistencies. In their writing there was no anticipation of the texts being made public like 
this: they contain ideas in progress, occasional misunderstandings and misrepresentations, and 
numerous other aspects reflective of their initial contexts.
 Adam Walker, 6 Weeks in Kyiv (2018), documentation available at <http://316
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/6weeksinkyiv.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
Documentation of this and the other artworks mentioned in Scene B can be found in Praxis.
 The work being discussed is 6 Weeks in Kyiv.317
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provided, and such forth. If 
the residency had been 
elsewhere, I would perhaps 
never have gone.  
The ability to take this 
opportunity throws up certain 
problematic questions of 
complicity that carry through 
into the work. The journeys 
listed, and recited, occur most 
frequently between art 
institutions and studios. Close 
inspection would make it clear 
that I am in Kyiv as a type of 
‘linguistic-relational’ worker 
- a highly valued form of 
labour within our present post-
Fordist context. My flexibility 
is presumed, able to take 
advantage and swiftly react to 
conditions of opportunity. This 
presumption, which I am pulled 
to conform to, ignores the 
material and social ties and 
responsibilities I have: a note 
on the table for example makes 
reference to my partner and 
then-five-month-old child 
coming to join me in Kyiv for a 
week. 
REPORT: 
On Wednesday 5 June I 
interviewed Oleksiy Radynski, a 
film-maker and contributor to 
the Visual Culture Research 
Centre. Meeting Oleksiy was a 
priority, as he had produced 
the Hito Steyerl artwork The 
Tower which I had seen in Kyiv 
(at VCRC) in 2017, and which I 
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plan to write about.  Our 318
conversation was focused on 
this artwork: how Hito had 
wanted to do something on 
economic chains of outsourcing 
emanating from warfare and had 
initially been looking in South 
East Asia. The technocratic 
Soviet history of Ukraine means 
it is a centre for this type of 
work though, so focus switched 
to here. Hito found Oleg, the 
main protagonist, and Oleksiy 
went to interview him. He owns 
and operates a company 
specialising in VR and AR 
rendering, and is one of the 
final graduates from the 
Soviet-period scientific/
technical institute in Kharkiv. 
Oleg’s company themselves 
produced the video, using 
adapted pre-existing material. 
The company became both the 
subject and object of the work, 
where the relations transpire.  
 Hito Steyerl, The Tower (2015-16), documentation available at <https://www.kow-318
berlin.com/artists/hito-steyerl/the-tower-2015-2016> [Accessed 2 January 2021].   
The Tower, a three-screen video installation with voiceover, tells the story of a 3D VR and AR 
video production company based in Kharkiv, Ukraine. The narrator acknowledges the present 
war and Kharkiv’s proximity to Russia, as well as its past renown for producing tanks and such 
forth. He then recalls the company’s past emphasis on producing military simulations which, he 
explains, has given way to predominantly producing 3D renderings and ‘fly-throughs’ of 
speculative projects for architecture firms and property developers. The narrator notes that 
most of these firms are located in western Europe or other places with time zones close to 
Ukraine, taking advantage of ‘near shore’ labour. The narrator reflects on this economic context, 
also noting the preponderance of ‘body leasing’. Though not a practice his company employs, 
he explains it is common, with the ‘near shore’ employee coming under direct management of a 
physically remote client company. In our later interview, Oleg Fonarov explained to me it is 
typical to have rows of cubicles of workers side by side, notionally employed by the same 
(local) company, but in fact all working in the direct employment of different remote companies.  
The Tower concludes with the narrator recounting a commission they received from Iraq to 
produce a simulation of a new ‘Tower of Babylon’, accompanied by images of a super-tall 
luxury skyscraper in the desert.   
I saw The Tower exhibited as part of Gray Cube: Art on Corruption.
Gray Cube: Art on Corruption, exhibition at Visual Culture Research Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2017 
<http://vcrc.org.ua/en/сірий-куб-виставка-про-корупцію/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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Although I wasn’t able to 
travel to Kharkiv in person, on 
Thursday 6 June I Skyped with 
Oleg. He preferred to speak via 
text chat. We discussed in 
greater detail his personal 
history Oleksiy had alluded to, 
and things he mentions in the 
artwork The Tower including 
ideas of ‘near shore’ and ‘body 
leasing’. We also discussed in 
detail the process by which the 
artwork had been produced.  
TRANSCRIPTION: 
Adam: I think if I do have a 
basis in anything it's a basis 
in text. Which is interesting 
vis-a-vis the relationship 
between practice and writing 
because sometimes the practice 
is writing and they slip into 
each other. […] I think because 
my work's always been really 
bound up in the context and the 
process and there's not a 
boundary. It's like what is the 
work is porously entwined with 
the production of the work and 
the reception of the work and 
the context or contexts of 
encounter with the work. […] 
Like a bringing together of 
site and event and action and 
presence in a sort of moment, 
but not like any sort of 
allegorical montage, like a 
montage of elements that are 
coalesced. But within the 
material reality […] trying to 
be affective.  
Vicki: Well, now you're making 
me think about the flag.  So 319
correct me if I'm wrong, but 
with this piece there's a kind 
 Adam Walker, The Return Beyond Which There Is No Point (2017-18), documentation available 319
at <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/thereturn.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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of process whereby you engage 
local economy to get that flag 
made and you go to this place 
that does the embroidery for 
you. But you are also reliant 
on Anna to mediate that or 
gate-keep that […]. But then 
there's that whole back-and-
forth part of it being too 
expensive to embroider. And you 
decide to drop some bits of the 
design. And then the flag is 
delivered to you in a bag at 
our TOMBOLA! event.  And then 320
there's the next stage which is 
you taking off that Ukrainian 
flag of Taras’s that was found 
up the chimney or wherever it 
was and putting your flag back 
on. Then there is the process 
of the procession through the 
tram lines and that encounter 
with those guys at the tram 
stop (on Defender of Ukraine 
Day), and the climbing up to 
the roof and so declaring this 
kind of ‘Republic of Soshenko’. 
Then there is the removal of 
that and taking it to Kharkiv 
and neatening it up then 
Olena's dad finding a stick for 
it….  
[…] 
Then it came back via Kyiv. So, 
it wasn't the end in Kharkiv. 
It then travelled back with 
me…. With the Ukrainian flag 
also. And then it's probably in 
a cupboard somewhere now. And 
that's the end for now? So 
that's the story of the flag…? 
But actually, in that whole 
story, you could take that 
story that I've just described 
- we both just described - and 
you could transcribe that story 
 Adam Walker and Vicki Thornton, TOMBOLA! (2017-18), documentation available at 320
<http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/tombola.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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and you've got an arc, a 
narrative arc of this thing and 
you've got all these different 
interactions within that thing… 
whether it's you dealing with 
Anna at the beginning, to the 
negotiation of the price, to it 
arriving in TOMBOLA!, to it 
being walked around the forest, 
to the Ukrainian flag being 
taken down and the other one 
being put on…. So which part of 
that is the work? Which part of 
that is the methodology or is 
all of it, and is that story 
that I've just told now of that 
piece of work important? 
Adam: But then there might be 
more fragments - there always 
might be another fragment 
further out from the edge. And 
there are fragments that are 
quite near the centre like the 
flag itself, probably. But then 
a lot of these other things 
like you just telling that 
story is kind of another 
fragment that sits somewhere 
beyond some of these other 
elements….  
ANSWERS: 
So I think the interesting 
thing about The Tower is how it 
shifts in relation between very 
bodily things and very abstract 
things.  
It starts with wanting to 
create a work about chains of 
outsourced labour emanating 
from warfare - warfare clearly 
being potentially directly, 
painfully affecting of bodies.  
This is then translated through 
these global systems of 
technology and capital. Because 
of our instant global 
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interconnectedness, western 
European companies can easily 
have their architectural 
renderings drawn up in 
Ukraine.  
EMAIL: 
And, because of the global 
system of finance/capital/
labour, it's cheaper to do so.  
But this abstraction then comes 
back to bodies, the bodies of 
coders sat working long hours 
at their terminals to realise 
these renderings on time. I 
found the use of the term 'body 
leasing' in my interview with 
Oleg very interesting in this 
regard. While developing 6 
Weeks in Kyiv, and through 
conversations had there, I was 
particularly interested in how 
the legacy of the Soviet 
techno-scientific state has 
left an extensive culture of 
technical knowledge and skill, 
particularly in computer 
programming and coding. This 
would seem to be an 
advantageous position in the 
emergent global economic 
context. However, in the case 
of Uber and its local Ukrainian 
equivalent and competitor, 
Uklon, the former’s established 
structural superiority of 
capital (financial and 
cultural) is allowing it to 
outcompete the latter. Global 
capital’s acceleration towards 
further inequality producing 
concentration (and the massive 
already established structural 
inequalities) means the ‘talent 
pool’ in a place like Kyiv 
becomes a site for ‘near shore’ 
outsourcing, rather than a 
place of potential competition. 
Several of the drivers listed 
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in 6 Weeks in Kyiv had left 
jobs in the technology sector 
because they could earn more 
(or at least at the time 
thought they could earn more) 
as Uber drivers.  
ANSWERS: 
What I find so interesting 
about The Tower though, as an 
artwork, is that while the 
above is what the work is 
'about', it is also in a sense 
what the work 'is'. We have a 
western Europe-based artist 
similarly outsourcing the 
production of this work to the 
company who themselves are the 
focus of the work they are 
producing.   
In so doing the work is brought 
back into real world proximity 
with warfare, and frames the 
reality of coding/programming 
expertise in contemporary 
Ukraine (as part of globalised 
labour markets) in relation to 
the main protagonist's (Oleg's) 




I stumbled into a chance 
encounter with a community of 
people in Kyiv, and later 
Kharkiv, through being selected 
for a residency there. That 
experience though, led me to 
become really fascinated by 
aspects of Ukraine as a context 
in a really key position at the 
nexus of multiple complex flows 
of power, affect, capital and 
vulnerability within global 
networks generally, and also 
within global networks of art. 
My positionality is of course 
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completely rooted within these, 
and acknowledging that is the 
first step in being able to 
engage in them critically.    
[…] The Tower enters into 
exploration of a number of the 
same interests in Ukraine’s 
position within a layering up 
upon layering up of abstracted 
systems of power, capital and 
technology, but ultimately how 
these might directly affect 
specific bodies. […] at the 
same time [I am] reflecting 
upon my own ongoing 
relationship with this place 
I’ve somehow become entangled 
with.    
TRANSCRIPTION: 
Adam: What TOMBOLA! did was… we 
sort of reconstituted a 
community. Of people all linked 
through us. Whereas with 
undertitled, we rocked up in a 
different space, a different 
city hundreds of miles away.  321
And did this thing.  
Vicki: Yes. And it's different 
isn't it? And I think it's 
something to think about if we 
make another piece, it's like 
how we circumvent that or 
navigate that or use it or 
utilise it within the piece. 
Because for me, I still think 
TOMBOLA! is a better piece. But 
then also that's maybe because 
I have got these fond memories 
of it. Also, this very 
involved… a kind of party 
vibe…. But then it was also 
strange and dry and awkward 
and…  
 Adam Walker and Vicki Thornton, undertitled (2019), composite video available at <http://321
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/undertitled.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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Adam: But then it's been 
mediated through the editing of 
it into this second thing as 
well….  
Vicki: Which has removed that 
layer of dryness and 
awkwardness and strangeness 
hasn't it somehow?  
Adam: Totally. I remember the 
edited version of it in a sense 
more than I remember the 
reality.  
REPORT: 
Beneath one of the pavilions is 
a fake mine shaft. It wasn’t 
open, but the caretaker there 
was able to let us in. The 
basement had the feel of a 
squat party space, which 
continued into the mine which 
is apparently regularly used 
for parties, events and 
filming. It was cold and dark, 
but not as cramped as a real 
mine; apparently made slightly 
larger so as to be more 
comfortable for visitors.  
TRANSCRIPTION: 
Vicki: So then this 
fragmentation clearly relates 
to this idea about different 
incarnations and different 
versions of the work. Like 
versioning. So, I guess that's 
quite a clear answer to what 
can an artwork do or practice 
do that the text can't. It's 
about fixing. The text has a 
lot of similarities to the 
film. In that it goes through 
the draft stage, then the 
editing stage and then it gets 
polished, footnotes added, and 
illustrations.  
187
Adam: Yeah. And it has a 
linearity. Ultimately, it's 
always going to be read like 
that.  
Vicki: And it's also time-
based, from beginning to end, 
and the artistic practice is 
not. And maybe that is what is 
the difference? The thing that 
artistic practice does is about 
the encounter. Social 
interaction.  
REPORT: 
I went to Anna and Taras’s flat 
for dinner (okroshka made with 
kefir). We discussed this 
notion of the ‘new east’: how 
it can be viewed as an 
opportunistic, cynical 
packaging of an aesthetic that 
is ‘other’ but is also a 
globally interconnected thing, 
e.g. how art-school kids in 
London now take on a fashion 
aesthetic echoing the Kyiv rave 
scene. 
[…] 
Taras sometimes wonders if he 
should just emigrate and get 
work as a builder in Barcelona. 
Many do apparently. And Anna 
would enjoy being by the sea; 
going back to Crimea is 
increasingly difficult, both 
practically and emotionally.  
ANSWERS: 
Vulnerability is deeply 
unequal. As noted, it affected 
certain parts of the country 
much more than others.  And 322
those who were most vulnerable 
were those without wealth, of 
 (Thatcherite Britain.)322
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working class background, 
without education….  
What has happened in Ukraine in 
recent years is of course not 
the same as this, but I think 
there is a parallel in the 
economic shocks to the country 
that have occurred after Maidan 
and the invasion. Fear and 
vulnerability are similarly 
produced. 
It goes without saying that the 
rave/youth/drug culture is of 
course in part a response to 
the difficult situation, to try 
and escape out of it for a few 
hours at least.  
TRANSCRIPTION: 
Adam: Well I think a text, in a 
very confined way, in a very 
constrained way of being an 
academic text or a linear text, 
has confines but then how about 
text moving into the digital? I 
think it starts to have more 
possibilities of overcoming 
some of those problems. Some of 
those confines. Sometimes I 
feel envious of the pure 
academics. Sometimes I think 
‘you're so lucky that all you 
have to do every day is just 
sit in the library, read books 
and write and turn it into a 
text’. I mean it's obviously 
not easy but… well, you don't 
continually have to figure out 
what you're doing.  
Vicki: That's true. You just do 
the thing you said you were 
going to do. And you don't have 
to be in Donbas being escorted 
off a mine by a guy with a gun 
or have all these kind of 
encounters and interactions.  
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Pause 
Vicki: But then even with the 
flag, it's the same isn't it? 
It's your work but it is also 
not. Because all these other 
things happened within it that 
relied on other people. There 
are so many layers. And that's 
maybe also the difference 
between practice-based 
methodologies and written ones. 
It's just that in the written 
one, there is no collaboration. 
It is a singular pursuit. I 
mean you're drawing in other 
voices but they're all being 
funnelled through your 
interpretation and you're 
gearing them towards something 
which, yes, art also does…  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PART 3: CARE
How can we imagine critical agency within a would-be totalising hegemony?
What could constitute a way of being through which sustainable resistant equality might form?
Part 3 brings together the contributing economic, historical, technological and political 
processes set out thus far and considers them from a Lucretian ontological perspective, 
as a contingent present produced through event-encounters. It considers the qualities 
of these event-encounters, and how the relations of the entities encountering one 
another might remain static, or potentially shift. 
Proceeding from this Lucretian ontology, care is developed as a ‘fidelity’ (according to 
Alain Badiou’s use of the term) which can be sustained through the event into an 
unknown future, and which might enable resistant, resilient more equitable ways of 
being.  I conclude by proposing radical care as a methodological, ethical and political 323
position which might hold some potentially destabilising and subversive potential 
towards, in addition to resilience within, the structures and logics of the technosphere.
 Alain Badiou, Being and Event [1988], trans. by Oliver Feltham (New York, NY: Continuum, 323
2005), pp. 232-237.
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From artwork to arttext inside the black box
Roland Barthes argues for the consideration not of art as work, as in ‘artwork’, but 
instead as text.  Positioning art in such a way, it becomes possible to hold it open in 324
an exploded dissemination of overlapping potential meaning. Unlike the defined, 
bounded ‘work’, the text out of which any particular meaning is formed operates 
intertextually and in continual interplay with both its historical and contemporary 
cultural contexts. The meaning is not innate, but is instead formed (and continuously 
reformed) contingently in the encounter of audience, author, context, and text itself, 
only existent through the discourse. There is a free interplay of relations in the 
construction of meaning between elements which operate playfully and in continual 
process. The notional author is shorn of supposed sole authority over meaning, and 
there is more equality in the construction and contestation of it. However, it is 
important to emphasise that this is not the transference of meaning away from author 
to the meaningless relativism of every individual’s personal truth being equally valid 
(a common criticism erroneously made of postmodernism), but rather that meaning is 
entirely contingent, produced in the encounter (through reading, re-playing and re-
forming).  That this production of meaning is co-performed, beyond the construct of 325
the individual, is key to the arguments that I will make in this part. As with Michel 
Foucault’s parrhesiac truth, meaning cannot be determined or presupposed, but is 
 This argument is further discussed in Praxis.324
Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ [1971], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 
(Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 155-164.
 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ [1968], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen 325
Heath (Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 142-148.
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nevertheless vitally meaningful.  It is in the continual process of formation in the 326
momentary infinitude of the event-encounter. As a singular agency we cannot 
ourselves alone produce meaning, but may be able to be one side of a productive 
encounter.  
Stepping back from abstraction, there then come a whole set of deeply unequal socio-
political relations which determine whether and how this meaning is nominatively 
claimed, articulated, recorded and disseminated, or not.  A related but distinct form 327
of text and language affects these processes too. While Barthes echoes Jurgen 
Habermas in noting an equality of free play and circulation within the text, it is to fall 
into politically problematic artificial separations to set this apart from the societal 
inequalities affecting the embodied humans articulating and being articulated by and 
through these texts.  As Part 1 explored (and as Praxis further addresses), the world 328
we inhabit is increasingly one formed textually, and one in which we increasingly 
operate as textualised individuals, but the form that text takes is far from that of the 
space of free play to which Barthes alludes. 
Walter Benjamin articulates the writer as the collector who cannot find the text they 
desire amongst those already in existence, and pulls it back into present being from the 
 Michel Foucault, The Courage of the Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the 326
Collège de France 1983-84, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2011), pp. 18-19.
 These inequalities of the public sphere were discussed in depth in Part 2.327
 Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’. 328
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society [1962], trans. by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 
1992),  p. 36.
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potential future archive.  In contrast to the capitalist mode of production’s 329
directionality from communal towards private (e.g. property ownership), Benjamin’s 
writer is motivated by an opposite directionality, from private to communal (e.g. the 
story, both within and around the text).  However, there are two complications to this 330
line of thought in the contemporary context. Firstly, Benjamin under-acknowledges the 
individualist proprietorial relation to a text (rendered increasingly primary though the 
inverted public sphere), with author not as creator but as owner, and beneficiary of 
cultural as well as possibly financial capital. Perhaps more fundamentally though, the 
possibility of pulling a text back from a potential future archive becomes increasingly 
impossible as the technosphere forecloses any potential futures closer and closer to the 
present, as well as subjectifying us as individuals in its own textual codes. As possible 
writers, we are produced through text at least as much as we might produce text, and 
the encoded grammar of this becomes increasingly hard to think or create outside of.  
‘Computational thinking’ is the term James Bridle uses to describe this supra-textual 
box which, while often unrecognised, constrains and restricts the free production of 
meaning in the encounter within the technosphere.  This is more than the surveillance 331
induced reduction of possible futures and emphasis on prediction that was discussed 
in Part 1. A foreclosed present public sphere, it is an unacknowledged a-criticality 
which is self-obscuring and impeding our collective ability to ask important questions: 
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Unpacking My Library: A Talk About Book Collecting’ [1931], in 329
Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 61-69 (p. 
63).
 Pil and Galia Kollectiv note that the collected book operates as the synthesis of these two 330
dialectical positions brought together. 
Pil and Galia Kollectiv, ‘Archiving the Future: Unpacking Benjamin’s Collection’, Coelacanth, 1 
(2008), also available at Pil and Galia Kollectiv website <http://www.kollectiv.co.uk/
Benjamin%20Collecting.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 James Bridle, New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future (London: Verso, 2018), p. 4.331
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to be critical either of the curtailment of the free production of meaning, or of the social 
exclusions denying participation in such a discussion. Just as the ‘black box’ of 
proprietary algorithms and data grows in dominance over increasing sectors of our 
bio-social life (from work, to health, to daily household tasks), we can think of the 
technosphere as a whole as being a black box; one we all find ourselves inescapably 
inside as subjectified individuals. 
This technospheric black box is not something authored or designed, and not a 
teleological inevitability. To think in such terms is to fall into the terrain of conspiracy 
theory: as Bridle argues, a completely understandable alternative to ‘cognitive 
mapping’ from a position of vulnerability without agency.  Rather, it is a ‘de-totalised 332
totality’: a contingent, aleatory present we find ourselves within, but nevertheless one 
premised on an infinitude of self-interested micro-events perpetuating inequalities.   333
Paradoxically, while computational thinking is itself the result of an infinite chain of 
interconnected chance event-encounters, it now functions to dictate and constrain the 
potentiality of all event-encounters, all being, occurring within it.
Translating Lucretius’s argument, Gilles Deleuze writes that while there is a pull 
towards heterogeneity of the event because of the infinite diversity of its potential 
constituent internal elements; there is, simultaneously, a tendency towards evental 
 Ibid., p. 205.332
Jameson’s concept of ‘cognitive mapping’ was addressed in Parts 1 and 2. 
Fredric Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. by Cary 
Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 347-358.
 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics 333
(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 29.
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resemblance within a given context resulting from shared external factors.  334
Computational thinking can be thought of as a growing planetary imposition of 
resemblance to the techno-capitalist orthodoxy. This not only affects and overrides 
much present internal heterogeneity, but also increasingly infects and pre-encodes into 
that which can be thought. Barthes’ author figure has been disembodied and 
disseminated, but not into the plural, equitable multitude of voices hoped for.  335
Instead, agency has been subsumed by a textual superstructure which prioritises its 
own continuation above the human.
 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense [1969], ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester 334
(New York NY: Continuum, 2004), p. 308.
 Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’.335
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Mechanics of the event-encounter
In order to critique the (re)production of both the subjectified individual and the 
technospheric black box, I now turn to the mechanics of the event-encounter itself, out 
of the perpetual chain of which both are (re)produced.  336
Louis Althusser proposes a theory of what he calls ‘aleatory materialism’ through the 
essay The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter.  His aim is to offer a 337
schema for how the existence of our present proceeds (and has proceeded), via a 
perpetual sequence of encounters, which, when there is affinity, ‘stick’ and create a new 
reality that cannot be reversed upon which subsequent encounters might occur. For 
Althusser, this continuous process informs our world both at the level of ontology 
proceeding through reproduction or alteration of itself (he uses the example of the 
irreversible meeting of egg and oil forming mayonnaise), but also at the historical or 
political level, where for every revolution where there is affinity which sticks and 
produces lasting change, there are countless others where there is not and which thus 
peter out, often vanishing from history.
Aleatory materialism is developed from the ontology of Lucretius and Epicurus. 
Movement and the instigation of change, in the form of the ‘clinamen’ are the basis of 
this: they are inherent within all matter.  As Deleuze emphasises, matter in and of 338
 While there is a distinction between my use of the terms ‘event’ and ‘encounter’, with the 336
former leaning more towards the ontological and the latter more towards a social, historical and 
political inter-human context, I purposefully make frequent use of the compound term to 
emphasise the interconnectedness of these realms.
 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-87, ed. by François Matheron 337
and Oliver Corpet, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163-207.
 Thomas Nail, Lucretius I: An Ontology of Motion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 338
2018), pp. 11-12.
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itself is continuous, but it is this motion which is always already present within it 
which produces folds offering the semblance of discreteness and difference.  Thus, 339
while adhering to Baruch Spinoza’s emphasis on a single consistent matter (to 
challenge this is in effect to push back and not engage with the question of how 
difference originates), the fold produces a plurality from which event, change, and the 
diversity of our world can ensue.  The recognition of motion is only possible where a 340
semblance of discreteness occurs though. Segments or markers upon the plane are 
needed to see movement occurring, and they in turn can only be formed in the folds 
produced through motion: as Thomas Nail states, ‘discreteness is a product of 
continuous, uncut, undivided motion and not the other way around’.  Furthermore, 341
the matter, while infinitely foldable, must be to some extent finite within an infinitude. 
Only with the presence of a void beyond matter is there space to move.  This space is 342
vital: it is the space in which matter can fold, and the space within the fold which 
prevents it from merely being a non-shift in a consistent continuum. It is the space of 
the possibility of a future shifting from the present; it is the space of potential affect 
whereby agency becomes possible. 
 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 305.339
 Baruch Spinoza, ‘Ethics’, in Complete Works, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, trans. by Samuel 340
Shirley (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 2002), pp. 213-382 (p. 224).
Nail.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense.
 Nail, p. 11. 341
This is to say the motion is primary and an appearance of discreteness follows in having 
chanced to make it perceptible; in contrast to the erroneous but perhaps more intuitive image of 
separate parts moving.
 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 305.342
198
Holding onto the continuity of matter then, and also seeking to avoid the modern 
scientific associations which depart from Lucretius’s conceptual usage, I do not use the 
term ‘atom’. Instead, we can envisage the clinamen with segments, which though we 
cannot see it, are in fact part of the same infinitely folded plane. The clinamen is 
inherent in all segments: it is the motion or swerve away from the parallel 
directionality of matter within an infinitude which would otherwise instigate nothing 
but stasis.  The swerve is what produces the fold, thus it is always already there in the 343
segment caused through the fold, but in so doing it also creates encounter, as segments, 
no longer moving in parallel, collide.  Many times this collision is a non-event, but as 344
they infinitely occur, enough do take hold. This causes infinite chains of knock-on 
effects of altered directionality and new encounter; thus our world, in all its complexity, 
can ultimately be. 
Matter is that which is, but matter is also movement. As Nail observes, an idealism has 
at times slipped into readings of Lucretius, arguing for an external force to initiate the 
motion.  This separating of motion out of matter, and granting it to some 345
transcendental external initiator, is an argument that stems from fear of the chaos 
 Althusser, p. 169.343
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense p. 306.
 Lyotard, in a similar vein, writes that it is not only that the encounter occurs in the labyrinth, 344
but that the labyrinth is brought into being through the encounter. 
Jean-François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy [1974], trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 36.
 Nail, p. 8.345
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implicit in a truly aleatory materiality.  The implications of this primacy of motion as 346
and in being are pertinent to the technosphere. As it increasingly proceeds towards 
hegemony over being, an external initiator of motion could be severed or pushed aside, 
but if the potential for change is always already present within the fundamentals of 
being, then that potential for change, for rupture, for agency and contestation of 
technospheric stasis, can never be completely erased.   
This is the vital importance of an ontology accounting for movement: it underpins the 
possibility to think a politics enabling of change, and a fracturing of the technosphere.
Lucretius emphasises that the clinamen does not create reality, but rather, confers it on 
the segments themselves. They always held that reality as a potentiality, and the 
swerve simply acts to shift a certain reality out of phantom abstraction into our 
ontology, or history.  The accomplished fact is purely a result of contingency; we are 347
able to reflect upon it simply because it chanced to happen. And yet, as the matter we 
inhabit, it absolutely matters.  As such, this is an ontology which Althusser develops 348
as a historical materialism which is neither metaphysical nor dialectical. There is no 
thesis and antithesis coming together as a new surface. There is no surface, and equally 
 Ibid., p. 8.346
In noting this, Nail answers his own questioning (p. 10) of why Althusser emphasises the 
aleatory over motion. While motion is key at the ontological level, it is the aleatory potential of 
change, rupture and revolution in the socio-historical which most interests Althusser.
 Althusser, p. 169.347
 Turning to perpetuated structural inequalities between human bodies, this axiom can be 348
taken further to assert, as Woodly does, that ‘being matter is enough to matter’. 
Deva Woodly, ‘The Politics of Care’, online presentation as part of In The Current Moment: 
Perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities, The New School, 18 June 2020 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih6F6N9pg-A> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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there is only surface, but it is a thick one-sided möbius strip of a surface which we can 
only ever be subjectively within, never upon, even less progressing from.  349
Badiou’s concept of event-encounter, drawing heavily on the Lucretian, is built on a 
grounding that mathematics, rather than being a model or representation of anything, 
simply is.  The code and algorithmic text, out of which our computational thinking 350
pseudo-world is built, is itself premised on mathematics. It is important here to 
remember that a code, language or text is not innately premised on inequality, but can 
become such through the unequal social relations refracted though it (and can go on to 
disseminate, reproduce and exacerbate these inequalities).
   
Badiou’s event occurs at the cusp between the state (the world) and the void of 
unknowability. In his conception, which renders more comprehensible the simultaneity 
of the event-encounter and the being of the segments in encounter, an intervention 
‘first’ occurs which acts to bring undecidability into the contingent situation. The event, 
potentially initiated in the intervention, is then completed and given meaning by 
‘retroactively’ and nominatively claiming it as such, generating a new state now 
 Lyotard, pp. 4-17.349
 Badiou, p. 7.350
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inclusive of that event.  And that new state then itself constitutes the matter for 351
infinite further potential situations of intervention.   352
The conceptual splitting out of the intervention from the event presents the possibility 
of a circularity whereby the event becomes the intervention for its own perpetual 
reproduction. A statically flickering ossified folding. This is the means by which the 
technosphere, through computational thinking, continually reproduces itself. To move 
beyond this though, Badiou emphasises the need to split the point of rejoining the 
circle and think more of loops spilling out in multiple dimensions, with each 
intervention not being the consequence of its own event, but instead, of a preceding 
one, derived from a different intervention.  353
Beyond his conception of the mechanics of the event, an important concept which 
Badiou introduces is ‘fidelity’.  Whereas Althusser’s ‘affinity’ is a relation between 354
world and event-encounter to produce something lasting and meaningful (or, in 
Badiou’s terms, for state and situation-intervention to produce something that might 
retrospectively be nominated evental), in other words a relationship across the horizon 
between world and unknown future, fidelity instead relates to relations within the 
 Terms such as ‘first’ and ’retroactively’ initially seem to contradict simultaneity. However, 351
recalling Husserl’s thick present discussed in Part 1, which holds within itself past and future, 
we can read Badiou’s use of these terms as an imperfect but more comprehensible articulation 
of a logic, rather than being strictly temporal.
Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. by 
John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
 Badiou, pp. 201-203.352
This is not a dialectical progression of synthesis forming a new ground. The event is part of the 
same continuous, thick (non-)surface within which we exist.
 Ibid., p. 209.353
 Ibid., pp. 232-237.354
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world, as well as pre-inscribed onto things entirely within the unknown void, to 
potentially be brought into being by an event.  355
As an event occurs, the resultant matter is all contingent to it, including the fidelities 
between things brought about. The fidelity is particular to the altered present, however, 
at one level of abstraction there can be an ongoing-ness, through events and across 
numerous potentialities, of the criterion of connection of the fidelity. We might for 
example think of the fidelity of love, which is contingent to the chain of event 
encounters leading to its present, but also holds an abstract quality as something which 
would continue through numerous potential futures or alternate presents.  
 Althusser, p. 191.355
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Textual fidelities
If we imagine the evental progression of the matter-present through the myriad 
multiplicities continually opening and erasing around it as a text, we might consider 
these fidelities as connecting hyperlinks automatically affixed onto dispersed clusters 
of linked words at the moment of their writing. Though intrinsically embedded within 
it, these linked words provide an alternative way through the written ‘reality’, jumping 
across and fragmenting its ordered progression, offering an alternate logic. Badiou 
writes that the further the operator of the fidelity is from recent events, the better it is 
able to discern marks furthest from those events.  To stay with our text metaphor (one 356
which is increasingly proceeding beyond metaphor in the technosphere), we can re-
articulate this as: when we navigate the text through a set of hyperlinks only minimally 
altered and affected by most recent events and changes, we might be better able see the 
alterations that have occurred to the text some distance back, as our counter-network of 
hyperlinks allows us to leap back to those points. Or alternatively, we are likewise 
better enabled to jump further forward into the infinite multiplicity of written but as-
yet unread futures.     357
However, Badiou warns of this fidelity-autonomy going too far and becoming 
dogmatic: when the maintenance of connections of fidelity overrides recognition of the 
event and resultant reality.  In this case, we would find our hyperlinked words 358
becoming fully untethered from the text of reality and operating in their own 
 Badiou, p. 237.356
 This speculative leaping forward according to a counter-hegemonic fidelity is pertinent to 357
radical care as it will be developed below.
 Ibid., p. 237.358
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unconnected self-referential other-text, unable to navigate, discern or potentially affect 
anything of the text-reality. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write of short-circuiting a 
language so that it does not reflect a hegemony and in so doing bind us, but 
nevertheless still using it, in new ways. This, they argue, holds much greater potential 
for counter-hegemonic rupture than irrelevant disconnected misuses.  359
For a fidelity to have any meaningful affect then, a continuous self-reflexivity is 
required: maintaining a connection but also an autonomy, in relation to the hegemonic 
system, the technosphere. In this way fidelities might offer a means of affective 
criticality, on the outside while within.
 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [1975], trans. by Dana 359
Polan (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. xvi.
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Reasserting the material 
As Althusser emphasises, any encounter affective within our experienced reality must 
take place in order to possibly take hold.  While this may sound axiomatic, it is worth 360
briefly considering what it means to ‘take place’. To have been inscribed into the 
retrospective history of nominated events as a marker point passed: certainly; but also 
to have ‘taken place’ in a situated, material sense: to have ‘taken up a place’. The 
encounter has both a temporal and a spatio-material located-ness. And for an 
encounter affected and affective within reality, the only situation available to occur 
within is within that reality. More precisely, the site, as discussed in Part 2 is constituted 
through encounter, but is still where the encounter occurs. This is quite evident when 
thinking of encounters between bodies or physical entities, but in terms of encounters 
of thought or ideology, or technological connection, here also there is ultimately some 
material base for the encounter. It took place, but also, in that moment, took up space, 
occupied place, was situated. In mattering, it had a materiality: perhaps geographically 
or corporeally, or perhaps socially, culturally or politically. These are all materially 
inscribed terrains, as discussed in Parts 1 and 2. Silicon Valley narratives would have us 
erroneously accept a field of pure abstract encounter, and it is important to maintain a 
criticality to this ideologically derived way of thinking: to remember the rootedness, 
and unpredictable multi-affective-ness, within the material, of every encounter. The 
hidden chains of labour overlooked within the technosphere, whether at global 
‘peripheries’ or bracketed out as devalued reproductive labour, or made opaque 
through micro-targeted individuation (as discussed in Part 2), are a key site where this 
material affect ‘takes place’.    
 Althusser, p. 172.360
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The science-fictive terrains of bleeding-edge technology and the most abstractedly 
conceptual realms of theory both similarly tempt us into a mode of immaterial 
ephemerality, where a freeing away from bodily-ness, mortality and compromise 
becomes tantalisingly appealing. It is, though, vital that the devalued ‘lumpen-reality’ 
is recognised and acknowledged, all the more as the vulnerability and exploitation 
occurring within it is so unequal.  We do not live in the void, in the nothingness, but 361
rather on the cusp of its materialisation into a collectively experienced reality. This 
reality produces and reproduces itself premised on a nominated set of events stretching 
out into history. While we proceed contingently, with no ‘meaning’ to the history 
produced, the entirety of what we deem meaningful is produced in that history. We can 
only grasp ourselves as subjects, within a context at the perpetually proceeding and 
erasing present, by looking back at that history.  We (in any cohesive sense of a ‘we’) 362
are produced and reproduced through ‘our’ singular chain of event-encounters, and 
can thus only ‘be’ at the present end of this chain: this contingent world is our only 
world.  Thus, it is a world in which we need ways of being. 363
For Althusser, Thomas Hobbes’ individuals can be thought of as segments with a will 
to continue: a drive to produce and reproduce themselves through encounters to come 
(and to produce the conditions to further enable this).  The full liberty of the 364
individual is premised on the full spectrum of multiplicities of potential within the 
 ‘Lumpen-reality’ is discussed in greater depth in Praxis. It is the overlooked, exploited realm 361
of devalued materiality and material labour which continues to underpin the technosphere.
 (This logic informs the consideration of the historical avant garde in the Radical care section 362
below.)
 A vital implication of this, which will be further explored, is that we care for it and do not fall 363
into either a nihilistic or transcendental way of thinking.
 Ibid., p. 181.364
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void being open in front of them (precisely what is closed down and limited in the 
subsumption of the future discussed in Part 1). Hobbes’ figure is presumptive of this 
individually-centred agency, ignoring the synthetic nature of the freedom they enjoy, 
which is rooted in overlooked, bracketed out inequality.  
Althusser goes on to pull his thread of aleatory materialism out of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s writing as well. The forest envisaged in The Social Contract, the ‘state of 
pure nature’, Rousseau argues, is an infinitely expansive one without bounds or 
constraints, meaning no encounters occur and no reality is formed.  Individuals, or 365
segments, never intersect with one another. Only with constraints does the forest 
acquire a finitude, and the meandering individuals within it begin to meet. This is the 
state of encounter.  For Althusser, Rousseau’s individuals equate to folds, and the 366
forest to the plane of matter. Beyond the constraints producing the conditions of 
encounter, the forest-plane’s finitude, within an infinite void, is what allows it to fold, 
as previously discussed. Thus, to Rousseau’s argument that the forest being finite 
produces the conditions of encounter, we can add that it is also the basis by which the 
forest itself becomes the elements which encounter one another.  Returning to another 367
argument of Rousseau’s though, that private property is the origin of inequality, we 
can think of the present forest as having been enclosed in ownership.  The owner is 368
 Ibid., p. 184.365
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’ [1762], in The Social Contract and The First and 
Second Discourses, ed. by Susan Dunn (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 149-254.
 Althusser, p. 185.366
 This is to say that the individuals within the forest, while appearing discrete through folding, 367
are segments of the continuous matter of the forest.
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, 368
or, Second Discourse’ [1755], in Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. by 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111-231.
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erecting fences to cut off access to the edges, and instead of recognising it as finite and 
thus foldable and changeable, it (our present technospheric context including 
ourselves) is projected as being infinite, static and ‘natural’. Its ability to fold, to 
become segments of unpredictable encounter, is being hidden.
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The threshold 
The ontological arguments addressed above, emphasising the possibility of change, are 
usually brought into historical materialism as a way of exploring what might make a 
movement take hold and become revolutionary, rupturing a structure.  This is 369
certainly important to my argument, but I also wish to develop the less conventional 
strand centred on the proprietorial hegemony over the plane of being, which is 
presented as static. The subsumption of the future and position of continual 
indebtedness discussed in Part 1 is an element of this, but in expanding out the 
consideration of what is owned to both the site of Part 2, and (falsely, through 
constraining computational thinking) to ‘being’ more generally, Jacques Derrida’s 
writing on hospitality becomes relevant.  This later writing is more usually 370
considered in ethical discussions of immigration and such forth, but I look to address it 
to the projected static plane of matter of our technospheric would-be totality, 
considering the hegemon as a host presenting themself as hospitable. This connection 
is key to situating radical care as existent within a falsely proclaimed inevitability 
which rejects a need for any alternative.
 For example, as Althusser does.369
Althusser.
 Jacques Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’, trans. by Barry Stocker, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical 370
Humanities, 5:3 (2000), 3-18.
Jacques Derrida, ‘The Principle of Hospitality’, trans. by Ashley Thompson, Parallax, 11:1 (2005), 
6-9.
Anne Dufourmantelle and Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
210
Acknowledging the above argued importance of recognising the material located-ness 
of the event-encounter, we might consider ‘society’ as a key site in relation to equality. 
There is a profound difference between two possible types of encounter that might take 
place within society (between which are a spectrum of possible intermediate positions). 
There is the encounter between two humans, coming together in motion and porosity, 
open to one another, not with boundaries but, instead, fuzzy gradations of intensity.  371
The contrasting encounter type is far more violent though: where the porous, 
vulnerable human collides with a structure such as the technosphere which claims to 
be static; a rigid fold in the plane which presents itself as a totality and thus within 
which the soft human folds must acquiesce to subjectification. 
This rigid fold claims a permanence, and thus determination of its site. It will not 
budge or flow (at least from the perspective of being within it) and thus claims 
proprietary control over existence internal to it, which, by virtue of being, must 
encounter it. Through its ownership of this rigid present, it presents as natural a logic 
or language of property, which largely determines the hierarchical position of those 
who seek individual achievement and success (more presumed, ‘natural’ codes) within 
this structure. As with the larger ossified fold, this resultant proprietorial constructing 
of the individuated human is itself rigid. Unlike our porous co-equal selves, it has hard 
edges. These edges bruise flesh when it encounters them, and form a threshold which 
cannot be crossed without permission. 
Within society we are almost continually crossing a threshold with the other, as diverse 
agents interrelating within the present-matter, as well as on the event horizon to the 
 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1980], 371
trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 153-164.
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future.  Whenever we encounter a proprietorial other we place ourselves upon their 372
threshold.  When we cross the threshold to the other’s owned site, we enter into what 373
Derrida terms their ‘hostipitality’.  This coinage is purposefully suggestive of 374
hospitality, hostility, host and hostage, all of which share an etymological lineage. As 
Derrida observes, the French term ‘hôte’ contains a sense of contractual reciprocity 
absent in its English translation, meaning ‘guest’ as well as ‘host’.  Veering away from 375
actual etymologies, I would add to these the slight suggestion of the word ‘stipulation’ 
that the middle part of Derrida’s coinage holds as a further relevant association: the 
stipulation placed upon the hôte-guest as they cross the threshold. 
When we cross the threshold to the other (or in fact remain upon it, as will be 
explained), the encounter produced is premised on difference between them and 
ourselves. (If there were no differentiation, there would be no event-encounter, just a 
consistent, undifferentiated being.) The centrality of property and ownership within 
our existent state of encounter, alongside ambition and competition, makes this 
crossing of thresholds not just a butting together of neutral difference, but one 
premised on inequalities inscribed into social relations. One side of the encounter holds 
dominance over the other, and claims the terrain as theirs. They are hôte-host, the other 
 As was argued in Parts 1 and 2, a decentring of the self and encountering of the other in co-372
equal co-vulnerability is vital in contesting the individuation of the technosphere. 
The future being rendered property was addressed in Part 1.
 It is important to differentiate this threshold, at the encounter between one and another, from 373
the previously mentioned threshold between present reality and future void. Acknowledging 
that, I consciously opt to use the same term as the emphasis on property inherent in the 
interpersonal encounter does, when considered alongside the subsumption of the future 




is hôte-guest, and by their hospitality they maintain their dominance in the 
encounter.  376
We proceed within proprietorial folds within folds within folds: moving outward from 
the immediately present rigid host, through increasing levels of generalised 
abstraction, to the ossified fold of the technosphere as an overarching context.     
There occurs a ‘folding [of] the foreign other into the internal law of the host’: 
effectively a textual production, by the dominant hôte-host, of a supra-event-encounter 
frame to their design (though also partially subject to the set of fidelities culturally-
contextually precedent around ‘hosting’, which it purports to be).  Any subsequent 377
event-encounters between the parties must occur within this, unless there is a 
significant rupturing of this contingently produced pseudo-reality. 
We might think of colonialism as a clear example of this asymmetry of hospitality, 
where material encounter premised upon and perpetuating of inequality is 
emphasised. However, we might also think of the encounter occurring in the terrain of 
language and text. To name, to determine the de facto or de jure language, is to 
effectively conceptually host and own, with translation as the threshold. English 
language dominance segues on from colonialism, but if we consider our present reality 
increasingly determined through textual forms of code, algorithm and data, we now 
increasingly have to cross a threshold into these languages to engage with agency in 
the world. As subjects, we are the hôtes-guests of a new dominant regime of these 
textual environments and their owners; our a-textual bodies denied access without 
 Ibid.376
 Ibid., p. 7.377
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translation, and once there, only present under stipulation. We might do well to 
consider the shared etymology with hostage and hostile when we think of where our 
data, our information and our presented selves are ‘hosted’. 
The apparent benevolence of the term hospitality is misleading. Intrinsic to it is this 
asymmetry between host and guest, and equally important is the implicit maintenance 
of the capacity to repeat.  The good host, as distinct perhaps from the good friend, 378
offers hospitality somewhere up to, but not beyond, the point where doing so would 
diminish their ability to offer further hospitality in the future. They guard their 
hospitality capital. Through framing the encounter across their threshold, they control 
the potential event-encounters and hold onto the ability to expel the other back 
through the door, meanwhile they remain invulnerable. This maintenance of the 
capacity to be hospitable then, is premised on hegemony over the situation of 
encounter. Hospitality entails a process of social, material reproduction whereby hosts 
maintain their capacity to host, which entails guests, having to operate across a 
threshold which is not theirs to frame, being perpetual guest; always reliant on the 
hospitality of others, of the technosphere. 
The central importance of resistance, including the maintaining of the capacity to resist 
(a mirror image of hospitality being premised upon maintenance of the capacity to 
host), was discussed in Parts 1 and 2. It is worth returning to here though, to note 
Howard Caygill’s framing of resistance in relation to the threshold.  For Caygill, 379
where revolution proceeds across and beyond the threshold without an ongoing 
 Ibid.378
 Howard Caygill, ‘Also Sprach Zapata: Philosophy and Resistance’, Radical Philosophy, 1:171 379
(2012), 19-25 <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/also-sprach-zapata> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
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capacity to resist, to create distance from power, a new threshold elsewhere will form. 
Resistance is what contests the premise of the threshold: not a direct contestation or 
overcoming of the barrier, but a hacking of the presumed coherence of the structure.   
The parallels with the solidifying and increasingly unbridgeable gap between property 
owners and renters in a city like London which this discussion of the threshold 
suggests are clear.  And as with that very material manifestation, where every scrap 380
of land or subdivision of building has a legally decreed form of ownership (including 
now vanishingly rare common land, still defined within a context of property), there is 
no pure neutral space of event-encounter within our society. This is because the event-
encounter cannot take place in the void: as soon as the intervention initiates its 
possibility, it is pulled into the world, a world framed through static technospheric 
hegemony and encoded with a logic of property ownership. Even if a particular 
individual seeks to reject this, it is the larger fold we are within.  
It is important to note that if the encounter is occurring between multifaceted agents 
which have multiple capacities and characteristics (e.g. humans), those same agents 
can encounter one another in a myriad range of differing situation-folds, 
simultaneously even. Within each of these, the host-guest relationship, and dominance 
over the threshold, might vary. Sometimes the dominance can be contested or 
unrecognised; a mixing of porous skins and thresholds braced against, perhaps 
overlapping one another. Only in the playing out of the event and inscribing with 
meaning might the dominance of one over the other become apparent.  381
 I mention London as it is my own current home city.380
 Furthermore, fidelities such as love, friendship and care (all of which will be discussed) will 381
frequently be present in various combinations and interrelations.
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Hospitality, in its self-interested asymmetry, always holds within itself the capacity of 
removal: it is a code always implicitly subject to being rescinded. Carl Schmitt writes of 
a sovereign figure always having the ability to determine a ‘state of exception’ and thus 
overrule the code.  In our contingently arrived at technospheric context, sovereignty 382
is disseminated through textual structures rather than residing in an individual. 
Nevertheless, within those textual structures, certain individuals do hold vested 
interest.  383
This determining of a state of exception incorporates both an autocratic invocation that 
a new state is initiated, and also an encoding of what that new state comprises.  The 384
state of exception occurs at the outer limits of what is permitted; as Giorgio Agamben 
writes, it is neither internal nor external to the state of normality (which it is defined in 
terms of, but specifically in terms of not being).  At the edge of the ossified plane of 385
stasis, it is a fuzzy boundary where a meta-logic of power which has always 
underpinned the code of hospitality begins to make itself more visible, and begins to 
act more directly. For this reason, the proclamation of a state of exception is a powerful 
move by the hegemon in contesting resistance. The stable, encoded centre of the 
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922], trans. by 382
George Schwabb (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 13.
 For Schmitt, there is the sense of a failure of liberal democracy in having to revert back to a 383
preceding structure of power.
From the perspective of the distributed power of the technosphere however, liberal democracy 
has been ‘superseded’. Rather than failing as a contemporary form of governance, it functions 
as a useful fiction to mask the exploitative violence of power. Accelerationism acknowledges 
this but, in its right-wing variant, celebrates that power.
 Ibid., p. xi.384
 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. by Kevin Attell (Chicago IL: University of Chicago 385
Press, 2005), p. 23.
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technospheric plane, where productive neoliberal lives are lived within the social 
factory, having moulded themselves to its logics, assumes an apparently natural stasis. 
The edge in contrast, where the bend of the fold occurs, is where both resistance and 
hegemonic power become dynamically active. These fuzzy boundary zones are where 
the falsity of the ossified plane can be challenged and critiqued, but are also where 
hegemonic power can arbitrarily cast aside checks on its repressive violence, flowing 
into a new form.  This edge space serves to reemphasise the entire logic of hospitality 386
as one of being perpetually subject to the power of the host, and reminds us of the need 
for counter-networks of care existing autonomously to that logic, which might persist 
when hospitality is torn away, as can occur at any moment.       
Hôte-guest is the condition of the multitude. Always on the threshold, a threshold 
controlled by another, having to fight (exhaustingly) for any agency over their own 
future. Derrida reflects on the two meanings of the French term ‘pas’: both ‘a step’, and 
‘not’.  This encapsulates the threshold to the future for the multitude: they cannot but 387
step forward into it, perhaps bringing with them fidelities of ambition, motivation and 
hope, but that step is always simultaneously a ‘not’, a step premised on conditionalities 
imposed and enforced by the current dominant regime which owns the threshold, the 
technosphere.
 They are the spaces Caygill observes resistance can occur at through fragmenting the 386
coherence of the structure, but they are also where the structure opts to exceed its own logic and 
act with dynamic violence. 
Caygill.
 Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’, p. 11.387
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Ways of being: love
In this bleak reality then, is there any way of operating, of being, that is critical to the 
dominant regime and constitutes a form of existence that is counter to it? Is there a way 
to actively find fidelities to carry forward resistantly through the threshold, rupturing 
it? Bridle proposes love and unknowing as the routes beyond computational thinking, 
and proceeds to develop these into an idea of guardianship, premised on ethical virtue 
and thinking clearly and acting ‘correctly’.  While the term guardianship manages to 388
engage the important idea of a site or territory developed in Part 2, while avoiding the 
issues of property and resultant power asymmetry in hospitality, this emphasis on 
clarity and correct action seems to fall in line with Fredric Jameson’s cognitive 
mapping, which Part 2 critiqued for under-recognising the entanglement of self within 
the structure.  Bridle’s emphasis on acting ethically correctly, rather than engaging 389
politically in the messy complexity, follows from this. However, the technosphere is a 
structure which, as Bridle elsewhere makes powerfully clear, is shifting faster than we 
can grasp it clearly, but within and upon which it is nevertheless imperative to act, to 
attempt to break the cycle of its reproduction.  Setting guardianship aside as 390
 Bridle, pp. 251-252.388
 Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping’.389
 Bridle.390
Groys describes this ungraspability of the continuously changing context in which we are 
bound as ‘bewilderment’.
Boris Groys, In the Flow (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 12, 34, 188.
The paradox of this bewilderment is that while it generates alienation, it does also enable 
certain forms of connection. In their sanctioned use, these connections are premised on an 
individuated (de)subjectification though. 
Marc James Léger, Don’t Network: The Avant Garde After Networks (New York NY: Minor 
Compositions, 2018), pp. 1-5.
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ineffectively cautious and impossibly seeking of objectivity then, does ‘love’ offer 
something important, perhaps chiming with the post-individual pro-human stance Part 
1 advocated, as we try to develop an enmeshed but autonomous resistance?
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of love, drawing on Saint Augustine’s writings on the topic, 
is as much a reflection on the process of subjectification.  She centres human life 391
around an unknown future anticipated through fear and desire: a reiteration of the 
cusp, or threshold, to the unknown now familiar from the discussion of the event 
above, but here focused on the individual, or perhaps human.  In a faith context, this 392
future exists outside of our material reality. With the foreclosure of the future described 
in Part 1, it is unsurprising these transcendentally envisaged futures hold appeal. 
There is a paradox inherent within love approached in terms of faith. On the one hand 
it pushes a commitment to the abstract, a holding out for the transcendental (‘Love 
God’); while on the other it commands an embracing of positionality within a specific 
context (‘Love thy neighbour’).  The former foregrounds the dogmatic, while the 393
latter centres on the historical and material. To translate this out of religion into 
philosophical terms though, we can see the paradox as being present within 
subjectifiation. We are read and read ourselves as autonomous individuals, while 
simultaneously being completely entangled in and produced by our context. 
 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine [1929], ed. by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith 391
Chelius Stark (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
 Ibid., p. 13.392
 Ibid.393
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In a foreshadowing of the discussion of friendship to come below though, Arendt 
navigates this paradox by considering the neighbour as a mirror of the self.  In their 394
failing to live the ‘good’ life, and in being castigated for this, they function as a warning 
against backsliding. Conversely, if they excel, or are at least viewed as such, they 
become the target to emulate. Thus the relationship to the other, when framed through 
this paradoxical transcendental gaze, though possibly disguised beneath outward acts 
of compassion, becomes rooted in self-formation, subjectification and individuation. 
The more closely just beneath or above ourselves on the ladder we perceive others to 
be, the more precisely we gauge our own position, and seek to maintain or improve 
it.  This process, in a secular contemporary context, is mirrored in how we are 395
subjectified within neoliberalism.   
A further concern in this formulation of love on a transcendental ground, and the 
resultant individuation, is the rendering of the ‘other’ human as object that occurs. This 
is perhaps not surprising, given the primacy of ‘Love God’ over ‘Love thy neighbour’. 
The position the other is cast into is one without agency or potential to rupture the neat 
construction of the individuated self that their very presence within the relation is 
secondary to.  The transcendental lover does not enter into a mutual bond of care 396
with the other, because their historically and contextually rooted pain, vulnerability 
and human-ness are all ultimately reduced to inconsequentiality in relation to the 
 Ibid., p. 105.394
 Christians might argue that grace, with its universalising non-comparative emphasis, 395
overcomes this issue. This is not the place for a theological discussion of grace, but rather the 
point made is how this rooting of love/care on a transcendental ground becomes a site of 
individuation within the present worldly reality.
 This rendering of the other human as object was central to both platform capitalism as 396
discussed in Part 1 and, arguably, certain models of socially engaged practice as discussed in 
Part 2.
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ahistorical perfection the individuated self will proceed into. Love remains abstract: 
constituting the subject, but in separation from their political context.
There is a circularity in the way these religious premises of faith, which were 
transposed wholesale via the ‘protestant work ethic’ into capitalism, and placed further 
upon and within the individual in post-Fordism, now reacquire a more explicit 
transcendentalism in some of the accelerationist discourses emanating from Silicon 
Valley.397
What is needed is not this centripetal model of relationship, of love or care as spokes 
coming out from a single subject (who, to continue the metaphor, is actually more 
interested in the axle). What is required is a de-centred network or web of care, where 
the bonds of relationship are, or at least seek to become, pluri-directionally equal in 
terms of affect and agency, and themselves become the focus rather than the 
individuals linking them. In removing the existential relief of a transcendentalism to 
fall back upon, the inequalities of vulnerability within our world become all the more 
starkly experienced, and the urgent need for these bonds of care, for everyone, become 
all the more apparent. 
Abandoning transcendentalism, or any supposedly fixed ground for that matter, is 
necessary though. Capitalism has proven able to subsume any would-be ground. Only 
in untethering from a co-optable fixedness might we form capacities of resistance that 
can remain outside of it. In this free-floating groundlessness, the bonds of relationship 
 Adam Gabbatt, ‘Is Silicon Valley's quest for immortality a fate worse than death?’, Guardian, 397
23 February 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/22/silicon-valley-
immortality-blood-infusion-gene-therapy> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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are all the more vital if we are not to lose ourselves within an unnavigable expanse of 
desubjectification.
——
Like Arendt, Badiou is critical of a transcendental framing of love, and instead 
proposes considering it as an imminent fidelity which opens up a ‘two scene’ (or 
perhaps better, ‘plurality’) of interconnected positionality.   398
In Badiou’s schema, the event-encounter of ‘falling in love’ is the intervention which is 
retroactively inscribed as evental through the ensuing commitment to the work of 
love.  The co-vulnerable, co-committed relationality of love as a fidelity, which he 399
outlines, seemingly holds some of the same resiliences and potential resistances 
towards the technospheric stasis as friendship and care which will be discussed below. 
A particular quality which Badiou develops is the corporeality of love.  This bodily-400
ness (which he contrasts against friendship) emerges in his rejection of the 
transcendental. However, in seeking another initiator for (or enactment of) love, he 
seems to dialectically reify sex (or at least sexual desire) as the sine qua non of pro-
 Alain Badiou with Nicolas Truong, In Praise of Love [2009], trans. by Peter Bush (New York 398
NY: The New Press, 2012).
For example, Badiou is critical of Kierkegaard’s setting out of a hierarchy of forms of love 
culminating in the religious. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
I suggest ‘plurality’ rather than ‘two scene’ in attempting to move beyond the binary exclusivity 
of the formulation of love Badiou proposes.
 Ibid., pp. 28, 41-44.399
 Ibid., pp. 34-37.400
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human relationality. This becomes somewhat exclusionary and problematic in seeking 
collective resistant ways of being, especially as (even accepting a subjective personal 
position) there is an under-questioned monogamous, binary hetero-normativity to his 
framing of sex.  More fundamentally, Badiou’s intrinsically sexual love ultimately 401
falls back on the self-interested individualism of sexual pleasure, via the same logic by 
which Badiou himself observes Lacan denied the possibility of a sexual relationship.  402
I am inclined to agree, within the urgency of the technospheric present, with Maggie 
Nelson, who writes ‘there is some evil shit in this world that needs fucking up, and the 
time for blithely asserting that sleeping with whomever you want however you want is 
going to jam its machinery is long past’.  Whether framed theologically or sexually, 403
love as a resistant fidelity too easily slips into an individuated transcendentalism. 
While I gratefully borrow Badiou’s concept of fidelity, I will shift away from love to 
consider some alternative operators. Friendship and, especially, care offer more fluid 
multifaceted capacities of resistance towards, and resilience within, the technosphere.
 This exclusionary position is later extended further through consideration of love within the 401
reproductive family, where it becomes bound up in questions of bio-genealogical lineages of 
social reproduction which sit uneasily with a desire for equality for all. 
Making explicit reference to ‘the couple’, Badiou proposes a possible definition of his 
conception of love as ‘minimal communism’. In its implicit boundaries and exclusivity, this is a 
questionable concept more akin to an expanded individualism, and antithetical to a collective, 
pro-human, equitable way of being for all.  
Ibid., p. 90.
 Ibid., pp.18-19.402
 Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts (New York NY: Melville House, 2016) p. 27.403
Pro-human practices, undertaken with care, could at times include ‘sleeping with whomever 
you want however you want’ (if there were mutual consent); this is to be advocated. My 
argument is that this is not on its own enough, even less so if conforming to an encoded 
normativity.
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Ways of being: friendship
If not love then, might friendship operate as a fidelity enabling a resistant, resilient 
network of relations? In building a viable concept of radical care, theorisations of 
friendship offer some important points of consideration.
In Politics of Friendship, Derrida explores the paradoxical ‘contretemps’ he sees at the 
centre of the friend relation.  He uses this term to encapsulate, as the French suggests, 404
two contrasting senses of time. On the one hand, there is a duration: a shared history 
and reality that underpins the friendship, which (to use Badiou’s terms) forms a 
fidelity that, barring an extreme event, the friends can reasonably expect to carry 
forward through the event into the future. The other aspect of the contretemps though, 
is the potential for shift or change as the two friends, rather than allowing their self-
subjectification to proceed as a relatively discrete and un-interfered with loop, open 
themselves up to one another in co-affect and co-vulnerability. This potentially 
destabilises the two selves, opening unpredictable aleatory futures out of the event-
encounter.       
Badiou’s terminology continues to map closely onto Derrida’s conception of 
friendship. For Badiou, the event-intervention loop was prevented from becoming a 
closed circle reproducing itself by instead spiralling it out in a fractal of other potential 
dimensions, with a separate event creating the context for the next intervention.  405
Similarly, in this friendship dynamic, the opening up of the circle of self to the other 
produces the external impetus to destabilise the self.  
 Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London: Verso, 1997).404
 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 209.405
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A further aspect of the contretemps is that friendship is not just a model that might be 
applicable to care, but itself needs care.  For the durational fidelity to be sustainable 406
through the instability, it needs to be committed to. This is where an element of 
radicality starts to enter, because a friendship that is only committed to so far echoes 
back to hospitality, and is ultimately premised on the self and self-interest. A radical 
friendship has to commit to the challenge, rupture or even potential destruction of the 
present self; only with this is the fidelity meaningful. Another way to put this is that 
the fidelity has to have already passed through the event, whatever the event. This is 
friendship, but also, to go back to Badiou, this is fidelity.  Such commitment also 407
fragments the threshold, which is constructed in terms of conditionality. Without this 
opening up of oneself to the unknown, both friendship and fidelity sit within the 
present reality, when they only have any potentially generative meaning beyond this 
when they transfer themselves across into the void. Committing them into that void is 
a small way to reclaim the future at a personal level, to hold open that unknown 
chance, despite the risk of potential rational self-disinterest. If we do not do this, are we 
not simply being opportunistic and entrepreneurial within a virtuosic economy: ideal 
neoliberal subjects? 
Derrida rejects the notion of an ‘ideal’ friendship, which would simply be a 
replacement transcendentalism.  Instead, each friendship should be recognised as 408
 This observation prefigures an extensive discussion of care for care itself which will come 406
below.
 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, pp. 12-17.407
Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 232-237.
 Derrida, Politics of Friendship.408
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contingent, developed through committed nurturing. It is a human-to-human 
relationship built not on a transferrable code, but on entangled embodied experience. 
This contingency, operating outside the code-able and commodifiable, is a 
characteristic that can hold friendships apart from subsumption into the technosphere: 
a friendship premised on a genuine co-vulnerability and co-affect can hold the 
potential to be a resilient site of resistance. 
David Webb builds on Derrida’s conception, but develops it through Foucault’s writing 
on care for the self and the other, making more explicit the need for unconditional 
commitment within friendship, to enable radical, unknown new (counter) 
subjectifications.  He develops the two intersecting subjects of the friendship in a way 409
that helpfully takes us beyond two overly simple loops of subjectification colliding and 
opening one another out. The entanglement of the two co-equal entities is not 
occurring on a singular axis, but across multiple facets of the intersecting selves (for 
Foucault, these are our self-relation and relations to forms of knowledge and 
normativity).  There is a deep, unknowable opening up of the self, which entails 410
unanticipated co-realisations, but the process can only occur when both parties commit 
despite the potential vulnerability.  
The friendship relation is non-linear and unpredictable. The multiplicity of axes of 
intersection and co-affect that are formed, if cared for and sustained, exponentially 
multiply the complexity and unknowability of potential futures. The encounter is not 
 David Webb, ‘On Friendship: Derrida, Foucault and the Practice of Becoming’ Research in 409
Phenomenology, 33 (2003), 119-140.
 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two’, in Ethics: Subjectivity and 410
Truth, ed. by Paul Rabinow, trans. by Robert Hurley and others (New York NY: The New Press, 
1994), pp. 199-205 (p. 201).
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one of outward-facing skin touching on outward-facing skin, producing one or two 
new future-voids, but instead a deep porous overlap of each self into the other, creating 
multi-dimensional voids of potential futures (and selves within them), in continuous 
formation and reformation.
The form of profound friendship being described here is very distant from the notional, 
mediated, textual friendships leveraged by Facebook and other social media, and the 
investment of committed time and effort (to produce care) needed from each human 
means there is some limit to the number of friends any single person might have.  411
However, that it is more than one further multiplies the potentially opening futures of 
each friend, and also enables the building of chains of linkage, the formation of a mesh 
across which affective encounters might pass through multiple persons in committed 
relationship with one another.  Here, there is a glimpse of a de-individuated pro-412
human network operating to a logic autonomous from the technosphere.   
Deleuze describes the potential of flow through affective encounter within and 
between enmeshed spirals of interconnected subjectification as ‘turbulent flow’.  It is 413
important to acknowledge that this turbulent flow, in as much as it does enable the 
aleatory production of unpredictable contexts, selves and voids, is still presently 
existent within a sub- and supra- structural matter of the totalising hegemonic context 
 Facebook ‘friendships’ are centred on commodification and individuated subjectification, as 411
examined in detail by Bucher. 
Taina Bucher, ‘The Friendship Assemblage: Investigating Programmed Sociality on Facebook’, 
Television & New Media, 14:6 (2012), 479-493.
 This greater and more open interconnectivity is a facet through which fidelities such as 412
friendship can offer more resistant and resilient potentialities than (often comparatively 
exclusive) love.
 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault [1986], trans. by Seán Hand (Minneapolis MN: University of 413
Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 99.
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of the technosphere. Friendships exist in an exhausting context of being and surviving, 
and an equally exhausting effort of self-reflection is continuously needed to guard 
against our thinking and acting within them becoming technospherically inflected, 
echoing the psychological feedback loops discussed in Part 1. In its would-be totality, 
the technosphere is impossible to view or grasp from outside and it is thus not helpful 
to think of it as a ground tethering the otherwise free-floating multi-dimensional mesh 
of friendship interconnections, but instead as a matter or substance through which the 
bonds of friendship must burrow and push. These bonds are not materially other, but 
can be thought of as a different texture of that same material. The dominant 
technospheric texture constantly seeps into the bonds, and encourages them back to the 
default state: constant care is needed to hold open the channels of this atypical intra-
material mesh. It is not just at the textural boundary, where the dominant texture 
encroaches, that the alternate is pulled back to the norm (though this may be where the 
pull is strongest); it is as if the matter of the atypically textured filaments itself is subject 
to a gravitational pull (though this is not a natural gravity). If not actively maintained 
and cared for in their alternate texture, bonds of friendship revert back to the 
technospheric standard. 
As Part 2 explored, in our contemporary reality we are desubjectified as much as we are 
subjectified, in the interests of new forms of capitalism circulating around (and within) 
us.  The process described above, of making oneself vulnerable and porous and 414
opening out potential future self-hoods in entangled encounter with others, could be 
framed as an a-critical replication of processes of desubjectification, echoing the value 
 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59 (1992), 3-7.414
Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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now placed on teamwork, networking and collaboration. As previously argued, the 
centring on human-to-human, as opposed to individuated, relations is key in avoiding 
slipping into this. In maintaining an apart-ness while being within, we tread a finely 
balanced path: contestation of an assumed discrete autonomy is required, as is 
resistance to collapse into complicity within the hegemonic structure. This is 
exhausting, making a committed care for one another all the more vital. 
 
We need to move beyond a narrow single-axis similarity-difference understanding of 
the friendship relation.  However, without care, this expanding out of the complexity 415
of the relationship will not remove the risk of overlooking the deeply ingrained 
inequalities inscribed in material, cultural and social positions built though shared 
historical reality. Proximities (of all types, not just spatial) mean there are affinities for 
friendship between those who are similar. The risk in this is that rather than friendship 
becoming a counter-mesh of co-equality, it instead breaks down into un- or under- 
connected sub-networks reinforcing positions of inequality, with little intersection 
between these. Thus, while we do need to think of friendship as a co-entangled 
navigation through an aleatory durational set of encounters, we also need to 
acknowledge that we are situated with differing degrees of difference to one another, as 
read through technospheric subjectification, and these differences are material. Our 
positionality must be reflected upon. To ignore this is to claim the modernist-liberal 
tabula rasa which whitewashes past exploitations and their ongoing effects. Friendship 
needs to be cared for, and treated with care.
 Webb.415
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Ways of being: care
Care seems to offer a glimmer of a fidelity which might critically and resistantly 
destabilise the threshold. It sits beyond a concept of static hospitality (implicitly 
premised on inequality, property and power): the person who cares must be willing to 
be moved by the other, to take on ‘response-ability’.  This is a mutually fluid basis in 416
equality at odds with the proprietorial dominance of hospitality. Care must be 
performed with care: it is a self-reflexively contingent process, very different from 
either the rigid, abstract transcendentalism or exclusionary, implicitly sexual framing of 
love. There is an ongoing committed laborious materiality to care, whereas it is 
possible to ‘love’ without wishing to do the work of love.  A bodily-ness of care goes 417
beyond that of sexually framed love to incorporate the erotic, but also myriad other 
forms of embodied contact. While friendship is perhaps the closest of the related 
fidelities discussed, care might be distinguished from it by a greater capacity to move 
beyond falling into relations of proximity and similarity. Additionally, care better holds 
open the possibility of relations without an assumption of reciprocality based on a-
critically assumed equality of agency (which, in failing to consider structural 
inequalities, denies the possibility of many friendships).  418
 Aryn Martin, Natasha Myers and Ana Viseu, ‘The politics of care in technoscience’, Social 416
Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 625-641 (p. 635).
The concept of ’response-ability’ was notably developed by Barad. 
Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007).
 Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds 417
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), p. 5.
 (While I am differentiating care from love and friendship, relations framed in terms of love 418
and friendship can be, and often are, also relations of care.) 
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Care, in contrast to friendship, can also more easily be extended to the non-human.  419
And while this is not the focus of this project, it is clearly of urgency at a time of 
environmental and ecological crisis. I do not shy away from the human-centricity of the 
term ‘non-human’ though, precisely because, in this important extension of care 
beyond the human, it is nevertheless vital to hold onto care for the human, 
acknowledging the massive disparities of human vulnerability to the effects of 
immanent threats such as the climate crisis. Centring on the human also resists the 
capitalist conception of care for goods and property (or even of humans as property, as 
discussed below). 
Care cannot be thought in abstraction, outside the structures within which we think it. 
Before considering it as a basis for contesting the technosphere, it must be 
acknowledged that for many, care, particularly in its material bodily aspects, occurs 
within capitalism, serving as a contributor towards rigidly stratified social 
reproduction.  In The Undying, Anne Boyer describes the medicalised body within 420
pharma-capitalism as a key site at which multiple forms of care within capitalism 
intersect in unequal social stratification. Those materially providing for the basic needs 
of her ill body, and undertaking the discomfortingly invasive sustaining of it in its 
vulnerability, and also those who carefully and methodically extract, record and input 
 In this, care holds a similar capacity to Haraway’s concept of kinship. Haraway’s emphasis 419
on ‘kin’ (as a means of shifting away from connections premised exclusively on bio-genealogy) 
also aligns with a centring on care in preference to love (which, in Badiou’s conception at least, 
is restrictively premised on a reproductive hetero-normativity).    
Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016).
Badiou with Truong.
 Shannon Mattern, ‘Maintenance and Care’, Places Journal (2018) <https://placesjournal.org/420
article/maintenance-and-care/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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the data underpinning her treatment, are all disproportionately female and people of 
colour; in contrast to the doctors, who interpret and decide but do not actually touch.  421
Hegemonic structures can also appropriate care through romanticising it, in terms of 
repair, or ‘make do and mend’. Without criticality, these narratives can become 
complicit within austerity capitalism which appropriates a frugal human resilience in 
the interests of an extractive system.     422
Discourses of ‘positive discrimination’ and ‘diversity’ can on the surface appear to 
align with care’s emphasis on equality and connection beyond the similar or 
proximate. However, these invitations to a web of relations are framed as a means of 
better enabling integration into an established structure premised on the neoliberal 
individual. This is very different to a counter-network of care existing autonomously to 
the hegemonic structure.  
Exploitative, capitalist appropriation of care has a long history. Christina Sharpe sets 
out the interwoven productions of racist discourses and modern capitalism through 
and in horrific acts of dehumanising violence upon the black body.  Transatlantic 423
slavery coincided with a set of technologies of financialization and abstraction which 
have expanded exponentially since to produce our present context.  The Africans in 424
 Anne Boyer, The Undying: Pain, Vulnerability, Mortality, Medicine, Art, Time, Dreams, Data, 421
Exhaustion, Cancer, and Care (London: Allen Lane, 2019), pp. 61-62.
 Mattern.422
 Christina Sharpe, In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 423
2016).
 Ibid.424
Ramon Amaro, ‘Machine Learning, Black Labour and Bio-Epistemic Resistance’, presentation at 
After Work symposium, University of West London, 27 January 2018 <https://autonomy.work/
portfolio/work-life-labour-automation-conference-photos-recordings/> [Accessed 2 January 
2021].
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the hold on the middle passage were translated across a threshold into becoming 
financial instruments; whether as dehumanised labour, or beyond this into a distant, 
largely invisible, fixing point for financial speculation.  
Sharpe recounts the story of the slave transport ship the Zong, infamous for the 
murdering by throwing overboard of over one hundred humans in order to claim their 
‘insurance value’. The ship had previously been named the Zorgue, and operated out 
of Dutch-speaking Middelburg, with ‘zorgue’ meaning ‘care’ in Dutch.  That a slave 425
ship could be called ‘care’ underlines how, in this earlier sub-type of capitalism, a logic 
of profit and property operated upon a substrate of violence. In the terms of the 
hegemonic structure, the captain was acting with great care, only his care was for his 
profit and a return to investors. In a brutal foreshadowing of the way we are abstracted 
into textual forms within the technosphere, the Zong murders demonstrate an 
uncritical adherence to a logic that even other humans might be considered solely as 
property, potential extractable labour, and textualised financial value. In slavery, 
Rousseau’s argument that private property is the origin of inequality reaches its 
nadir.    426
 Sharpe, pp. 34-35, 45.425
This renaming, or slippage of name, succinctly reflects the remote, abstracted, textualised 
processes of capitalism of which it was part.
 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality’.426
We can think of transatlantic slavery as a highly specific and horrifically violent foreshadowing 
of the passivity and denial of agency discussed in Part 1, whereby the technosphere exploits our 
bare existence, our ‘being’. Slavery operated on an inverse of this, with ‘being’ annihilated into 
labour, and brutal systemic violence removing the capacity of resistance from the subject 
humans whom it sought to dehumanise.
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The legacy of the black Atlantic has continuing affect, which will be further discussed 
below. While we can recognise some aspects of the abstracting violence manifested in 
the Zong murders as now being a dispersed logic affecting a broader range of humans, 
it is especially important at the same time to again emphasise that exploitation and 
violence within the technosphere are not equally distributed, and compounded 
exploitations and exclusions continue through it, not least of black people and people 
of colour.  427
——
 Cameron Rowland’s 2020 exhibition 3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73 was focused on the violent 427
abstraction of black bodies within the entwined histories of transatlantic slavery and capitalism 
discussed here. 
Cameron Rowland, 3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73,  exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, 
London, 2020 <https://www.ica.art/exhibitions/cameron-rowland> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Rowland’s exhibition, as well as reflexively turning attention to the ICA’s own material 
entanglement with slavery (e.g. as manifested in its mahogany doors and handrails), also 
included an ‘officer monitor’: a device to enable the remote tracking and monitoring of 
individuals as an alternative to traditional incarceration. This brought the exhibition’s historical 
focus to direct consideration within the technospheric present. Black people and people of 
colour are disproportionately overrepresented in the prison populations of both the US and UK, 
and both systems incorporate significant private enterprise, including the operation of ‘for-
profit’ prisons.   
‘Criminal Justice Fact Sheet’, NAACP website (2020) <https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-
fact-sheet/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
‘Race’, Prison Reform Trust website <http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/WhatWeDo/
Projectsresearch/Race> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Clyde Haberman, ‘For Private Prisons, Detaining Immigrants Is Big Business’, New York Times, 1 
October 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigration-
detention.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Prison Reform Trust, Private Punishment: Who Profits? (London: Prison Reform Trust, 2005), 
available at <http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/portals/0/documents/
private%20punishment%20who%20profits.pdf> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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A pro-human care, contesting power, will mostly not emanate from power, since that 
would usually be illogical to the operating of that power within a proprietorial and 
acquisitive world.  This care must operate within a world it finds objectionable, and 428
thus has a resistance implicit within it.  There is a performed disconnection within a 429
pro-human care: in seeking a caring way of being, one frequently has to ironically not 
care about the individuating logics of the technospheric world around us.   430
What might an equitable re-finding of, reasserting of, the human within this counter-
logic of care look like? The co-equal human must be plural, must be relational, in 
acknowledgement of the notion of selfness being irremovably formed in a fluxing 
intermeshing with context, not least other human selves. The very notion of ‘human’ 
 Martin, Myers and Viseu, p. 628.428
 To continue the discussion of ‘self-care’ from Parts 1 and 2, we can consider self-care in its 429
capitalist forms as not operating within a world it finds objectionable, but instead (re)producing 
a subject better able to converge with that world. Self-care, as commonly presented on 
Instagram and similar platforms, considers the human as property (even if the owner might be 
the associated individual). This self-care is performed/re-presented in the capitalist care terms 
of repairing or maximising the efficiency and exploitability of this piece of property. 
As Hobart and Kneese note, contemporary self-care techniques enabling maintenance of 
productivity are a form of ‘New Age salve in a fresh iteration of the Weberian Protestant work 
ethic’. 
Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’, Social Text, 38:1 (2020), 1-16 (p. 4). 
Published in March 2020, the ‘Radical Care’ themed issue of Social Text, edited by Hobart and 
Kneese, was the first serious piece of scholarship I encountered specifically using the term 
‘radical care’, around which I myself was already thinking.
Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, eds., ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’ [special issue], Social Text, 38:1 (2020).
Hobart and Kneese’s definition of radical care as ‘a set of vital but underappreciated strategies 
for enduring precarious worlds’ does not articulate the radical in potentially instigating 
systemic change in the way I develop the term, and is thus more akin to a form of resilience 
within my lexicon.
Hobart and Kneese, p. 2.
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 78.430
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needs to be acknowledged as extended beyond a discrete bounding skin: stretched 
outward, and indeed inward, in messy interplays. In place of a textual code of 
property-inequality as our basis of relating, how can this co-equal human plurality 
move forward as a counter-way of being, of co-being, or perhaps inter-being?
A pro-human care centres upon the relation rather than the individual at either end, 
emphasising their bound up-ness within one another, and thus the need to continually 
reflect upon the bond as pivotal to a way of being rooted in equality.
——
The 2015 themed issue of Social Studies of Science responded to Maria Puig de la 
Bellacasa’s earlier paper in the same journal which advocated a shift from concern to 
care, to develop a discourse of ‘critical care’.  For care to be critical it needs to be 431
perpetually unsettled, in continual contestation with itself and the contexts within 
which it sits; it is a fluid, political thing. In so being, care functions as an active form of 
counter public as developed in Part 2. It opens itself up in continual dimensions of 
further countering, refusing to ossify. Michelle Murphy writes that there are at least 
four meanings to care: it is emotional attachment and fondness; it means to provide for, 
sustain, and look after; it is attention and concern, watchfulness and caution; and it is a 
 Ana Viseu and others, eds., ‘The Politics of Care in Technoscience’ [special issue], Social 431
Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015).
Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, ‘Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling neglected things’, 
Social Studies of Science, 41:1 (2011), 85-106.
Puig de Bellacasa describes technoscience as a ‘world’ in which socio-political processes and 
imaginaries are unavoidably bound up with scientific knowledge and material production. 
Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 17.
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troubled, worried, unsettledness.  A more condensed setting out of these multiple 432
aspects inherent within care is subsequently offered by Puig de la Bellacasa who 
identifies three principle dimensions within it.  There is material care as labour and 433
work, either for other humans in variably direct, proximate forms, or for some other 
object or process. There is care as affect and affection, in the forming and nurturing of 
the inter-human bonds between us. Often ephemeral, this aspect of care frequently falls 
outside of designated remunerated labour, though mirrors many of the skills which are 
elsewhere economically valued.  434
While these two dimensions to care align with writing on social reproduction, 
Bellacasa’s third aspect, ethical and political care, is an important extension beyond this 
within critical care.  A more abstract engagement with the injustice and inequality of 435
the world within which more material and affective forms of care are desperately 
needed, it is a slowing down and acknowledging of complexity and a refusal to 
presume, and it is a critical attention and concern for something (something which one 
may not be the principal affectee of). It is a troubled-ness with the current state of 
things; an ethics and politics of refusing to accept the stasis of the technosphere. 
 Michelle Murphy, ‘Unsettling care: Transnational itineraries of care in feminist health 432
practices’, Social Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 717-737 (p. 721).
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 5.433
Other overlapping articulations of the complexity of care include, from a design perspective, 
that proposed in The Lancaster Care Charter. Here, for an open-futured design approach, the 
authors advocate a simultaneous holding onto of ‘care of complexity’, ‘care of the project’ and 
‘care of relations’. 
Paul Rodgers and others, ‘The Lancaster Care Charter’, Design Issues, 35:1 (2019), 73-77.
 This irony within post-Fordism was discussed in Part 1.434
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 5.435
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There is a positionality to any discourse, which it is important to consider. For example, 
Murphy notes that some of the discourse of care emerging from feminism in the 1970s 
presumed and accepted a site of capitalism, whiteness and (post-)coloniality.  A vital 436
aspect of critical care, in avoiding a similar subsumption by broader existent 
hierarchies, is to be continually self-reflexive: to bring its acknowledgement of 
complexity and troubled-ness with the current state of things to itself. It needs to 
remain fluid, continually contesting itself. Care must be reclaimed, not from impurities, 
but from attempts to simplify it.437
 
——
In working with this multi-dimensional, self-reflexive concept of care, it is vital that the 
hierarchies of the technosphere are not allowed to develop within it. Care needs to be 
taken, for example, to avoid a valorising of the conceptual and discursive dimensions 
of multifaceted care as being in any way superior to, precedent to, or determining of 
the material aspects of care. To fall into this is to a-critically replicate the hierarchy of 
labour types in the technosphere as set out in Part 1.  
The Pirate Care conference, hosted by the Centre for Postdigital Cultures at Coventry 
University in June 2019, coalesced in a related way to this project, around care as 
resilient resistance to property. A number of presentations focused on piratically 
misusing the technosphere’s own infrastructures to enable pockets of equality within 
highly unequally structured systems such as pharma-capitalism or financialised 
 Murphy, p. 721.436
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 11.437
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intellectual property.   Others approached care from a political standpoint, addressing 438
sites of particular vulnerability.  Amidst these though, one speaker shared an example 439
of a collective model of nursery care developed where state provision was lacking.  I 440
draw attention to this to emphasise how mutually vital to one another Puig de la 
Bellacasa’s three dimensions of care are.  Thought through these dimensions, the 441
development of a collective, equitable nursery model can be a precursor to parents or 
guardians, sharing the labour of childcare, being enabled to consider contingent ethical 
and political complexities of care (including the lack of state-provided care producing 
the need for such a nursery in the first pace). At the same time, the politics implicit 
 John Willbanks, ‘Open Science, DIY Bio, and Cheap Data’, presentation at Pirate Care 438
conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://
pirate.care/pages/abstracts/> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Nick Titus, ‘I’m My Own Primary Care Provider: Taking Back Control with DIY Medicine in the 
21st Century’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry 
University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgMPGOw3Flg&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=18> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Gilbert Rodman, ‘Whose Culture? Our Culture!: Pirates as Cultural Care/Takers’, presentation 
at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDPP-detx5A&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=2> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Agustina Andreoletti, ‘Shadow Libraries: Using Art to Resist’, presentation at Pirate Care 
conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9J9CfTYHBk&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=5> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Taraneh Fazeli, ’Sick Time, Sleepy Time, Crip Time: Against Capitalism’s Temporal Bullying’, 439
presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 
June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckCkTszuXpk&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=17> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
Kirsten Forkert, Janna Graham and Victoria Mponda, ’Social Media and Refugee Solidarity 
Networks in the Face of State Failures’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for 
Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=IW-aGqfClIg&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=14> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Maddalena Fragnito, ‘Soprasotto, a Pirate Kindergarten’, presentation at Pirate Care 440
conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=n98GxL0OIms&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=11> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p.5.441
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within the nursery can be framed and practised with care at their centre owing in part 
to the reflexive consideration which the nursery has enabled. And furthermore, the 
collective nursery, almost like a site of (artistic) practice inseparable from its 
surrounding social, political and economic contexts, alongside being a practical 
enabler, might itself be precisely where those contingent ethical and political 
complexities of care can be most fruitfully developed.    442
To offer another example, The Black Panther Party’s ‘Free Breakfast for School 
Children’ programme can somewhat similarly be seen as a site where these different 
aspects of care mutually interrelated. The breakfast programme was materially much 
needed in the US at the time, with 12.6 million children living in households 
experiencing food poverty.  The programme thus provided vital immediate material 443
care in the meeting of a need perpetuated by structures the Panthers opposed (and this 
 Following this conference, Pirate Care has developed into an ongoing project centred around 442
an online syllabus. 
Pirate Care, Pirate Care [project website] (2020) <https://pirate.care> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
The project operates to share information and strategies between instances of specific piratical 
(e.g. anti-proprietorial) care practice, including those presented at the conference. 
The principal organisers of Pirate Care state that it is seeking to operate in the grey zones 
between institutions and on the fringes of legality, premised on solidarity (as opposed to 
generosity) in taking on risks placed upon others. They refuse a dichotomy between technology 
and care, actively making (mis)use of contemporary technologies. They state that the project is 
not one of moving outside law, but of undermining, shifting and disturbing the law where it is 
not premised on human well-being. 
Valeria Graziano, Marcell Mars and Tomislav Medak, ‘Pirate Care’, online presentation as part 
of Kunsthalle Wien X Pirate Care, 14 May 2020 <https://kunsthallewien.at/en/event/pirate-
care-ein-talk-mit-valeria-graziano-marcell-mars-and-tomislav-medak/> [Accessed 2 January 
2021].  
In many ways then, Pirate Care as a project operates as an example of radically caring practice as 
proposed by this research project, within an activist context.
 Nik Heynen, ‘Bending the Bars of Empire from Every Ghetto for Survival: The Black Panther 443
Party's Radical Antihunger Politics of Social Reproduction and Scale’, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 99:2 (2009), 406-422 (p. 419).
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food provision was therefore required of all chapters of the party). At the same time, 
the programme also acted as a vector disseminating the Panthers’ broader political 
project and granting it greater positive publicity.  Recognition of this significance of 444
the breakfast programme was made clear in an internal memo written by FBI Director J 
Edgar Hoover in 1969 which stated ‘The [programme] represents the best and most 
influential activity going for the [Black Panther Party] and, as such, is potentially the 
greatest threat to efforts by authorities to neutralize the [Black Panther Party] and 
destroy what it stands for’.  445
Beyond this dialectical relationship between overarching political aims and immediate 
material actions though, as with the nursery above, the breakfast programme enabled a 
vital reflexivity of care within the party’s internal structure. In prioritising the assertion 
of racial equality, many women in the party had accepted a degree of gender inequality 
in its workings.  However, the breakfast programme’s centring of material care 446
created a site at which greater gender equality could be fostered through the bodily 
practice of working hard alongside one another, in combination, crucially, with 
recognition of the vital importance of this as a vector in furthering the Black Panther 
 Ibid., p. 407.444
 Ruth Gebreyesus, ‘“One of the biggest, baddest things we did”: Black Panthers' free 445
breakfasts, 50 years on’, Guardian, 18 October 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2019/oct/17/black-panther-party-oakland-free-breakfast-50th-anniversary> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Heynen, p. 413.446
This occasional placing ‘on hold’ of gender equality by some black women parallels the 
aforementioned problematic presumptions of whiteness running through much feminist 
discourse at the time which Murphy observes.   
Murphy, p. 721.
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Party’s broader aims.  Asserting gender inequalities was incompatible with the 447
urgently needed material care of the busy and extremely effective breakfast kitchens. 
This looping together of the diverse aspects of critical care as they feed into one 
another is vital. Within the mix, all facets of care are equally key. This is a text though, 
and in and of itself falls toward the discursive. I have sought to acknowledge and 
discuss the more directly material aspects of care, and have attempted to carry some 
into textual form, as well as emphasising their absolute centrality within artistic 
interventions and within arttexts’ subsequent consideration. This text affirmatively 
states its co-equal consideration of all aspects of care, and recognises its author’s 
reliance and responsibilities in enmeshments of material and affective care, but is of 
itself principally discursive and theoretical. I do not apologise for this: while any 
construction of a hierarchy of elements within care needs to be contested, at the same 
time the discursive, theoretical site needs to be addressed, not least so that it is not 
subsumed by uncaring structures.   
Sharpe frames care as a project of thought, writing ‘thinking needs care […] and that 
thinking and care need to stay in the wake’ (of continual contextual reflexive 
consideration).  This includes writing about it; there is a need to acknowledge the 448
material affect of the act of writing, and a need to write carefully, caring-ly, about care. 
As her title In the Wake asserts, not to mention recent lived experience in Minneapolis, 
Tottenham and elsewhere, the past does not go away. It folds onto the present and 
 This was a gradual, complex and incomplete process. As Heynen notes, men frequently 447
received disproportionate credit, while women undertook the majority of the work.
Heynen, p. 412.
 Sharpe, p. 5.448
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informs the future, as the structure reproduces itself. There is a double meaning to 
‘wake’, both sides of which Sharpe elucidates: that of the wake of a ship, the ripples of 
the event moving ever further out from it in space and time; and the wake of a funeral, 
the time of grieving, of recognising that which has occurred and continues to do so.  449
Part of care as a project of thought is to hold these open, to refuse to close them down 
as resolved and to look only forward, but to recognise them and care about the ongoing 
affect, and ongoing grief. ‘Coming to terms with’, a borrowing from law into everyday 
speech, still entails a freezing out of the fluidity of the human into a contractual text: it 
is not the aim. 
Care can be extended adjectivally into ‘caring’, but equally important to critical care is 
that it can become ‘careful’. The words care and accurate have a related derivation.  450
More than etymologically interesting though, this highlights that the encoded 
presumptions of ‘accuracy’ within the technosphere might themselves need to be 
contested and have care brought back into them. As Puig de la Bellacasa writes, ‘a 
politics of care goes against the bifurcation of consciousness that would keep our 
knowledge untouched by anxiety and inaccurateness’: care entails thinking beyond a 
dialectical model whereby the textual, data-orientated, scientistic understanding of 
accuracy is held up against meaningless, irrelevant inaccuracy.  Instead, inaccuracy 451
and accuracy need to be recognised as a fluid, porous mesh, often ethically and 
politically charged. As a binary division between accuracy and inaccuracy needs 
breaking down, so a singular notion of accuracy also requires fragmenting. Sensuous 
and apparently irrational aspects of our human-ness need to be recognised as 
 Ibid.449
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics, p. 91.450
 Ibid., p. 93.451
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important in themselves, perhaps as means of moving beyond the strictures of 
computational thinking. 
Critical care, in its complexifying of accuracy, also helps to reassert a self-reflexive 
consideration of positionality. Puig de la Bellacasa’s arguing for a movement from 
‘matters of fact’, through ‘matters of concern’, to ‘matters of care’ is in the first shift a 
rejection of the stasis of the ossified fold and an asserting of affect, and then in the 
second, a centring on inequitably dispersed agency and vulnerability across a co-
humanity.  In recognising our positionality within this, what was presented as an 452
objective, neutral stasis becomes apparent as a contingently produced, ethically and 
politically charged, present. It is worth recalling Jean-François Lyotard’s thick surface 
of being and Edmund Husserl’s related idea of the moment which contains past and 
future within it here, both of which can help us envisage such a present.  There is far 453
greater complexity, contingently but nevertheless meaningfully formed and forming, 
than the flatness the technosphere presents. Critical care is a very useful framework in 
helping us navigate this.    
——
Joan C. Tronto and Berenice Fisher set out the foundational definition of care upon 
which critical care builds as being ‘everything that we do to maintain, continue and 
 Puig de la Bellacasa, ‘Matters of care in technoscience’, p. 87.452
 Lyotard.453
Husserl.
Both of these ways of conceptualising our present reality (in line with Puig de la Bellacasa’s 
progression from fact, through concern, to care) emphasise a fluidity and interrelatedness, but 
also, vitally, hold open a possibility of agency.
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repair “our world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’.  However, the digital 454
networks and automated systems and structures mediating and increasingly 
constituting our world (not to mention feeding back into our conceptions and 
materialisations of ‘self’) are moving ever faster. A way of being solely based on critical 
care may unfortunately find itself continuously left behind and addressing that which 
has been deemed to have been progressed beyond; accelerated past through new 
automated technologies operating both within proprietorial black boxes and at speeds 
beyond comprehension, self-justified and self-reproduced as the necessary condition of 
the technosphere. Critical care is crucial, but unto the discourse I want to contribute 
‘radical care’.
 Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York NY: 454
Routledge, 1993), p. 103.
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Radical care
Critical care offers a vital counter-logic to that of technospheric hegemony, producing 
material resilience which might at specific sites coalesce into instances of resistance. It 
does this with continual care for itself, avoiding ossifying into another rigid structure. 
However, in order to contest strategically at a systemic level, on the event-horizon of 
the present as it is occurring, something more speculative can be added to it, entering 
into the unknown spaces of the void without the ethical certainties of having carefully 
considered care at that specific event. As described, aspects of care are vulnerable to 
neoliberal subsumption, and the radical form of care can offer some protection against 
this in leaping away from the expected course, acting to shock and surprise the 
hegemonic structure.  Radical care cannot be based around any false assumption of 455
equality: it has to recognise the variabilities of position, and instead has to carry within 
its own make-up the construction of equality. It can only do so, as will be discussed, by 
being fully enmeshed with critical care. Far from being a departure or progression from 
critical care, it is a dimension of critical care which I seek to tease out, but which not only 
remains attached to it but in turn fully holds critical care within itself. 
Considering care as an ethics-methodology (of resistant, resilient practice-being), to 
broadly generalise: we might identify critical care as the facet which places slightly 
greater emphasis on ethics, while radical care opens more space for action. The 
 Spade gives a specific example of unpredictable surprise acting as a means of pulling care 455
away from hegemonic appropriation, in the context of disaster relief following the 2018 Puerto 
Rico hurricane. Mutual aid relief organisers used subterfuge, surprise and audacity to disrupt 
state inaction: falsely claiming permission to distribute stockpiled supplies from a government 
warehouse, and producing false documents to enable others to do likewise.  
Dean Spade, ‘Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival’, Social Text, 38:1 
(2020), 131-151 (p. 138).
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complexity in each of these slight prioritisations is formed through having the other 
also already fully there within. The ethical and methodological, and critical and radical, 
all ultimately coalesce in the political: a politics of care as a way of being beyond the 
perpetuating inequalities of the technosphere.    
There will be periodic moments where a paradoxically careless act needs to be flung 
forward as an immediate intervention into the public sphere. By necessity, this act will 
be unconsidered, carefree, careless. Only in so doing can it hold within itself a fragment 
of potential to rupture the perpetuating course of uncaring inequality into which it is 
directed. The fluxing, shifting network of power moves so swiftly to suppress or 
appropriate critique that radical, careless, anarchic potential underminings of it are 
vital. 
There is a profound care in the nurturing of the co-equal networks out of which this 
radical act is initiated. There is great care in the reflexive development of the lexis and 
praxis it proceeds as and from. But it itself is necessarily carelessly carefree and 
immediate. Radical care as a counter way of being operates in continual reflexive 
contestation of itself, but nevertheless coheres as a fidelity which can pass through the 
threshold of the present, acknowledging the present’s deeply flawed material and 
discursive realities, and offers a glimmer of a possibility of reopening diverse futures 
through a rejection of the primacy of property in thinking life, labour, object and 
subject.
The work of care stands in opposition to the violence of stating ‘I just don’t care’, and 
refusing connection to the human-ness of the other. All of the multiple aspects of 
critical care constitute the essential work of care which must be always already present 
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at the point of the radically caring unpredictable act. This enfolding of, and enfolding 
within, critical care is what holds radical care away from accelerationist positions. 
Whereas a (right) accelerationist view advocates speculative acts according to an 
individualist logic which willingly dehumanises, the speculative acts of radical care are 
founded conversely in an ethics centred in co-equal care for the human.  
The critical is not just a check or brake on the radical, restraining the act that looks to 
leap forward into the unknown. Without enfolding the critical within itself, radical care 
could become entirely negative: operating solely as attempts to subvert and disrupt the 
technosphere. In Althusser’s terminology though, these interventions would be less 
likely to ‘take hold’ as meaningful events without some affirmative, positive element: a 
narrative of another way of being, much more graspable than a purely negative 
critique.  That positive element is critical care. One manifestation of the critical-456
radical relationship is thus the radically caring act as a vessel to deliver critical care to a 
site of potential fracture within the apparently ossified totality of the technosphere. If 
we take the exposition of invisible labours of care as being a critique of the 
technosphere (through interrogation of the inequalities of forms of labour within it), 
this aligns with Puig de la Bellacasa’s view that ‘the point is not only to expose or 
reveal invisible labours of care, but also to generate care’.  We can go further than this 457
though: it is not only that we might go beyond critique with the proposing of a new 
 Althusser, p, 172.456
 Puig de la Bellacasa, ‘Matters of care in technoscience’, p. 94.457
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way being, but in radical care enfolding critical care, that the speculative throwing 
forward of new ways of being might itself be the most affective form of critique.  458
——
  
As Puig de la Bellacasa emphasises in Matters of Care, a caring approach to thinking-
writing entails both an acknowledgement of the multiplicities of authorship, present 
and historic, that go into any concept, and also an acknowledgement that any new 
contribution is not some teleological advancement, superseding and overwriting that 
which came before.  I have sought to emphasise radical care’s inseparability from 459
critical care, and in so doing acknowledge the lineage of careful authorships it emerges 
from, in addition to being more widely formed through the whole breadth of lines of 
research (themselves all building upon others’) within this project.   
Considering the disruptive affect of radical-critical care, I want to acknowledge a 
further lineage which is specifically relevant to the artistic intervention as a potential 
manifestation of the radically caring act: the historical avant garde. As Marc James 
Léger argues, avant garde art must draw on its previous selves as a way of holding 
onto enmeshed autonomy within its context.  In the shifting, dematerialised, post-460
truth cultural space of the technosphere, an artistic (or radical) engagement which does 
not critically reflect on its genealogy risks losing whatever tenuous positions of 
 Simultaneously, as Spade notes, new ways of being must themselves be held accountable to 458
ongoing radical critique in order that they do not themselves become exclusionary. 
Spade, p. 135.
 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics.459
 Léger, p. 28.460
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autonomy or critique might still remain. As we generate speculative forward-looking 
acts, if they are to resist hegemony, we can use this history of creative resistance as a 
navigation aid to better ascertain the potential fractures within the technosphere.  
Moreover, holding onto historical counter narratives outside of the present defends 
alternate ways of being, and resists the subsumption of their archive. In reflecting back 
upon a set of potential imaginings of diverse futures as themselves being of value, if 
mainly unrealised, the importance of imagining collective futures beyond the present 
threshold is affirmed. This valuing and sustaining of other ways of being, echoing the 
proactive reaching out to the other human in care, is essential in holding onto a 
complexity in the face of populist and fascist binaries, and techno- and econo-centric 
claims of indisputable faits accomplis. This is to say that there is no good way of being 
in the singular. The proposing of the radical continually comes from the outside which 
must always be kept open (through reflexive counter publics), thus serving to help 
prevent a centralised ossifying of care too closely related to power. An aspect of caring 
for care then, is this holding open of the space of the radical. This aligns with an ‘anti-
anti-art’ position, arguing against the absence or foreclosure of speculative, critical, 
creative acts that might disrupt the proceeding of the status quo.  In carefully looking 461
to the future, the radically caring artistic intervention acts to avoid alignment with any 
potentially hegemonic emergent vanguard. The radical act must take care: as the 
analysis of the relations of art within post-Fordism in Part 1 outlined, being in the 
vanguard or centre of either art or capitalism can swiftly, without care, become one and 
the same. 
 Ibid., pp. 15-20.461
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Husserl’s thick present is vital to radical care.  It enables us to think the radical at the 462
speculative leading edge, while still being fully connected to all the essential aspects of 
critical care in the present reality. Acknowledging the need for paradoxically careless 
acts, radical care must hold within itself a trust of intent and pre-forgiveness, which 
this complete mutuality with critical care enables of it. Care itself, like the act, needs to 
be already flung forward into the unknown, as a fidelity able to cross the threshold into 
uncertain futures.  Care must be trusted as being there in the future-present, it must 463
have already been inscribed, embodied. It must be a way of being out of which the 
intervention can be trusted to carelessly go, and within which the event might be 
carefully, caring-ly written. Almost all of the radical acts will be ineffective, and some 
will unfortunately be harmful. A caring acceptance of this reality must already be there 
though, only in so doing can we hold open the potential for the radically caring, 
careless act to affectively instigate possibilities of new ways of being. This might at 
times come with great difficulty, not least for the affectee of an unforeseen 
consequence. This is why the radical must always come with (critical) care, but some 
risk unfortunately remains. The alternative though, is submitting to the foreclosed 
static present of the technosphere in all its perpetuating inequality, exploitation and 
violence.  
 Husserl.462
 Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 232-237.463
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This project operates across a range of textual strata and shifts between these, 
occasionally pausing in the interstices or operating in multiple registers 
simultaneously. Sometimes this fluidity between different encounters with, and 
positionalities with regard to, texts falls in alignment. At other times there is tension. 
This shifting form has attempted to embody an enmeshment within (con)textualities, 
refusing the presumption of a singularly authoritative text.    
I have offered narratives: historical, speculative, theoretical, and, at times, personal. But 
the text has also, in the form and structure in which it has been presented and in its 
shifts of style, taken on a critical embodiment of that which it extra-textually addresses. 
This is reflective of the continuously circulating methodological trio of ‘iterative 
refracted practice, theorising and being’ translating onto the page. In addressing the 
rigid textual abstraction of the technosphere this has been essential: to hold the textual 
outcome within the process and vice versa, as much as possible in connection to the 
body, the human, the position, the contingency, the event, the ethics, and the politics.
Thus, the three principal contributions of this project are not discrete. Radical care as a 
way of being and ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’ as a method of practice 
have only become further entwined within one another. Each respectively places 
greater emphasis on de-individuated inter-relationality (in the case of radical care), or 
the would-be affective act (in the case of ‘embodied flattened allegorical montage’), 
though even this gentle teasing apart proves contestable once stated; connecting 
tendrils refuse the distinction. Both are premised on a continuous reflexive criticality 
towards totalising structures, acknowledgement of unavoidable positionality within 
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unequal systems, the contingent mattering of the present-reality, and the multiplicities 
of potentiality made possible by affect. As the concepts have developed, each has 
become integral to the other, while not collapsing into it. 
Radical care, as developed, enables a way to be within site and potentially act, affect or 
interrupt. This ‘being there’ is not predicated on individuated subject-hood: it contests 
a presumption of individuated being as resource. It allows one not to be paralysed by 
one’s own context. It does this through proffering a pro-human egalitarian position 
based in care in the immediate present, while connecting this to the possibility of 
radically shifting the stasis. Radical care is within the world, but can be a counter-way 
of being, holding an autonomy from abstracting structures of violence and exploitation. 
At the same time, it is a fidelity: an inclusive egalitarian inter-human mesh which 
might pass through the threshold to the future.  Prior to that though, the articulation 464
of these futures in the present acts to hold open a plurality of more caring potential 
collective being.
 As Part 3 explored, Badiou positions fidelities as interrelational operators preceding the 464
event, which while being subject to the possibility of change as they pass into the unknown 
void of the future, nevertheless hold a committed-ness into that future. 




‘Ana’ is a Greek prefix which, amongst other things, etymologically points to ‘again’ or 
‘throughout’. I use it for these associations: the arguments of this research project are 
rooted in an ongoing process of self-reflexivity and are positioned against rigidity and 
stasis.  To ‘conclude’ would be antithetical to this. Thus, this is not a conclusion but 465
an ‘ana-conclusion’. I refuse the premise of shifting from process to outcome: the 
invitation to fix, make concrete, pull together, and state conclusively. I refuse the supra-
human hegemony of the final, abstracted text, severed from its ongoing (human) 
relationships and authorships.  466
Having said that, this is a pause. A moment to take care: for myself, for others, and for 
the ideas developed through this project. A moment to share these research findings 
with a world in urgent need of radically caring ways of being. 
——
The research questions offered in the introduction, while fluid, have been addressed in 
their present states. 
 An additional etymological link is with ‘upon’. This recalls the need to take care to 465
acknowledge the contributions of the collectivity of others whose present or prior work 
supports any research. This moment of ana-concluding is enabled by all of their work, as well as 
my own.
 In line with this, I do not provide a neat summation of either radical care or ‘embodied 466
flattened allegorical montage’ here. Full explorations of each, in their complexity, can be found in 
Part 3 and Praxis respectively. (The third of the entwined original contributions, ‘iterative 
refracted practice theorising and being’, was elucidated in the Introduction.)
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In considering how the technosphere uses de-humanising abstraction to subsume labour, the 
body, the artist and the future, an abstracting of our ‘being’ into resource has been 
theorised; a de-humanising logic of indebtedness has been considered (perhaps 
masquerading as hospitality); the erasure of complexity through data-centricity has 
been shown; the foreclosing of futures through algorithmic speculation has been 
examined; and art and artists’ under-criticality towards their own subsumed 
complicity in the socio-economic processes by which the technosphere has emerged 
has been established.    
Approaching how technospheric abstraction manifests in differentiated inequalities at the 
pivotal sites of the collective political body and individuated human body, variabilities of 
agency and vulnerability have been shown to be key, with the exploitation of those in a 
position of relative vulnerability being obfuscated and bracketed out. The entwined, 
non-discrete interrelationship of material and discursive elements in the perpetuation 
of these inequalities has become clear, notably through the inverted public sphere; and 
the means by which power operates directly upon the body through both embodiment 
and disembodiment has been elucidated.     467
Reflexive consideration of a series of artistic interventions, by myself and others, has 
addressed how artistic use of (dis)embodiment might enable critical affect. I have proposed 
(with certain exceptions) an approach of disembodiment of the artwork in parallel with 
embodiment of the artist, as a means of critically addressing and contesting disparities 
 Specifically, identified processes of disembodiment include fragmenting the human into e.g. 467
linguistic-relational capability, material care provision, participation, etc. These fragments might 
then be massed as attention, financialised value, data, and so forth.
Embodiment occurs through data trails, surveillance and rigid emplacement. It also occurs 
through acts or conditions of physical violence.
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of agency and vulnerability at the sites of the collective political body and individuated 
human body. Part 2 formulated a viral approach to misuse of the technologies and 
logics of power, and Praxis located fissures between different realms within the 
technosphere where disruptive affect might be directed.      
Part 3 proffered a set of connected theoretical arguments by which we can imagine 
critical agency within a would-be totalising hegemony. This is centred on a Lucretian 
ontology wherein motion is primary, and through this, change and agency are held 
irremovably possible. 
And finally, in addressing what could constitute a way of being through which sustainable 
resistant equality might form, radical care is proposed, as an addition to the existent 
discourse of critical care.    
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Practice
Radical care is a methodology-ethics which can function as a means of practice, but not 
discretely from being. Practice cannot be separated from being: to argue otherwise is to 
deny both the positionality and subjectivity of the artist, as well as their materiality and 
human-ness. Radical care can function as a fidelity by which a proactive act of practice, 
art perhaps, can speculatively press out from the coherence of the present ‘practice of 
being’ to hold broader affect. It is a framework to work through which actively holds 
any practice in a continual process of ongoing mutual connectivity with being. 
To overlook being in the undertaking of this research project (essentially to bracket it 
out) would entail my rendering of my own being into a resource. I would be complicit 
in the same extractive, exploitative relationship to being as the hegemonic structures 
within the technosphere. As a porous entity in continuous interrelationship with the 
world around me, this has inevitably, to some extent, happened. Rather than 
undermining the upholding of being within the research though, this makes the messy, 
un-fully-achievable process of seeking to acknowledge it all the more vital.    
——
Where then do the arttexts discussed in Praxis (and those bound within Lexis, and those 
which will be created in future) sit in relation to this expanded milieu of radical care?  468
They are not enactments, expressions, articulations or representations of it, yet they are 
formed in relation to it. In an echo of Part 3’s Lucretian assertion of a primacy of 
 This question is not to under-acknowledge their contribution to the research process, but to 468
additionally reflect back on them as research manifestations from this altered perspective.
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contiguous motion while that motion is rendered visible only through an artificial 
semblance of discreteness, we can think of the arttexts as apparently discrete segments 
which now, having helped us recognise the continuity of radical care as a possible way 
of being, we can reconsider as being part of that continuity.  469
Practice is the means by which the continual reassertion and reproduction of radical 
care can be enabled.  The arttexts are no longer steps towards a realisation of radical 470
care, and nor should they be thought of as expressions ‘beyond’. They are contingently 
situated embodiments of a way of being inflected through radical care.  They are both 471
formed through it and form it, but are not expressions of it: they are integral to a way 
of being within it. As ‘art’, they are able to operate with a degree of potentially 
disruptive autonomy, and as ‘text’, to do so transgressively within the logics of the 
technosphere. This is practice’s strategic role: to continue and expand the sites of 
possible radical care within an uncaring world.    472
The artistic intervention aspires to function as a radically caring apparatus, bringing 
together the bodily, textual, and situational. As Giorgio Agamben writes, we are subject 
to an escalating, overlapping mesh of apparatuses, often now operating as much 
 This reflexive realisation was perhaps most clearly expressed in Scene B.469
 Alongside art-making, this practice might manifest in a wide range of potential means of 470
claiming or creating a site in the world. Activism, politics, writing, forms of radical sociality or 
communality are all possible examples.
 They may on occasion ‘fail’ in their relation to radical care, as discussed below.471
 To be clear, I am not instrumentally proposing a single function for practice. This is a role 472
practice could strategically fulfil, as part of an attempt to bring about a more radically caring 
world, according to the purposefully open framework established in this research project. 
Within this, specific forms or methods of practice are not pre-determined.   
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through desubjectification as subjectficiation.  The radically caring art apparatus 473
though, holds the potential to instigate the encounter which might, even if only briefly, 
produce the radically caring subject. Whether artist, participant, viewer or part of the 
encounter in some other way, this subject, even if only momentarily, can have agency 
and autonomy. They are a wholly different being from their individuated, 
technospheric shadow. 
 The caveat that must accompany all of this is that other integral aspect of human-ness: 
our messy fallibility. As Part 3 ended in emphasising, to hold open the space of the 
radical within care, this unknowable risk must be accepted. Radical care is a 
continuous process founded in its material existence in an ‘imperfect’ world, which is 
inclusive of ‘imperfect’ humans who are interrelated in their co-caring and co-cares. 
There is no such thing as ‘perfect’ radical care; to argue otherwise re-opens all the 
problems of a transcendental idealism. All of the arttexts, theorisations and arguments 
contributing to this project can be critiqued, and should be. They assert the need for 
speculative action operating into the unknown, but that very space becomes foreclosed 
and as static as the technosphere itself if radical care, in all its critique, care and 
forgiveness, is not already thrown across that threshold. And there, it must be 
addressed as much to the reflexive theorising and practicing of itself as to anything 
else. 
 Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella 473
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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Addendum: Covid-19
In the later stages of undertaking this research project, Covid-19 was declared a global 
pandemic and has had considerable impact upon life around the world. As I write, I 
like many am still in ‘lockdown’ and have only seen friends and family outside of my 
immediate household through a screen for several months.  It is too soon to say 474
anything about the pandemic, though a cacophony of more and less helpful 
information and opinion is being produced every day.  
At the same time, it is essential to say something about the pandemic, or to be more 
specific, to say something about the biopolitics around the pandemic, which relate 
considerably to this project. 
There has been a governmental scramble to respond, or to appear to be responding.  475
Much of this crisis response has been extremely badly managed, especially in the 
 It is worth noting that there is variability in what is termed ‘lockdown’. As will be discussed, 474
an individual’s life circumstances and socio-economic positionality has significant impact upon 
this. Differing political and historical contexts across states mean that what lockdown juridically 
constitutes can also vary greatly. Lockdown in the UK is relatively lenient compared to some 
other European countries.
 In the UK for example, a number of rapidly set-up, temporary ‘Nightingale’ hospitals were 475
publicised as being a strong, proactive response. However, to-date they remain a largely empty 
misallocation of resources.
Sarah Neville and others, ‘Nightingale hospitals largely empty as NHS weathers the storm’, 
Financial Times, 24 April 2020 <https://www.ft.com/content/
09897050-13bc-4ebe-99af-25b8d2ab5781> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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UK.   This is not the place for a detailed examination of this mismanagement, 476
however Covid-19 and the responses to it have brought long perpetuated structural 
inequalities and their related ideologies into stark visibility. Much of what the 
pandemic has brought wider attention to is in fact the well-established perpetuating 
basis of the technosphere. 
Covid-19 has made brutally apparent a neoliberal ideology of human life as something 
fungible, to be valued according to its labour productivity. Underpinning strategies 
such as ‘herd immunity’ and an emphasis on the importance of reinvigorating the 
economy even if it means deaths, pushing those with increased caring responsibilities 
back towards work, and an eagerness to end furloughing, has been an assumption that 
the human loses systemic worth if they are not fulfilling a role as an exploitable 
 The three articles below, which are critical of the UK government response, were widely 476
circulated on social media in April 2020. (The Reuters article is badly headlined. The headline 
seems to exonerate the Prime Minister, which is contrary to the argument the article in fact 
makes.) 
Stephen Grey and Andrew MacAskill, ‘Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about 
coronavirus - but they were slow to sound the alarm’, Reuters website (7 April 2020) <https://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci/special-report-johnson-
listened-to-his-scientists-about-coronavirus-but-they-were-slow-to-sound-the-alarm-
idUKKBN21P1X8> [Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
Jonathan Calvert, George Arbuthnott and Jonathan Leake, ‘Coronavirus: 38 days when Britain 
sleepwalked into disaster’, Sunday Times, 19 April 2020 <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
coronavirus-38-days-when-britain-sleepwalked-into-disaster-hq3b9tlgh> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]. 
Toby Helm, Emma Graham-Harrison and Robin McKie, ‘How did Britain get its coronavirus 
response so wrong?’, Guardian, 19 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
apr/18/how-did-britain-get-its-response-to-coronavirus-so-wrong> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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individual, or are at least enabling others to fulfil this role.  Furthermore, it is 477
presumed that the human must seek to find worth within this system and no other. If 
the pandemic has made anything clear it is this: that we are held within an increasingly 
rigid fold of subjectification through neoliberal economic productivity alone.
Within this equation of life as labour, the pandemic has also served to make a fissure 
starkly apparent. As Part 1 examined, virtuosic labour premised on linguistic-relational 
capability has come to be highly valued, while physical, material, bodily labour is 
devalorised. Covid-19 has brought about a situation where typically better 
remunerated linguistic-relational workers can perform their jobs in relative safety at 
home, while material workers must continue to expose themselves to the virus (and by 
 Though a strategy of ‘herd immunity’ was officially jettisoned, a logic akin to it arguably 477
continued to implicitly inform government decision making. 
Anthony Costello, ‘Despite what Matt Hancock says, the government's policy is still herd 
immunity’, Guardian, 3 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/
03/matt-hancock-government-policy-herd-immunity-community-surveillance-covid-19> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
On 10 May, Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a televised statement emphasising the need for 
the UK to ‘get back to work’. A shift from the previous instruction to only work outside one’s 
home if performing an ‘essential’ service, this new government line was that all should be 
working (ideally from home, but elsewhere if necessary). 
 
Angela Dewan and Nada Bashir, 'Boris Johnson calls on UK to go back to work in plan to ease 
lockdown’, CNN website (11 May 2020) <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/10/uk/uk-
coronavirus-lockdown-boris-johnson-gbr-intl/index.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]. 
The government released further details of Johnson’s announcement the following day. This, 
along with surrounding debate, made clear that in-home contact framed economically (such as 
a cleaner or nanny working within an employer’s residence) was now permitted, while ‘non-
economic’ domestic visits from non-co-resident family and friends remained prohibited. 
The Cabinet Office, ‘Our plan to rebuild: The UK Government’s COVID-19 recovery 
strategy’, .gov.uk [official UK government website] (12 May 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-
strategy/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
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extension, also expose those directly around themselves).  The perpetuating 478
inequalities of capitalism not only mean that discriminated against groups (women, 
people of colour, trans people, those without formal qualifications, immigrants, etc.) 
are over-represented in this latter category, but also that these groups of people are 
more likely to be living with existent health and social conditions that make them more 
vulnerable to Covid-19.      
The dark paradox, as Parts 1 and 2 examined, is that the supposed immateriality of the 
technosphere remains entirely dependent upon this material labour. Thus, while those 
on the privileged side of the labour-fissure endure the relatively mild inconvenience of 
having to work from home, they do so while entirely reliant upon the material workers 
going out to work.  Those in the positions of power to encourage, enforce and deny 479
alternatives to this, as well as framing the discourse, are themselves typically linguistic-
relational workers.  A profound inequality in embodiment and its enforcing, and in 480
agency and vulnerability, is brought to the surface. In the UK, a lack of criticality 
towards this structural inequality has been accompanied by a popular narrative of ‘care 
workers’ as heroes. Framing them as such, while not contesting their conditions of low 
 This is a false binary which many jobs blur. However, this does not negate the core point of 478
unequal social, familial and architectural vulnerability. 
Jason DeParle, ‘The Coronavirus Class Divide: Space and Privacy’, New York Times, 12 April 
2020 <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty-privacy.html> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Labelling these inconveniences ‘mild’ is only meant within subjectification through economic 479
productivity. This is not a belittling of the broader psycho-social effects of the pandemic and 
lockdown.
 Some of the discourse circulating on social media has even carried an implicit blaming of 480
material workers for coming into close contact as they travel to their place of work. For 
example, the video footage below was extensively retweeted.  
Sky News tweet, Twitter (13 May 2020) <https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/
1260465038881685505> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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pay and, in many cases, precarious work creates conditions for an implicit expectation 
of martyrdom. The virus is presented as an enemy with whom we are ‘at war’, all 
behind the ‘heroic’ ‘front-line’ workers. The reality is that these care workers conduct 
devalorised labour, and thus, in a neoliberal system which puts profit first, must 
repeatedly put themselves at risk with wholly inadequate protection. The fleeting 
heroic label attached to the care-home worker or bus driver is only loosely affixed: it 
implicitly applies primarily to NHS staff, and even there only really to doctors and 
nurses, who carry a professional (effectively linguistic-relational) status. After the 
pandemic, many care-home workers and bus drivers will have died, and the working 
conditions and remuneration of those who have not will in no meaningful way have 
improved.      
The pandemic has made the lumpen-reality unavoidably present to those who do not 
live within it, when the technosphere usually looks to obfuscate it. It is present in the 
cellular material vulnerability of our bodies. It is re-presented in weekly claps for those 
temporarily celebrated as heroes. And it has been made unavoidably present in our 
domestic lives as we cannot outsource childcare, cleaning, cooking and other daily 
tasks. 
At the same time, the pandemic raises questions about the core mechanisms by which 
humans are abstracted in the technosphere. Part 1 examined debt as a key means of 
subjectification. However, Covid-19 has seen the ‘unavoidable’, ‘necessary’ indebted 
logic of a decade of austerity almost instantly replaced with vast (though not 
necessarily well directed) government expenditure.  Structures which determine life, 481
 Heather Stewart, ‘“Whatever it takes”: chancellor announces £350bn aid for UK businesses’, 481
Guardian, 17 March 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/17/rishi-sunak-
pledges-350bn-to-tackle-coronavirus-impact> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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and which are presented as ‘natural’ and unchanging, are being shown in a new light 
as ideologically reproduced in the interests of power.         
——
Within this macroscopic coming to prominence of profoundly unequal labour-life-
vulnerability which Covid-19 has instigated, there are a number of more specific areas 
of significant relevance to this research project.
Our ambivalent relationship with Silicon Valley techno-capitalism has been 
foregrounded. Video calls and next-day Amazon deliveries were often unthinkingly 
enjoyed as entirely positive conveniences. In lockdown though, the exhaustion of a 
video-conferencing platform such as Zoom has become apparent when it is the only 
way to either work or socialise. Its data security and surveillance implications, as well 
as its vulnerability to hacking, have also received justified criticism.  And while the 482
majority might still not immediately give much thought to the other humans’ 
vulnerable working conditions which their Amazon or Deliveroo order might 
perpetuate, there may at least be a growing awareness of the vulnerable embodiment 
of a human at your door. For many, the convenient services offered by these and other 
platform capitalist companies have been invaluable in living as comfortable a life as 
possible through lockdown. The companies are more than happy to emphasise this 
line: Zoom’s share price has ballooned as it has become the default means of group 
communication, and it has hurriedly looked to shore up its technical defects and 
 Kari Paul, ‘“Zoom is malware”: why experts worry about the video conferencing platform’, 482
Guardian, 2 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/zoom-
technology-security-coronavirus-video-conferencing> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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vulnerabilities to secure this position.  Amazon is making unprecedented profits.  483 484
Deliveroo sent marketing emails at the start of the lockdown positioning itself as a key 
public service, detailing a new policy of ‘contact-free delivery’ whereby customers now 
no longer need to have any interaction at all with the delivery rider (who continues to 
be exploited as detailed in Part 2).  485
For platform capitalism, Covid-19 is an opportunity. It is presenting new territories of 
previously un- or under- commodified aspects of human life which can be colonised. 
Technology, data, and its analysis are being held up as a talismanic panacea by 
companies and the panicking governments who rush to seek their assistance. These are 
viewed as the solutions that will return us as quickly as possible to ’normal’ life, or 
even better, a new even more proprietorially profitable, productive and de-humanised 
form of it.  Care is largely absent in this profit-seeking rush. There is no care for the 486
workers, and there is no pause to carefully, caring-ly consider what the world and 
ways of being within it might be.         
 Rupert Neate, ‘Zoom booms as demand for video-conferencing tech grows’, Guardian, 31 483
March 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/mar/31/zoom-booms-as-
demand-for-video-conferencing-tech-grows-in-coronavirus-outbreak> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]. 
Kate O’Flaherty, ‘Zoom Security: Here’s What Zoom Is Doing To Make Its Service Safer’, Forbes 
website (10 April 2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/04/10/zoom-
security-heres-what-zoom-is-doing-to-make-its-service-safer/#3221d10930fc> [Accessed 2 
January 2021].
 Rupert Neate, ‘Amazon reaps $11,000-a-second coronavirus lockdown bonanza’, Guardian, 15 484
April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/15/amazon-lockdown-
bonanza-jeff-bezos-fortune-109bn-coronavirus> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Prad Nathan, ‘You can now get contact-free deliveries’, Deliveroo Foodscene [Deliveroo 485
operated blog/website] (15 March 2020) <https://foodscene.deliveroo.co.uk/restaurant-
profiles/introducing-contact-free-delivery.html>  [Accessed 2 January 2021].
 Casey Newton, ‘Why countries keep bowing to Apple and Google’s contact tracing app 486
requirements’, The Verge website (8 May 2020) <https://www.theverge.com/interface/
2020/5/8/21250744/apple-google-contact-tracing-england-germany-exposure-notification-
india-privacy> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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The state’s relation to the pandemic is complex and varied. It still largely holds the 
position of sovereign entity to which worried populations look for authority and 
guidance. At the same time though, a state such as the UK is utterly beholden to 
private interests (e.g. the technology, pharmaceutical and financial industries, to 
specify just three of the most immediate examples). Covid-19 makes clear how the 
neoliberal state is completely entwined with these interests, and yet, at the same time, 
how these companies still need to operate through the state for the most part in order 
to access the human en masse, outside of acts of individual consumerism. Cracks are 
emerging in the already archaic state-centric model though: within the turbulence of 
Covid-19, cities, hospitals, employers, communities and individuals have sought both 
information and material goods as independent actors in the world.  They do so out 487
of necessity as the inability of the state to offer what it claims is exposed, but also do so 
in an extremely precarious position as their own vulnerability and desperation become 
profitably exploitable abstractions, without even a fictive veneer of the social to soften 
an economic logic.     
There is little new in the post-truth fake news environment generated by the pandemic; 
this was an information-scape which was already well established. However, the global 
panic surrounding Covid-19 has both exacerbated and been exacerbated by it. As Part 2 
detailed, we now live with a largely inverted public sphere in which the notion of a 
truth or meaningfulness to any argument or piece of information has been superseded 
by a value premised on clicks, shares and visibility. ‘Authoritative’ voices operate on 
the same fluid plane as anarchic voices, critical voices, subversive voices, exploitative 
 Samanth Subramanian, ‘How the face mask became the world's most coveted commodity’, 487
Guardian, 28 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/28/face-masks-
coveted-commodity-coronavirus-pandemic> [Accessed 2 January 2021].
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voices, fascist voices and more. As many are finding, this can be a dislocating 
experience (and thus, many panickingly seek perceived authorities). However, if one 
very small, heavily caveated positive can be taken from the ongoing pandemic 
experience in relation to the themes of this research project, it might be this: that while 
this fluxing fluid plane is easy to lose oneself within, it is preferable to one under the 
total domination of inescapable technospheric power. It thus offers a glimmer of space 
into which radically caring ways of being might be proposed, enacted, explored and 
embodied.  
The great challenge is that while some structures within the technospheric fold might 
be crumbling, the abstracted, textualised, econocentric logics of the fold itself remain. 
Within this future-present though, radical care does, at least speculatively, provide a 
framework for more equitable, plural, generous, relational, subversive, speculative, 
anarchic, playful, resistant, resilient, reflexive and open ways of being.  
269
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliographic materials are sorted into the following categories: Books, chapters, papers 
and other ‘non-journalistic’ texts; Presentations and lectures; Artworks, exhibitions and 
projects; Journalistic texts; and Miscellaneous items.
This taxonomy is intended to present the material in the most useful way: neither 
cluttering the key literature with journalistic articles cited once by way of example, nor 
unhelpfully dispersing related texts by the same author into an excess of separate lists. 
Inevitably, there are a few instances where an item’s classification is not clear-cut.
270
Books, chapters, papers and other ‘non-journalistic’ texts
Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], trans. by Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002)
Agamben, Giorgio, State of Exception, trans. by Kevin Attell (Chicago IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005) 
——  What is an Apparatus?, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009)
Akama, Yoko, Penny Hagen and Desna Whaanga-Schollum, ‘Problematising Replicable Design 
to Practice Respectful Reciprocal and Relational Co-designing with Indigenous People’, 
Design and Culture, 11:1 (2019), 59-84
Althusser, Louis, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
[1971], trans. by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014)
——  Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-87, ed. by François Matheron and Oliver 
Corpet, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006)  
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition [1958], 2nd edn (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1998)
——  Love and Saint Augustine [1929], ed. by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark 
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
Badiou, Alain, Being and Event [1988], trans. by Oliver Feltham (New York, NY: Continuum, 
2005)
Badiou, Alain with Nicolas Truong, In Praise of Love [2009], trans. by Peter Bush (New York NY: 
The New Press, 2012)
Barad, Karen, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007)
Barthes, Roland, ‘The Death of the Author’ [1968], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 
(Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 142-148
——  ‘From Work to Text’ [1971], in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (Glasgow: 
Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 155-164  
271
Benjamin, Walter, ‘The Author as Producer’ [1934], in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 
2, Part 2 1931-34, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith, trans. by 
Rodney Livingstone and others (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 
768-782
——  The Origin of German Tragic Drama [1963], trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso, 2009)
——  ‘Unpacking My Library: A Talk About Book Collecting’ [1931], in Illuminations, ed. by 
Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 61-69 
Berardi, Franco, After the Future, ed. by Gary Genosko and Nicholas Thoburn (Oakland CA: AK 
Press, 2011)
—— The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. by Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina 
Mecchia (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2009)
Berry, Josephine, Art and (Bare) Life: A Biopolitical Enquiry (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2018)
Berry Slater, Josephine, ‘The Ghosts of Participation Past’, Mute, 3:4 (2012) <https://
www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/ghosts-participation-past> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
De Boever, Arne and others, eds., Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012)
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello, ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’, International Journal of Politics, 
Culture and Society, 18 (2005), 161-188
——  ‘The Work of Critique and Normative Change’ [2001], in Work, ed. by Friederike Sigler, 
Documents of Contemporary Art series (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2017), pp. 44-47
Bourriaud, Nicolas, Postproduction. Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World, trans. by 
Jeanine Herman (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2002)
Boyer, Anne, The Undying: Pain, Vulnerability, Mortality, Medicine, Art, Time, Dreams, Data, 
Exhaustion, Cancer, and Care (London: Allen Lane, 2019)
Bratton, Benjamin, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2015)
Bridle, James, New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future (London: Verso, 2018)
——   ‘#sxaesthetic’, booktwo [personal blog] (15 March 2012) <http://booktwo.org/notebook/
sxaesthetic/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
272
Bucher, Taina, ‘The Friendship Assemblage: Investigating Programmed Sociality on Facebook’, 
Television & New Media, 14:6 (2012), 479-493
Buchloh, Benjamin, ‘Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art’, 
Artforum, 21:1 (1982), 43-56
——   ‘From Faktura to Factography’, October, 30 (1984), 82-119 
Buchmann, Sabeth, ‘Under the Sign of Labour’, in Art After Conceptual Art, ed. by Alexander 
Alberro and Sabeth Buchmann (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 179-196
Butler, Judith, ‘Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street’, transversal texts (2011) <https://
transversal.at/transversal/1011/butler/en> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  Notes Toward a Theory of Performative Assembly (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015) 
The Cabinet Office, ‘Our plan to rebuild: The UK Government’s COVID-19 recovery 




Campbell, Timothy C., Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011)
Caygill, Howard, ‘Also Sprach Zapata: Philosophy and Resistance’, Radical Philosophy, 1:171 
(2012), 19-25 <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/also-sprach-zapata> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  ‘Walter Benjamin’s Concept of Allegory’, in The Cambridge Companion to Allegory, ed. by 
Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 
241-253  
Celis Bueno, Claudio, The Attention Economy: Labour, Time and Power in Cognitive Capitalism 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) 
Chandler, David, ‘A World Without Causation: Big Data and the Coming of Age of 
Posthumanism’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 43:3 (2015), 833-851  
von Clausewitz, Carl, One War [1832], ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992)
Contreras-Koterbay, Scott and Lukasz Mirocha, The New Aesthetic and Art: Constellations of the 
Postdigital (Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2016)
273
Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010)
Cooper, Melinda, Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era (Seattle WA: 
University of Washington Press, 2008)
Cowan, Bainard, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory’, New German Critique, 22 (1981), 
109-122
‘Criminal Justice Fact Sheet’, NAACP website (2020) <https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-
fact-sheet/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Debord, Guy, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle [1988], trans. by Malcolm Imrie (London: 
Verso, 1998) 
——  Society of the Spectacle [1967], trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York NY: Zone 
Books, 1994) 
Deleuze, Gilles, Foucault [1986], trans. by Seán Hand (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988) 
——  The Logic of Sense [1969], ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester (New York 
NY: Continuum, 2004)
——   ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59 (1992), 3-7
——   Spinoza: Practical Philosophy [1970], trans. by Robert Hurley (San Francisco CA: City Lights 
Books, 1988)
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [1975], trans. by Dana Polan 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
——  A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1980], trans. by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987)
Derrida, Jacques, ‘Hostipitality’, trans. by Barry Stocker, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical 
Humanities, 5:3 (2000), 3-18
——  Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London: Verso, 1997) 
——  ‘The Principle of Hospitality’, trans. by Ashley Thompson, Parallax, 11:1 (2005), 6-9
Deutsche, Rosalyn, ‘Art and Public Space: Questions of Democracy’, Social Text, 33 (1992), 34-53
274
Dietachmair, Philip and Pascal Gielen, eds., The Art of Civil Action: Political Space and Cultural 
Dissent (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2018)
Dowler, Lorraine and others, ‘Care’, in Keywords in Radical Geography: Antipode at 50, ed. by 
Antipode Editorial Collective (Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2019), pp. 35-29
Dufourmantelle, Anne and Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000) 
Easterling, Keller, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London: Verso, 2016)
Edelman, Elijah Adiv, ‘Beyond Resilience: Trans Coalitional Activism as Radical Self-Care’, 
Social Text, 38:1 (2020), 109-130  
Federici, Silvia, ‘On Affective Labour’, in Cognitive Capitalism, Education and Digital Labour ed. by 
Michael Peters and Ergin Bulut (New York NY: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 57-73
——  Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist Struggle (Oakland CA: PM 
Press, 2012) 
Finn, Ed, What Algorithms Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2017)
Fisher, Mark, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (London: Zero Books, 2009)
Foucault, Michel, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3 [1984], trans. by Robert 
Hurley (New York NY: Pantheon Books, 1986) 
——  The Courage of the Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the Collège de France 
1983-84, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave McMillan, 
2011)
——  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison [1975], trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin, 1991)
——  ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two’, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. by 
Paul Rabinow, trans. by Robert Hurley and others (New York NY: The New Press, 1994), 
pp. 199-205 
 
——  Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. by Michel 
Senellart, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2009)
——  Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, ed. by Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by David Macey (New York NY: Picador, 2003)
275
——  The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: I [1976], trans. by Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1998) 
Fraser, Nancy, ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’, New Left Review, 100 (2016), 99-117
——  ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’, Social Text, 25/26 (1990), 56-80
——  Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2008)
Fuchs, Christian, ‘Towards the Public Service Internet as Alternative to the Commercial 
Internet’, ORF Texte, 20 (2017), 43-50
Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man [1992] (London: Penguin, 2012)
Gielen, Pascal, ‘A Caravan of Freedom: Mobile Autonomy Beyond “Auto-Mobility”’, in Mobile 
Autonomy: Exercises in Artists’ Self-Organisation, ed. by Nico Dockx and Pascal Gielen 
(Amsterdam: Valiz, 2015), pp. 63-83
——  The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude: Global Art, Politics and Post-Fordism (Amsterdam: 
Valiz, 2009)
Graeber, David, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (New York NY: Melville House, 2011)
Groys, Boris, Art Power (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008)
——  In the Flow (London: Verso, 2016)
Guattari, Félix, ‘The Proliferation of Margins’, trans. by Richard Gardner and Sybil Walker, in 
Autonomia: Post-Political Politics, ed. by Sylvere Lotringer and Christian Marazzi (Los 
Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 108-111
——  The Three Ecologies [1989], trans. by Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Continuum, 
2008)
Habermas, Jurgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society [1962], trans. by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1992)
Haraway, Donna, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York NY: 
Routledge, 1991) 
——  Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2016)
276
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) 
——  Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (London: Penguin, 2004) 
Harney, Stefano and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study (New York 
NY: Minor Compositions, 2013)
Harvey, David, Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development 
(London: Verso, 2006)
Harvie, Jen, Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time [1953], trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1996)
——  Parmenides [1982], trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1992)
Hester, Helen, Xenofeminism (Cambridge: Polity, 2018)
Heynen, Nik, ‘Bending the Bars of Empire from Every Ghetto for Survival: The Black Panther 
Party's Radical Antihunger Politics of Social Reproduction and Scale’, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 99:2 (2009), 406-422
Hobart, Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani and Tamara Kneese, eds., ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’ [special issue], Social Text, 38:1 (2020)
Hobart, Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani and Tamara Kneese, ‘Radical Care: Survival 
Strategies for Uncertain Times’, Social Text, 38:1 (2020), 1-16
Holloway, John, ‘In the Beginning Was the Scream’, Common Sense, 11 (1991), 69-77
Husserl, Edmund, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. 
by John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991)
Jagoe, Rebecca and Sharon Kivland, eds., On Care (London: Ma Bibliothèque, 2020)
Jameson, Fredric, Allegory and Ideology (London: Verso, 2019)
——  ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. by Cary Nelson and 
Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 347-358 
——  Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991) 
277
Kearney, Ryan, ‘Can Film Assist in the Fight Against Gentrification?’, frieze website (1 October 
2020) <https://www.frieze.com/article/can-film-assist-fight-against-gentrification> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Kollectiv, Pil and Galia, ‘Archiving the Future: Unpacking Benjamin’s Collection’, Coelacanth, 1 
(2008), also available at Pil and Galia Kollectiv website <http://www.kollectiv.co.uk/
Benjamin%20Collecting.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Kunst, Bojana, Artist at Work: Proximity of Art and Capitalism (London: Zero Books, 2015) 
Kwon, Miwon, One Place After Another: Site Specific Art and Locational Identity (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 2004)
Lazzarato, Maurizio, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. 
by Joshua David Jordan (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2012)
——  ‘From Biopower to Biopolitics’, trans. by Ivan A. Ramirez, Pli: The Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy, 13 (2002), 99-113 
Lefebvre, Henri, The Production of Space, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991)
Léger, Marc James, Don’t Network: The Avant Garde After Networks (New York NY: Minor 
Compositions, 2018) 
Leonard, Sarah and Nancy Fraser, ‘Capitalism’s Crisis of Care’, Dissent, 63:4 (2016) <https://
www.dissentmagazine.org/article/nancy-fraser-interview-capitalism-crisis-of-care> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Lyon, David, ’Surveillance, Snowden and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique’, Big 
Data & Society, 1:2 (2014) <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/
10.1177/2053951714541861> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Lyotard, Jean-François, Libidinal Economy [1974], trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993) 
Martin, Aryn, Natasha Myers and Ana, Viseu, ‘The politics of care in technoscience’, Social 
Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 625-641  
Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [1857-61], trans. by Martin 
Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993)
Mason, Paul, PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future (London: Allen Lane, 2015)
278
Mattern, Shannon, ‘Maintenance and Care’, Places Journal (2018) <https://placesjournal.org/
article/maintenance-and-care/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
McGee, Micki, ‘Capitalism’s Care Problem: Some Traces, Fixes and Patches’, Social Text, 38:1 
(2020), 39-66 
Moore, Phoebe, ‘The Quantified Self: What Counts in the Neoliberal Workplace’, New Media & 
Society, 18:11 (2015), 2774-2792
Murphy, Michelle, ‘Unsettling care: Transnational itineraries of care in feminist health practices’, 
Social Studies of Science, 45:5 (2015), 717-737
Nail, Thomas, Lucretius I: An Ontology of Motion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018)
Nancy, Jean-Luc, ‘Of Being-in-Common’, trans. by James Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, ed. 
by Miami Theory Collective (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 
1-12
Nelson, Maggie, The Argonauts (New York NY: Melville House, 2016)
——  The Art of Cruelty: A Reckoning (New York NY: W. W. Norton, 2012)
Nestler, Gerald, ‘A-Symmetry - Algorithmic Finance and the Dark Side of the Efficient Market’, 
Technosphere Magazine website (2015) <https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/A-
Symmetry-Algorithmic-Finance-and-the-Dark-Side-of-the-Efficient-Market-
Ung2aMUKzh2Qk5eVRvT4W> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  ‘The Derivative Condition: A Present Inquiry into the History of Futures’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2016) <http://
research.gold.ac.uk/20534/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Pasquinelli, Matteo, ‘Italian Operaismo and the Information Machine’, Theory, Culture and 
Society, 32:3 (2015), 49-68
Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014)
Prison Reform Trust, Private Punishment: Who Profits? (London: Prison Reform Trust, 2005), 
available at <http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/portals/0/documents/
private%20punishment%20who%20profits.pdf> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Puig de la Bellacasa, Maria, ‘Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling neglected things’, 
Social Studies of Science, 41:1 (2011), 85-106
279
——  Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds (Minneapolis MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2017)
‘Race’, Prison Reform Trust website <http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/WhatWeDo/
Projectsresearch/Race> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Rodgers, Paul and others, ‘The Lancaster Care Charter’, Design Issues, 35:1 (2019), 73-77
Rolnik, Suely, ‘The Geopolitics of Pimping’, trans. by Brian Holmes, transversal texts (2006) 
<https://transversal.at/transversal/1106/rolnik/en> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Ross, Kristin, The Emergence of Social Space (London: Verso, 2007) 
——  ‘Making a Territory’, in The Zad and NoTAV: Territorial Struggles and the Making of a New 
Political Intelligence, by Mauvaise Troupe Collective and Kristin Ross (London: Verso, 
2018), also available at Mauvaise Troupe Collective website <https://mauvaisetroupe.org/
spip.php?article229> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, 
or, Second Discourse’ [1755], in Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. 
by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111-231
——  ‘The Social Contract’ [1762], in The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, ed. 
by Susan Dunn (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 149-254
Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922], trans. by 
George Schwabb (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005)
——  Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology [1970], trans. by 
Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity, 2008) 
Sharpe, Christina, In the Wake: On Blackness and Being (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 
2016)
Sholette, Gregory, Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture (London: Pluto 
Press, 2011)
——  Delirium and Resistance: Activist Art and the Crisis of Capitalism, ed. by Kim Charnley 
(London: Pluto Press, 2017)
Spade, Dean, ‘Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival’, Social Text, 
38:1 (2020), 131-151  
Spinoza, Baruch, ‘Ethics’ [1677], in Complete Works, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, trans. by Samuel 
Shirley (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 2002), pp. 213-382
280
Srnicek, Nick, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2016) 
Srnicek, Nick and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work 
(London: Verso, 2015)
Stakemeier, Kerstin and Marina Vishmidt, Reproducing Autonomy: Work, Money, Crisis and 
Contemporary Art (Berlin: Mute, 2016)
Sterling, Bruce, ‘An Essay on the New Aesthetic’, Wired website (4 February 2012) <https://
www.wired.com/2012/04/an-essay-on-the-new-aesthetic/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Steyerl, Hito, ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, e-flux journal, 10 (2009) <https://www.e-flux.com/
journal/10/61362/in-defense-of-the-poor-image/> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Stiegler, Bernard, ‘Care: Within the limits of capitalism economising means taking care’, trans. 
by Georges Collins, in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change Volume 1, ed. by 
Tom Cohen (Ann Arbor MI: Open Humanities Press, 2012) <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/
o/ohp/10539563.0001.001/1:6/--telemorphosis-theory-in-the-era-of-climate-change-
vol-1?rgn=div1;view=fulltext> [Accessed 2 January 2021]  
Stiegler, Bernard and Irit Rogoff, ‘Transindividuation’, e-flux journal, 14 (2010) <https://www.e-
flux.com/journal/14/61314/transindividuation/> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Teikmanis, Andris, ‘Typologies of Research’, in SHARE Handbook for Artistic Research Education, 
ed. by Mick Wilson and Schelte van Ruiten (Amsterdam: ELIA, 2013), pp. 162-169 
Toscano, Alberto, ‘Gaming the Plumbing: High-Frequency Trading and the Spaces of Capital’, 
Mute, 3:4 (2013) <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/gaming-plumbing-high-
frequency-trading-and-spaces-capital> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Tronti, Mario, ‘The Strategy of Refusal’ [1965], trans. by Red Notes, in Autonomia: Post-Political 
Politics, ed. by Sylvere Lotringer and Christian Marazzi (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 
2007), pp. 28-35 
——  Workers and Capital [1966], trans. by David Broder (London: Verso, 2019)
Tronto, Joan C., Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York NY: 
Routledge, 1993)
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015)
Vidokle, Anton and others, eds., The Internet Does Not Exist (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2015) 
281
Virno, Paolo, A Grammar of the Multitude: For An Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. by 
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 
2004)
Viseu, Ana and others, eds., ‘The Politics of Care in Technoscience’ [special issue], Social Studies 
of Science, 45:5 (2015)
Vishmidt, Marina, ‘Bodies in space: On the ends of vulnerability’, Radical Philosophy, 2:8 (2020), 
33-46 <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/bodies-in-space> [Accessed 2 
January 2021]
Webb, David, ‘On Friendship: Derrida, Foucault and the Practice of Becoming’ Research in 
Phenomenology, 33 (2003), 119-140
Williams, Alex and Nick Srnicek, ‘#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics’, 
Critical Legal Thinking website (14 May 2013) <http://criticallegalthinking.com/
2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
Zuboff, Shoshana, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New 
Frontier of Power (New York NY: PublicAffairs, 2019)
282
Presentations and lectures
Abse Gogarty, Larne, ‘Coherence and Complicity: On the Wholeness of Post-Internet 
Aesthetics’, presentation at Propositions #4: Unpacking Aesthetics and the Far Right 
conference, BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 17 March 2018 <https://vimeo.com/
266048660> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Amaro, Ramon, ‘Machine Learning, Black Labour and Bio-Epistemic Resistance’, presentation 
at After Work symposium, University of West London, 27 January 2018 <https://
autonomy.work/portfolio/work-life-labour-automation-conference-photos-recordings/> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Andreoletti, Agustina, ‘Shadow Libraries: Using Art to Resist’, presentation at Pirate Care 
conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9J9CfTYHBk&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=5> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Fazeli, Taraneh, ’Sick Time, Sleepy Time, Crip Time: Against Capitalism’s Temporal Bullying’, 
presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 
20 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckCkTszuXpk&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=17> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Forkert, Kirsten, Janna Graham and Victoria Mponda, ’Social Media and Refugee Solidarity 
Networks in the Face of State Failures’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for 
Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IW-aGqfClIg&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=14> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Fragnito, Maddalena, ‘Soprasotto, a Pirate Kindergarten’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, 
Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=n98GxL0OIms&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=11> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Graziano, Valeria, Marcell Mars and Tomislav Medak, ‘Pirate Care’, online presentation as part 
of Kunsthalle Wien X Pirate Care, 14 May 2020 <https://kunsthallewien.at/en/event/
pirate-care-ein-talk-mit-valeria-graziano-marcell-mars-and-tomislav-medak/> [Accessed 
2 January 2021] 
Hester, Helen, After Work: What’s left and Who Cares?, presentation at Goldsmiths College, 
University of London, 22 February 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ynnGV3RHy2c> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
283
Rodman, Gilbert, ‘Whose Culture? Our Culture!: Pirates as Cultural Care/Takers’, presentation 
at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 20 June 2019 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDPP-detx5A&list=PLX-
N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=2> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Srnicek, Nick, ‘Navigating Neoliberalism: Political Aesthetics After the Crisis’ presentation at 
The Matter of Contradiction, Treignac, France, 1-7 September 2012 <https://vimeo.com/
52434614> [Accessed 2 January 2021]  
Titus, Nick, ‘I’m My Own Primary Care Provider: Taking Back Control with DIY Medicine in 
the 21st Century’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, Centre for Postdigital Cultures, 
Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VgMPGOw3Flg&list=PLX-N8krB2JMcVktrreeqLJAKTYqNoiSnO&index=18> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Vishmidt, Marina, ‘Figure Eight is Half of 4’, presentation at After Work symposium, University 
of West London, 27 January 2018 <https://autonomy.work/portfolio/work-life-labour-
automation-conference-photos-recordings/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Willbanks, John, ‘Open Science, DIY Bio, and Cheap Data’, presentation at Pirate Care conference, 
Centre for Postdigital Cultures, Coventry University, 19 June 2019 <https://pirate.care/
pages/abstracts/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Woodly, Deva, ‘The Politics of Care’, online presentation as part of In The Current Moment: 
Perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities, The New School, 18 June 2020 <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih6F6N9pg-A> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
284
Artworks, exhibitions and projects
Asher, Michael, untitled artwork for The Museum as Site, exhibition at Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art, 1981
Blas, Zach, Contra-Internet, exhibition at Gasworks, London, 2017 <https://
www.gasworks.org.uk/exhibitions/zach-blas-contra-internet-2017-09-28/> [Accessed 2 
January 2021] 
Farocki, Harun, Arbeiter Verlassen di Fabrik [Workers Leaving the Factory] (1995) <https://
vimeo.com/59338090> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Forensic Architecture, Counter Investigations, exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, 
London, 2018 <https://www.ica.art/exhibitions/forensic-architecture-counter-
investigations> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Forensic Oceanography [part of Forensic Architecture], Death By Rescue [project website] (2016) 
<https://deathbyrescue.org> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Gray Cube: Art on Corruption, exhibition at Visual Culture Research Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2017 
<http://vcrc.org.ua/en/сірий-куб-виставка-про-корупцію/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Ivekovic, Sanja, Trokut [Triangle] (1979), documentation available at <https://
www.museoreinasofia.es/en/collection/artwork/trokut-triangle> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
Pirate Care, Pirate Care [project website] (2020) <https://pirate.care> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Quinlan, Hannah and Rosie Hastings, In My Room, exhibition at Focal Point Gallery, Southend-
on-Sea, 2020 <http://www.fpg.org.uk/exhibition/rosie-hastings-and-hannah-quinlan/> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Rainer, Yvonne, No Manifesto (1965), text available at <https://www.moma.org/learn/
moma_learning/yvonne-rainer-trio-a-1978/> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Rowland, Cameron, 3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73,  exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, 
London, 2020 <https://www.ica.art/exhibitions/cameron-rowland> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
Scourti, Erica, ‘Empathy Deck’, Twitter [artwork / bot] (2016-2018) <https://twitter.com/
empathydeck?lang=en> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
285
Steyerl, Hito, How Not to be Seen: A Fucking Didactic Educational .MOV File (2013), available at 
<https://www.artforum.com/video/hito-steyerl-how-not-to-be-seen-a-fucking-didactic-
educational-mov-file-2013-51651> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  The Tower (2015-16), documentation available at <https://www.kow-berlin.com/artists/
hito-steyerl/the-tower-2015-2016> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Technosphere Magazine [website/research project initiated by Haus der Kulturen der Welt] 
(2015-19) <https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Walker, Adam, 6 Weeks in Kyiv (2018), documentation available at <http://
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/6weeksinkyiv.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  Negatory Manifesto (2016) <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/negatorymanifesto.htm> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  The Return Beyond Which There Is No Point (2017-18), documentation available at <http://
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/thereturn.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
——  Sequestered (2018), documentation available at <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/
sequestered.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Walker, Adam and Emma McGarry, Special Rights (2018), documentation available at <http://
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/specialrights.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Walker, Adam and Vicki Thornton, STATESCAPE∞ (2020), documentation available at <http://
www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/statescape.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
——  TOMBOLA! (2017-18), documentation available at <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/
tombola.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
——  undertitled (2019), composite video available at <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/
undertitled.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Walker, Adam with others, Our Skins are Porous Too (2019) <http://www.adamjbwalker.co.uk/
ourskins.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
286
Journalistic texts
Barr, Sabrina, ‘UK Weather: Deliveroo Faces Criticism Over Driver Safety In Heavy Snow’, 
Independent, 2 March 2018 <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/food-and-drink/
deliveroo-driver-safety-uk-weather-snow-criticism-extra-charge-delivery-a8236966.html> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Batty, David, ‘Conditions for Abu Dhabi's migrant workers “shame the west”’, Guardian, 22 
December 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/22/abu-dhabi-
migrant-workers-conditions-shame-west> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Butler, Sarah, ‘How Deliveroo's “dark kitchens” are catering from car parks’, Guardian, 28 
October 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/oct/28/deliveroo-dark-
kitchens-pop-up-feeding-the-city-london> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Calvert, Jonathan, George Arbuthnott and Jonathan Leake, ‘Coronavirus: 38 days when Britain 
sleepwalked into disaster’, Sunday Times, 19 April 2020 <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/
article/coronavirus-38-days-when-britain-sleepwalked-into-disaster-hq3b9tlgh> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021] 
‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, Guardian website (2018-) <https://www.theguardian.com/
news/series/cambridge-analytica-files> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Costello, Anthony, ‘Despite what Matt Hancock says, the government's policy is still herd 
immunity’, Guardian, 3 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2020/apr/03/matt-hancock-government-policy-herd-immunity-community-surveillance-
covid-19> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
DeParle, Jason, ‘The Coronavirus Class Divide: Space and Privacy’, New York Times, 12 April 
2020 <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty-
privacy.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Dewan, Angela and Nada Bashir, 'Boris Johnson calls on UK to go back to work in plan to ease 
lockdown’, CNN website (11 May 2020) <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/10/uk/uk-
coronavirus-lockdown-boris-johnson-gbr-intl/index.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
‘European Commission Antitrust: Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive practices 
in online advertising’, European Commission website (20 March 2019) <https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Foo, Yun Chi, ‘Facebook in EU antitrust crosshairs over data collection’, Reuters website (2 
December 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-facebook-antitrust/facebook-
in-eu-antitrust-crosshairs-over-data-collection-idUSKBN1Y625J> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
287
Gabbatt, Adam, ‘Is Silicon Valley's quest for immortality a fate worse than death?’, Guardian, 23 
February 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/22/silicon-valley-
immortality-blood-infusion-gene-therapy> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Geary, Aoife, ‘A Day in the Life of Deliveroo Rider Sean O’Farrell Power’, blog run by Jobbio 
[employment platform] (20 February 2017) <https://blog.jobbio.com/2017/02/20/day-
life-deliveroo-rider-sean-ofarrell-power/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Gebreyesus, Ruth, ‘“One of the biggest, baddest things we did”: Black Panthers' free breakfasts, 
50 years on’, Guardian, 18 October 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/
oct/17/black-panther-party-oakland-free-breakfast-50th-anniversary> [Accessed 2 
January 2021] 
Greenwald, Glenn and others, ‘Microsoft handed the NSA access to encrypted messages’, 
Guardian, 12 July 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-
nsa-collaboration-user-data> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Grey, Stephen and Andrew MacAskill, ‘Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about 
coronavirus - but they were slow to sound the alarm’, Reuters website (7 April 2020) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci/special-report-
johnson-listened-to-his-scientists-about-coronavirus-but-they-were-slow-to-sound-the-
alarm-idUKKBN21P1X8> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Haberman, Clyde, ‘For Private Prisons, Detaining Immigrants Is Big Business’, New York Times, 
1 October 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigration-
detention.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Haque, Zubaida, ‘How the gig economy is widening racial inequality’, New Statesman, 8 
February 2018 <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2018/02/how-gig-
economy-widening-racial-inequality> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Helm, Toby, Emma Graham-Harrison and Robin McKie, ‘How did Britain get its coronavirus 
response so wrong?’, Guardian, 19 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/apr/18/how-did-britain-get-its-response-to-coronavirus-so-wrong> [Accessed 2 
January 2021]
Hopkins, Nick and Simon Bowers, ‘Apple secretly moved parts of empire to Jersey after row 
over tax affairs’, Guardian, 6 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/
2017/nov/06/apple-secretly-moved-jersey-ireland-tax-row-paradise-papers> [Accessed 2 
January 2021] 
 ‘Khorgos: the biggest dry port in the world: A visual explainer’, South China Morning Post 
website <https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/
khorgos.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
288
Laughland, Oliver, ‘How the CIA tortured its detainees’, Guardian, 20 May 2015 <https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/cia-torture-methods-waterboarding-
sleep-deprivation> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Lenin, Vladimir, ‘The Dual Power’, Pravda, 9 April 1917, trans. by Isaacs Bernard, available at 
Marxists Internet Archive <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/
09.htm> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Morin, Richard, ‘Indentured Servitude in the Persian Gulf’, New York Times, 12 April 2013 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/sunday-review/indentured-servitude-in-the-
persian-gulf.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Nathan, Prad, ‘You can now get contact-free deliveries’, Deliveroo Foodscene [Deliveroo operated 
blog/website] (15 March 2020) <https://foodscene.deliveroo.co.uk/restaurant-profiles/
introducing-contact-free-delivery.html>  [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Neate, Rupert, ‘Amazon reaps $11,000-a-second coronavirus lockdown bonanza’, Guardian, 15 
April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/15/amazon-
lockdown-bonanza-jeff-bezos-fortune-109bn-coronavirus> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
——  ‘Zoom booms as demand for video-conferencing tech grows’, Guardian, 31 March 2020 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/mar/31/zoom-booms-as-demand-
for-video-conferencing-tech-grows-in-coronavirus-outbreak> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Neville, Sarah and others, ‘Nightingale hospitals largely empty as NHS weathers the storm’, 
Financial Times, 24 April 2020 <https://www.ft.com/content/
09897050-13bc-4ebe-99af-25b8d2ab5781> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Newcomer, Eric and Olivia Zaleski, ‘When Their Shifts End, Uber Drivers Set Up Camp in 
Parking Lots Across the U.S.’ Bloomberg website (23 January 2017) <https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/when-their-shifts-end-uber-drivers-set-
up-camp-in-parking-lots-across-the-u-s> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Newton, Casey, ‘Why countries keep bowing to Apple and Google’s contact tracing app 
requirements’, The Verge website (8 May 2020) <https://www.theverge.com/interface/
2020/5/8/21250744/apple-google-contact-tracing-england-germany-exposure-
notification-india-privacy> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
O’Connell, Mark, ‘Why Silicon Valley Billionaires are Prepping for the Apocalypse in New 
Zealand’, Guardian, 15 February 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/
15/why-silicon-valley-billionaires-are-prepping-for-the-apocalypse-in-new-zealand> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021] 
289
O’Flaherty, Kate, ‘Zoom Security: Here’s What Zoom Is Doing To Make Its Service Safer’, Forbes 
website (10 April 2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/04/10/
zoom-security-heres-what-zoom-is-doing-to-make-its-service-safer/#3221d10930fc> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Paul, Kari, ‘“Zoom is malware”: why experts worry about the video conferencing platform’, 
Guardian, 2 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/zoom-
technology-security-coronavirus-video-conferencing> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Reid, Carlton, ‘Confessions of a Deliveroo rider: get fit by delivering fast food’, Bike blog on 
Guardian website (8 January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/bike-
blog/2018/jan/08/confessions-of-a-deliveroo-rider-get-fit-by-delivering-fast-food> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Reuters with CNBC.com, ‘Saudis set $500 billion plan to develop zone linked with Jordan and 
Egypt’, CNBC website (24 October 2017)  <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/24/
saudis-500-billion-plan-to-neom-business-city.html> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Shead, Sam, ‘The Deliveroo strike is over as the company abandons plans to force couriers into 
signing new contracts’, Business Insider website (17 August 2016) <https://
www.businessinsider.com/the-deliveroo-strike-is-over-as-the-company-abandons-plans-
to-force-couriers-into-signing-new-contracts-2016-8?r=USandIR=T> [Accessed 2 January 
2021]
Slobodian, Quinn, ‘How the libertarian right plans to profit from the pandemic’, Guardian, 1 
June 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/01/coronavirus-
libertarian-right-profit-coronavirus-pandemic?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other> [Accessed 2 
January 2021]
Soper, Spencer, ‘Amazon Drivers Are Hanging Smartphones in Trees to Get More Work’, 
Bloomberg website (1 September 2020) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-09-01/amazon-drivers-are-hanging-smartphones-in-trees-to-get-more-work> 
[Accessed 2 January 2021]
Stewart, Heather, ‘“Whatever it takes”: chancellor announces £350bn aid for UK businesses’, 
Guardian, 17 March 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/17/rishi-
sunak-pledges-350bn-to-tackle-coronavirus-impact> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Subramanian, Samanth, ‘How the face mask became the world's most coveted commodity’, 
Guardian, 28 April 2020 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/28/face-
masks-coveted-commodity-coronavirus-pandemic> [Accessed 2 January 2021] 
Topham, Gwyn, ‘Uber drivers waiting in villages near Heathrow cause “huge distress”’, 
Guardian, 11 May 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/11/uber-
drivers-villages-heathrow-huge-distress> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
290
Zhou, Naaman, ‘Accidents, stress and uncertainty: food delivery riders lift lid on work 
conditions’, Guardian, 30 April 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/
may/01/accidents-stress-and-uncertainty-food-delivery-riders-lift-lid-on-work-
conditions> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
291
Miscellaneous items
Adept Business Solutions, Camplus - Camp Management Software <http://adeptsol.com/
products/camp-management-software-dubai-sharjah-abudhabi-soudi-bahrain-middle-
east-qatar-kuwait-ksa-oman-uae/> [Accessed 2 January 2021]
Republic of Estonia, E-Residency application website <https://e-resident.gov.ee> [Accessed 2 
January 2021]
Sky News tweet, Twitter (13 May 2020) <https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/
1260465038881685505> [Accessed 2 January 2021]  
292
APPENDIX: ETHICS APPROVAL
  
293
